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Several years ago, the writer, then employed as a 
planning engineer by a large natural~gas transmission and 
distribution company, became aware of the possibility that 
the regulated public utility might rationally make invest­
ments that do not minimize costs^ This possibility has its 
origin in the fact, peculiar to regulated firms, that cost 
minimization need not maximize the wealth of the owners of 
the firme Accordingly, the regulated firm— given the manner 
of regulation which has become institutionalized by 
American public utility regulatory bodies--may logically 
choose some mix of operating and capital costs that does 
not result in minimal total costs to produce required out­
put, The writer has observed utility operating personnel 
who demonstrated various degrees of awareness of this possi­
bility by the observation, "So the investment doesn't save 
money — it still goes into rate base, " The writer is aware 
of no overt nor general disregard for capital expenditures 
that results in the firm being calculatedly more capital 
intensive than is "socially desirable," Yet some discern­
ing people, who were within the observation of the writer, 
knew that even for minimum-cost conditions, a dollar
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expended for plant and equipment was more valuable to the 
owners than a dollar expended for operations and mainte­
nance* This knowledge, or "intuition," had a way of ob­
liquely influencing the solutions of capital-budgeting 
problems without ever being marshalled into some tractable 
form--even in theory*
This study is addressed to the problem of determining 
how, in theory, the regulated firm may rationally make its 
capital-budgeting (or asset-acquisition) decisions» If the 
regulated firm's return— and profit--is a function of in­
vestment in plant and equipment, then it is plausible to 
argue that the firm might well use more capital under regu­
lation than it would if not subject to regulation, assuming 
that, output in both cases is the same* If this is true, then 
what are the constraints that hold in check this propensity 
for greater use of capital? In this study, it is argued that 
the constraints ares (1) The demand function facing the 
firm and (2) the production function which describes how the 
firm transforms its inputs into output*
The possibility that the regulated firm might be more 
capital intensive than minimum-cost conditions require has 
been raised by several observers in recent years* Averch 
and Johnson stated that the regulated firm can be expected 
to use more capital than the unregulated firm would use for 
the same output,^ Moreover, Averch and Johnson argued that
^Harvey Averch and Leland M* Johnson, "Behavior of
the regulated firm would treat its cost of capital for in­
vestment in plant as though it were cheaper than its exterior 
price, by the amount of the rate of pure profit of the firm. 
Wellicz argued that regulation would lead to inefficient al­
location of resources in his study of peak-load pricing for 
natural-gas pipeline companies.^ Klevorick discussed a 
measure of efficiency of input allocation.^ Westfield de­
veloped a persuasive, intriguing argument that the public 
utility (as opposed to its customers) was not injured-- 
indeed, was profitably aided— by the admitted overpricing by 
General Electric, Westinghouse, and others in the sale of 
generating equipment several years ago.^ Shepherd also saw 
the possibility of overinvestment by the regulated firm, but 
also suggested that the customer’s insistence on continuous 
quality service might actually require a more capital- 
intensive allocation of inputs.^ Shepherd alone brings to 
bear a constraint by equating average cost of investment to
the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint," American Economic Re­
view, Vol. LII, No. 6, pp. 1052-1069.
2S.H, Wellicz, "Regulation of Natural-Gas Pipeline 
Companies; An Economic Analysis," Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. LXIX, No. 2, pp. 30-43.
^Alvin K. Klevorick, "The Graduated Fair Return:
A Regulatory Proposal," American Economic Review, Vol. LVI, 
No. 2, p. 478.
4Fred M. Westfield, "Regulation and Conspiracy," 
American Economic Review, Vol. LV, No. 2, pp. 424-433,
^William G. Shepherd, "Regulatory Constraints and 
Public Utility Investment," Land Economics, Vol. XLIII,
No. 3, pp. 348-355.
vi
average revenue of investmentj he assumed that the cost of 
capital would increase as more of it is usedo
In this study, the cost of capital is held constant. 
Admittedly, Shepherd's point is well taken and a function 
that describes the increasing cost of capital certainly de­
serves treatment as a parameter in a theoretical inquiry into 
capital decisions of the regulated firm. In Chapter III, the 
cost of capital is treated, even if indirectly, as a factor 
in capital decisions of the regulated firm. This treatment 
is incidental to development of the "Lambda" function, which 
primarily concerns the marginal rate of technical substitu­
tions of inputs. In the writer's view, however, the demand 
and production functions are more decisive as constraints 
than an increasing-cost-of-capital function. This study, 
then, basically concerns the formulation of a model for the 
regulated firm to describe an optimal allocation of inputs 
in the face of these two constraints.
In Chapter I, the neoclassical minimum-cost ap­
proach to capital decisions is summarized. Current practice 
of the regulated firm as it adapts real-world cost data to 
the neoclassical prescription for allocation of inputs is 
also reviewed. The suggestion is pointedly made that the 
neoclassical solution (or direct adaptations of it) is not 
optimal for the regulated firm.
In Chapter II, a model is developed to describe 
optimal behavior of the regulated firm. Two homogeneous
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inputs, capital and labor, and a homogeneous output are as­
sumed» A rate of return greater than the cost of capital 
is assumed» At first, capital is treated as indestructible, 
but this assumption is in turn relaxed» Chapter II details 
how the principal constraints, the demand and production 
functions, are incorporated into the model» The optimal 
capital decision reflects equilibrium— an equilibrium 
interplay of inputs, output, and price of output» The 
model is then examined to show how the equilibrium solu­
tions for capital, labor, output, and price respond to 
changes in variables within the model» Through Chapter III, 
and even to a lesser extent in Chapter IV, a study of the 
changes in the variables is methodologically an exercise 
in comparative statics»
In the latter part of this investigation, the 
model is adapted to dynamic conditions» Chapter IV is an 
inquiry into replacement decisions of the regulated firm in 
a setting of increasing costs, as the plant ages and tech­
nology improves»
Later in Chapter V, the model is adapted to growth, 
capital deterioration, a range of returns to scale, and 
changes in price-quantity elasticity» Finally, the model 
is adapted further to encompass output fluctuations in a 
sinusoidal pattern, thus accommodating the load-factor 
problem»
The writer has made but few comments as to the
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efficiency of the regulated firm and has, for the most 
part, deliberately refrained from stating welfare implica­
tions of the theory of capital decisions under regulation. 
Much could be said, and deserves to be said, regarding 
welfare aspects of capital decisions of the regulated firm. 
But if sound theory really is developed, then and only then, 
can the welfare problem be defined sharply to permit the 
subject to receive quantitative rather than qualitative 
treatment. The writer does not pass judgment on the de­
cisions that lead to greater capital intensity under regu­
lations, This behavior is viewed as "rational," nothing 
more.
As to the reality of the model, the writer is 
aware of the possible criticism of homogeneous inputs and 
homogeneous output. Furthermore, the problem of defining 
a demand function for public-utility output has been, and 
still is, a formidable task, Greenhut, without actually 
developing a model, has discussed the problem of "simple 
unrealistic theory" versus "complex realistic theory" in 
relation to the problem of the behavior of the firm under 
regulation,®
Despite the occasionally involved algebra and dif­
ferentiation, the theory that attends development of the 
model in this study is simple and straight-forward. The
®M,L, Greenhut, "On the Question of Realism in Eco­
nomic Theory and the Regulation of Public Utilities," Land 
Economics, Vol, XLIII, No, 3, pp, 260-267,
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writer takes no position as to which of the two camps cited 
by Greenhut is corrects "the more and more realism school" 
or the opposition "o o o [which is] in favor of the un­
realistic approach in the apparent belief that the simple 
unrealistic theory opens up the greater number of im­
portant vistas and new horizons for economists in generalo"
Greenhut's bias in favor of realism, even complex realism,
is clear; but simplicity is not necessarily to be equated
to unrealismo The writer is aware of additions and em­
bellishments that would make the model developed in this 
study more realistically complex, but surely Greenhut would 
agree that complex realism is an evolutionary process; and, 
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THEORY OF THE CAPITAL DECISION 
IN THE REGULATED FIRM
CHAPTER I
PROJECT ECONOMY FOR THE REGULATED FIRM
In recent years, project economy for the regulated 
firm has become an exercise in measuring and comparing the 
least revenues required to assure a given rate of return on 
investment in proposed projectsConventionally, the rela­
tive attractiveness of alternative projects of unregulated 
firms is assessed by comparisons of present worths, of in­
ternal rates of return, or simply by comparisons of minimum 
costs required for a given outputo In the regulated firm, 
return on investment is fixed; by contrast, in the unregu­
lated firm, it results from a complex of management decisions 
given the environment of the firm. In fact, the fixed rate 
of return is the most distinguishing characteristic of the 
regulated firm.^ Accordingly, the regulated firm seeks to
^Project economy, a common term in the literature of 
"engineering economy,^' is defined as the evaluating procedure 
for selecting the most attractive of alternative projects 
competing for adoption in the capital budget of the firm,
^Other characteristics associated with regulation and
2
minimize revenue required--in order to cover total costs-- 
subject to the constraint that a rate of return^ s b e  
earnedo This is not the simple minimization problem that it 
at first appears to be-=if inputs are to be allocated op­
timally.
Conventional planning practice for the regulated 
firm has been to choose the project for which the present 
value^ of revenue collected from its customers is minimized, 
although permitting the firm to earn a "fair" or allowable 
return on investment in plant and equipment. The similarities 
of, and differences between, the minimum-cost approach of 
the unregulated firm and the minimum-revenue-requirements 
approach of the regulated firm to project selection is at 
once apparent in the two functions g
C  = wL + rWK ( l o i )
R = wL + sWK do 2)
where C is the total cost of the project in the unregulated 
firm,
R is the total revenue required by the project in the 
regulated firm, 
w is the wage rate of labor or, more generally, the 
price of variable inputs.
the regulated firm, e,g,, price determination, are intro­
duced in later chapters,
^Alternately, the uniform equivalent may be minimized. 
The uniform equivalent is an even flow of funds, which when 
discounted over a planning period, yields the present worth 
referred to here.
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W is the price of a unit of capital 
r is the "rental cost" of capital, expressed in 
per cent
s is the required, or "fair", rate of return, as al­
lowed by the regulatory authorities 
L is the quantity of labor, or more generally, of 
variable inputs 
K is the quantity of capital, or more generally, of 
fixed inputs 0
In either case the firm seeks to minimize the function 
appropriate to it. If the regulated firm measures its revenue 
requirements such that only the minimum acceptable rate of 
return is earned, then functions ( l o i )  and ( l o 2 )  are iden­
tical o Implicit here is the identical allocation of inputs 
for the two functions» Regulation, however, affects optimal 
allocation of inputs» The differences and similarities 
of the cost function (1»1) and the revenue function (1»2) are 
developed more fully later to show that for optimal condi­
tions, the two functions can lead to different, perhaps im­
portantly different, capital decisions»
The Neoclassical Minimum-Cost Case
Neoclassical analysis of project economy generally 
involves homogeneous inputs, capital and labor» The produc­
tion function for the project is written in the general form 
Q = f (L,K) (1»3)
where Q is the quantity of output
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L is the quantity of labor
K is units of capitalo
The total cost function is equation (Id)
C = wL + rWKo
In this simple cost function, capital is assumed to 
be indestructible, ioSo, has infinite life, and hence no 
provision for depreciation is madeo The term r measures the 
rental rate on investment WKo
Smith explains r more fully;
If we imagine the firm selling perpetuities in 
the bond market at a price 1/r to finance the in­
vestment WK then rWK is the annual payment to bond­
holders of record 0 In a very real sense we can think 
of rWK as the cost of "maintaining" the 'presence' of 
a unit of capital in production
The problem of minimizing costs has been discussed 
by a number of writerso Smith,^ Baumol,^ and Ferguson,? 
have similar treatments of the problem of minimizing the cost 
function
C *» wL + rWK 
subject to the constraint
Q - f (L,K) 0
^Vernon Lo Smith, Investment and Production (Cam­
bridge, Massoi Harvard University ^ress, i^él), o
Sibid.
^William Jo Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations 
Analysis (Englewood Cliff, No Jo* Prentice-liail, iyél), ëS
?Co Eo Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory (Homewood, 
Illo8 Irwin, 1966), 156»
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A classic treatment of this problem makes use of 
the rule that, in equilibrium, the marginal rate of sub­
stitution of labor for capital is equal to the ratio of 
the wage rate to the rental rate of one unit of capital.
This rule results from minimizing the function;
0 = WL + rWK - X[f(L,K) - Q] (1.4)
where 0 is the objective function to be minimized and X is 
the Lagrange multiplier.
Smith minimizes 0 to obtain the marginal productivity 
conditions
^  =s w  - Xf^ = 0 (1.5)
= rW - Xf^ = 0 (lo6)
= Q - f (L,K) = 0. (1.7)a x
3 fwhere f^ = the marginal product of labor
fjr » the marginal product of capital
The neoclassical choice of project is, then, a 
simple constrained minimization problem, wherein the cost 
function to be minimized is subject to the maintenance of 
some output.
To probe further the necessary conditions for se­
lecting the minimum-cost project, differential variations 
in the cost and production functions are examined. Total
6
differentiation of (1.3) yieldsj
dQ = i£ii dL + dK = 0 (1.8)3L 3K
= fLdL + f%dK = 0 (1.9)
for constant output.
The necessary condition for minimum cost, i.e., the 
equality of the ratios of the price of each factor to its 
respective marginal product, is stated:
A , ^  (1.10)
where again f^ and fK ' respectively.
The necessary condition for minimum cost describes 
the point of "economic balance" of engineering economy.® The 
term economic balance means here that for most projects an 
allocation of inputs is possible such that an increase in 
either L or K increases total cost. Engineering or project 
economy is concerned with identifying and measuring variable 
operating costs that decrease as fixed investment costs in­
crease so that an optimal mix of variable and fixed costs 
may be established. This problem is illustrated graphically 
in Fig. 1.1,
In Fig. 1.1 a given output Q is assumed required.
^Herbert E. Schweyer, Process Engineering Economics 
(New York; McGraw-Hill, 1955), 20d. W.5. riarbert, "Économie
Process Operations," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, 
Vol. XXXIX, No. 7, 947T-949. .... .....
ko-S►3
Costs Qf fixsd inputs 
rTTC
Vsrlsbl# oosts ■ w
C sp ltS , K
Figt ltl~ Æ o t» l oosts of a given output produced with various combinations of labor 
and oapital
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This output may be described by any number of production 
functions, but for simplicity is assumed here to'be the 
familiar Cobb-Douglas function:
Q = mL*K6 (1.11)
where L is the quantity of labor 
K is the units of capital
m is a coefficient, usually associated with a 
state of technology 
a is elasticity of output with respect to the 
quantity of labor, L 
3 is the elasticity of output with respect to 
units of capital, K,
Fig. loi shows that an infinite number of combinations 
of L and K will produce required output Q. If the price of L 
and K are defined, then a unique combination of L and K exists 
such that conditions of minimum cost are achieved to produce 
output Q.
The isocost lines M ,  CD, etc. describe the cost
of output for combinations of L and K that lie on those
lines. Many combinations of L and K described by isocost 
line EF can produce output Q, but cost is not minimal for 
any of them. No combination of L and K described by line ^  
can produce required output Q. Line M ,  then, is unique in 
that it represents one combination of L and K that is capable
of producing output Q and yet line M  represents lower costs
than any other isocost line for combinations of L and K
9
capable of producing output Q,
The slope of the isocost line is obtained by total 
differentiation of Equation (1,1)
dC = wdL + rWdK = 0.
dK _ w _
3b rw f%
when îi- exceeds ^  , the mix of inputs lies to right of the rw
point of "economic balance" of Fig, 1,1, Conversely, when
^  is less than ^  , the mix of inputs lies to left of this
K —
optimal point. The terms IL., ^  are all expressionsdL rW f^
for the marginal rate of technical substitution, MRTS^ fo^ k f
of labor for capital.
Labor, L, or variable inputs, is by its nature a 
function of output, or,
L = g (0,K). (1,12)
The cost function may now be written
C = w g(Q,K) + rWK, (1,13)
Minimum cost obtains when
^  = 0, (1,14)
Equation (1,14) is another way of describing the 
conditions required for the optimal mix of labor, L^, and 
capital, K®, or the point of "economic balance,"
Equation (1,1.) may be rewritten» substituting for L 





c = w(S) P 7 a   ̂WK (1,16)
(1,17)
Solving for optimal capital,
Ko 1/a (1,18)
And substituting for K in (1,15) and solving for 
optimal labor, L°
L* r V e
T5TF (1,19)
Equations (1,18) and (1,19) describe the K and L of 
Fig, 1,1 for the minimum-cost requirement shown by isocost 
line ^  and by the point where
3 ^  "  °
for output Q,
Costs are minimal when total investment in plant is
IX




Equation (1.20) represents idealized conditions of 
indestructible capital stock, no income tax, no property 
tax, and no insurance. The real-world solution to the 
minimum-cost problem abstracts easily from the idealized 
case. Cost of capital, r, may be adjusted to cover real- 
world charges for depreciation, income tax, property tax and 
insurance. The required adjustment of r to cover these 
charges for the cost-minimizing firm parallels the adjust­
ment required for return, s, to cover the same charges for 
the regulated firm.
Project Economy in the 
Requlated ^irm
The revenue function 
R 3 WL + sWK
for the project in the regulated firm is minimized but not in 
the same way as is the cost function for the regulated firm. 
Substituting g(Q,K) for L and then differentiating R with 
respect to K yields an erroneous solution. In the normal 
case of s > r, the traditional cost-minimization approach re­
sults in the use of less capital for the simple reason that 
this solution reflects the fact that s makes capital more 
expensive than r. Since return sWK— and pure profit, 
(e-r)WK— are so clearly greater when more capital is used, 
it then intuitively makes good sense to argue that rational 
behavior on the part of the regulated firm calls for greater.
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not less, use of capital in its production process. Such an 
argument would imply that the regulated firm somehow uses 
capital as though it were less expensive than for the un­
regulated firm. Unfortunately, no measure is available as to 
just how the regulated firm treats its interior, as opposed 
to its exterior, cost of capital, until a comparison is made 
of the regulated firm's use of capital with that of the cost- 
minimizing unregulated firm.
Project economy for the regulated firm has been 
largely a matter of comparing revenue requirements based on 
the minimum acceptable rate of return, or alternately, of 
finding the neoclassical minimum-cost solution and then 
adding something to the minimum acceptable rate of return to 
obtain a "fair" or allowable rate of return. In Chapter II, 
it will be demonstrated that such a solution is not optimal 
for the regulated firm. Indeed, most of the work done to 
date on project or engineering economy has been directed 
toward refinements to reflect real-world facts of deprecia­
tion, income tax, insurance, and property tax on revenue 
requirements. In short, most of the literature and practi­
cally all the project manuals^ for regulated firms are guides
QExamples of these manuals are: American Telephone
and Telegraph Company, "Engineering Economy," 2nd. ed, 1963; 
Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation, "Economic Prin­
ciples as Applied to Public Utility Engineering," 1961;
Edison Electric Institute, "Economic Comparison of Alter­
native Plans," 1959; lowa-Illinois Gas Company, "Engineering 
Economics"; Long Island Lighting Company, "Engineering 
Studies of Economy," 1963; Northern Natural Gas Company and 
Subsidiaries," Investment Analysis Procedure," 1963; Public
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as to how r and s of the cost and revenue functions
C = wL + rWK 
R = WL + sWK
are to be adjusted to cover the workaday realities of de­
preciation, income taxes, insurance, property tax, and dis­
persion of asset life» This part of project economy may be 
used in, or adapted to, a theoretical treatment of the 
optimal allocation of inputs.
Adjustments of r and s to Cover 
All E*ixed dosts
The solution to the problem of optimal allocation 
of inputs for the regulated firm is the subject of Chapter II« 
The necessary adjustments for r and s are clearly necessary 
to obtain meaningful real-world minimums for the cost and 
the revenue functions. This adjustment is required regard­
less of whether inputs are allocated in accord with the 
cost-minimizing concept or in accord with the static model 
for the regulated firm to be developed in Chapter II and 
modified in Chapters IV and V, All variable inputs are 
covered in the expression wL; but, as indicated, the expres­
sion sWK of the revenue function must be modified to cover 
not only the cost of capital and pure profit but must cover 
as well the other named components of fixed inputss de­
preciation, income taxes, property taxes, and insurance.
Service Electric and Gas Company, "An Abbreviated Course in 
Engineering Economics," 2 vols,, I960,
14
Such comprehensive coverage is achieved without altering the 
basic character of the revenue function. The revenue function 
is shown diagramatically in Fig. 1.2. The cost of debt is 
shown as interest on debt; the cost of equity capital is 
shown as the larger part of net income. The remaining part, 
(s-r)WK, of net income is pure profit in the classic sense.
A rate of return, s, which exactly offsets the cost of 
capital has been characterized as the minimum acceptable 
rate of return. Fig. 1.2 shows that income taxes, property 
taxes, depreciation, and insurance may be expressed as 
functions of investment, WK. In turn, these costs may be 
expressed as functions of absolute return sWK, or of pure 
profit (s-r)WK, A rate of return less than r may be equated 
to a kind of confiscation, and may be expected to lead to 
disinvestment if the owners did not view such a return 
other than temporary. Under such conditions low bids for 
the firm's common stock may be expected. A higher rate of 
return than the cost of capital is compelling incentive for 
new investment and serves to attract capital for projects 
as required in subsequent periods. The proper role for the 
regulatory commission is to place a fair ceiling on pure 
profit by setting a rate of return, s, on "used and useful" 
plant, so that the firm will attract capital for projects 
required for growth and for the quality in service desired 
by the customer. The commission, however, cannot regulate 
the minimum acceptable rate of return. Only the investor
Inoome Tax
Gjx>33 Income
















Tig, 1.2.— Graphic illustration of gross revenue required from a project to earn "fair* return, 2
J6
who measures his opportunity costs can set such a rate, but 
both regulatory commissions and the managements of regu­
lated firms must estimate this rate as well, perhaps, as 
anticipate changes in it over timeo
The minimum acceptable rate of return is expected to 
be higher than the cost of senior capital issues and less 
than the actual rate of return. The minimum rate of return 
may be affected by cyclical attitudes of investors and by 
the level of interest rates but is apparently remarkably 
stable over time. The more important consideration, perhaps, 
is that the minimum acceptable rate decreases as actual 
earnings increase. Correspondingly, the minimum rate in­
creases as actual earnings decrease.
Comparison of projects in the regulated firm becomes 
an exercise in reducing to present worth the revenue re­
quirements for a planning period. Alternatively, a compari­
son may be made of the "levelized" or uniform equivalent of 
revenue requirements of competing projects. If the discount 
rate is the minimum acceptable rate of return, the results 
in project selection are identical to those of minimum-cost 
case. If the discount rate is a "fair" or allowable rate of 
return, or if pure profit is simply added to revenue appli­
cable to the minimum-cost case, then significantly different 
results may obtain.
Fig, 1,3 shows diagrammatically the difference between 
the revenue requirements for the case of minimum acceptable
17
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Fig , 1 ,3 ,—Revenue requirements for a minimum acceptable rate o f return, r, 
and for a fa ir  or allowable rate o f  return, £.
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returnp which is also the minimum-cost case, and for the case 
where regulated return, s, is earned. Both cost of capital, 
r, and rate of return, s, have been adjusted to r^ and s' to 
encompass other real-world capital charges of income tax, 
depreciation, property tax, and insurance. Income taxes and 
depreciation require special treatment to permit their in­
corporation in the r'WK and s'WK functions.
The two topics will be considered in separate sub­
sections immediately below. Fig, 1,3 does not now show the 
inputs for the cost function and the revenue function to be 
the same. This difference in the allocation of inputs is a 
departure from the assumptions underlying many capital- 
budgeting manuals for public utilities. These manuals 
lead the planner to seek the neoclassical minimum-cost 
solution for the regulated firm and then to add some value 
equal to pure profit rate (s'-r') to obtain total revenue 
requirements.
Income Taxes
The income-tax liability resulting from the year's 
net taxable income is a function of return, investment, 
debt-eqv ity ratio, and the tax rate ;
Flt^ = f(s,WK, L/E, t%) 
where FIt% is the amount of income taxes
L/E is the debt equity ratio, with L and E
the amounts of debt and equity, respectively 
tx is the income tax rate.
19
To develop more clearly that income taxes, Fit IS












Operating Revenue Deductions 3400,00
Net Operating Revenue ï é d S o Ô Ô
Other Income 100,00
Gross Income Before Taxes "TTinnW
Interest on Debt 200,00
Taxable Income l^dJ,Üd
Federal Income Tax (given t%=.50) 750,0()
Net Income After Taxes and Interest $ fdd (JO
Return for Payment of Interest and 
Dividends (line i + line f) $ 950,00
From the statement above, the following relationships 
are apparent if the tax rate is t^i 
h = gtx but g = e - f
h = (e - f) t%
j = (i + f) but i ■ g - h
i = g - h + f  = e -  f -  h + f = e -  h
e = j + h
Xh = jtjj + htjj - ft 
h = htjj + (j-f)tjj
h(l - tx) = (j - f)tx
h = (Ï - f) «
The last of the foregoing equations may be written 
in more general form:
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Utilities are usually characterized by a capitaliza­
tion with considerably more debt than found in the capital 
structure of unregulated firms. The debt-capitalization 
ratio of most utilities ranges from 1/3 to 2/3. Most regu­
lated firms are represented in the upper half of this 
range. Fixing the debt-equity ratio permits income taxes 
to be stated as a function of investment. To develop this 
function(, let
L = * percent debt
E = .g A - g  , percent equity
s = return on investment
i = interest rate
WK = investment
sWK = return on investment
iLWK = interest paynent on debt.
The percent of the return dollar consumed by debt is
or ~  . This percentage is sometimes referred to as
"debt drain." By rearranging and substituting in equation 
(1.21) the income tax function may be written
iL
Fit, = ' (1.22)
To illustrate, arithmetically, let
Debt, L = 60 percent of total capitalization = .6 
Return, s = .065
21
Interest rate» i = «05
Tax rate, t^ = .52,
The proportion of return, s, consumed by interest 
payments is
^  = .415 or 41.5 percent
Flt^ = .065WK(1,083) (1.23)
= .042 WK
This simple relation expresses the uniform equivalent of in­
come taxes in terms of original investment.
Depreciation and Annuity 
Depreciation
Provisions for capital recovery, or for replacement 
of destructible equipment, is achieved by some systematic, 
periodic charge which presumably is directly related to the 
rate of deterioration of the capital goods employed. The 
incorporation of a depreciation component for r" and s "  in 
determining a rental charge for investment WK poses no 
problem. The depreciation charge (expressed in percent as 
d) may simply be stated d°WKy but cost of capital, r, and 
rate of return, s, are then applicable to a constantly di­
minishing base. The quantities rWK and sWK require that 
some average, or some equivalent, be found to reflect the 
fact of capital deterioration. A more convenient solution 
lies in finding an equivalent for r and s rather for WK.
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Consider the case of a $5,000 for a planning period or useful 
life of 5 years, as illustrated in Table loi»
Table 1 0 lo-“Illustration of capital recovery costs in the 

























1 $5,000 $325 $1,000 $1,325
2 4,000 260 1,000 1,260
3 3,000 195 1,000 1,195
4 2,000 130 1,000 1,130
5 1,000 65 1,000 1,065
Now, to illustrate the concept of uniform equiv­
alence, suppose that, instead of making straight-line de­
preciation charges each year and reducing the net invest­
ment by the same constant amount, a separate "fund" is 
established in which equal deposits are made. The fund is 
assumed to earn interest at 6.5 percent annually. The 
return on investment must be obtained on the original cost 
of $5,000 over the entire five-year period. The accumulated 
sum, five years hence, of the annual "deposits" plus interest 
compounded annually must equal the original investment? 
therefore, $5,000 must be multiplied by some present-value 




$5000 X (its)n_i = $5000 x (1,065)5-1
= $5000 X e l 7 5 6  $878,
Table loi may now be recast as Table lo2o
Table lc2e— Illustration of capital recovery costs in the 











1 $5,000 $ 325 $ 878 $1,203
2 5,000 325 878 1,203
3 5,000 325 878 1,203
4 5,000 325 878 1,203
5 5,000 325 878 1,203
$1,625 $4,390 $6,015
The example cited in Table 1=1 is correct but is 
difficult and cumbersome to use in project evaluation 
studies. In the example of Table 1,2, depreciation charges 
are determined by "setting aside" equal annual payments, 
which when compounded at 6,5 per cent per year would ac­
cumulate to $5000 in five years»
The following computation is presented to demonstrate 
that the present worths of the total annual charges in the
24
two preceding illustrations are equal, even though the sums
of the charges over five years differ slightly.
Table 1,3,— Present worths of capital 











Table 1, 2 Table 1.1 Table 1,2 Table 1,1
1 $1,203 $1,325 .9390 $1,129,62 $1,244,18
2 1,203 1,260 .8817 1,060,69 1,110,94
3 1,203 1,195 .8278 995.84 989,22
4 1,203 1,130 .7773 935,09 878,34
5 1,203 1,065 ,7299 878,07 777,34
$6,015 $5,975 $4,999,31 $5,000,02
As previously suggested, determination of the aver­
age return over the life of the investment, or the planning 
period, becomes tedious if the method of Table 1 is used. 
This approach can thus be replaced by a more manageable 
method involving an "equated rate of return" which, when 
multiplied by the initial investment, will yield the aver­
age return over the life of the investment. Such a pro­
cedure is significantly time-saving in calculations when 
proposed projects possess different useful lives and differ­
ent salvage values.
This treatment becomes clearer when Table 1,1 is 
re-examined and recast in terms of present worth as in
25
Table lo4,
Table lo4o— Analysis of present worth of capital recovery 























1 $325,00 $1,000,00 ,9390 $305.18 $ 939,00
2 260,00 1,000,00 .8817 229,14 881,70
3 193,00 1,000,00 .8278 161,42 827,80
4 130,00 1,000,00 ,7773 101.05 777.30
5 65,00 1,000,00 .7299 41.44 729,90
Total $975,00 $5,000.00 $844.33 $4 ,155,70
The present worth of the annual charges may be 
equated to an annuity covering the five-year period for both 
return and depreciation» By reference to a table for pres­
ent worth to annuity, the factor
l - ( l+a)-n
















= .2406 X $844.33 = $203.15 = 4.06% of $5,000
,2406 X 4,155.70 = 999.86 = 20.00% of $5,000
$5,000,03 $1,203,01 = 24,06% of $5,000
Clearly, the annual charge for depreciation is 
20 per cent, but the charge for return on investment is only 
$203.15, which is equal to an average annual charge of 
4,06 per cent on the initial investment of $5000. This 
average charge is often called the equated rate of return on 
investment. This concept can be clarified by returning again 
to the example of Table 1.2.
Return on Investment * $5,000 x ,065 = $ 325.00
Annuity Depreciation = 5,000 x .1756 = 878,00
Total Annual Charge $5,000 x .2406 = $1,203.00
The following identity may now be stated;
_Equated Return on Investment Return on Investment
Plus = Plus (1,25)
Straight Line Depreciation Annuity Depreciation
or, alternatively,
Equated Return _ 
on Investment
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Return on Investment plus Annuity 




,0406 = ,065 + ,1756 - ,20,
The depreciation annuity is a method for reducing 
total cost of plant to be recovered to a level per cent of 
initial plant investment. Either side of the above identity 
is a means of providing for return of, and return on, in­
vested capital. This sum is commonly referred to as the 
"capital recovery f a c t o r " a n d  may appear either as
3 (1 + s)t Qj. seSt
(1 + 8)^ - 1 est -1 
to permit return and depreciation to be stated as a combined 
constant function of investment WK,^^
Retirement Dispersion
An important consideration relative to annuity depre­
ciation is the implicit certainty attributed to the life of 
the project. Plant retirement in the real world, however, is 
characterized by uncertainty. Public-utility plant is unique 
in that so much is known of the probability of length of its
^Opaul He Jaynes, "The Depreciation Annuity," Transac­
tions of American Institute of Electrical Engineers, LXîW, 
part TllT Tïïhr; pp,' 1395-Î415,-------------- -̂-----
^Ipaul Ho Jeynes and L, Van Nimwegen, "The Criterion 
of Economic Choice," Transactions of American Institute of 
Electrical Engineers, LXkVil, part ïïf, 1^5ë, pp» 6Ü6-632,
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useful life» The dispersion of useful life estimates of 
utility plant about some mean and hence the dispersion of 
depreciation costs can be estimated in much the same manner 
as insurance premiums are calculated for human life.
The Engineering Experiment Station of Iowa State 
University has developed a "codified" system that describes 
patterns of retirement dispersion for various types of 
public-utility plant. Figure 1,4 shows several types of 
dispersion patterns described by letters, S, L, and R and by 
subscripts. The letter S designates symmetrical dispersion; 
letters L and R refer to asymmetry where the maximum rate 
of retirement occurs before and after, respectively, the 
average life of plant. If retirements occur at nearly the 
same rates at all ages, a subscript near zero is applied,
A higher subscript is applied if nearly all retirements 
occur in a brief period near average life,12,13,14,15
12r „ Winfrey, "Statistical Analyses of Industrial 
Property Retirements," Bulletin 125, Iowa Engineering Experi­
ment Station, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, 1939,
H r , Winfrey, "Depreciation of Group Properties," 
Bulletin 155, Iowa Engineering Experiment Station, Iowa 
State University, Ames, Iowa, 1942,
l^R, Winfrey, "Condition-Percent Tables and Deprecia­
tion of Unit and Group Properties," Bulletin 156, Iowa 
Engineering Experiment Station, Iowa State University, Ames, 
Iowa, 1943,
l^J, Jeming, "Estimates of Average Service Life," 
Econometrica, 1943, Vol« XI, No, 2, pp, 141-150,
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Fig. 1.4 - Iowa-Type Retirement Dispersion Curves
Source; Reproduced from Iowa State Experiment 
Station Bulletin No. 155. R. Winfrey, "Depreciation 
of Group Properties."
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Table lo5o— Depreciation annuity in per cent of capital 
investment for a range of probable lives and types of 





lo Ll L3 L5 SC So
5 .1897 .1857 ,1808 ,1781 .1880 .1843
6 .1555 .1517 ,1467 1442 1540 1503
7 .1313 .1274 .1224 ,1200 .1298 ,1261
8 .1131 .1092 ,1043 .1019 ,1117 .1081
9 .0991 .0952 .0903 .0878 .0977 .0939
10 .0878 ,0840 .0791 .0767 .0866 .0828
15 .0547 .0509 .0461 .0437 .0538 .0499
20 .0386 .0349 .0301 .0279 .0379 ,0340
25 .0292 .0256 .0210 ,0189 .0288 .0248
30 .0232 .0197 .0152 .0133 ,0230 .0190
40 ,0159 .0127 .0087 .0070 .0162 .0122
60 ,0093 .0065 .0033 .0022 .0100 .0064
®See PoHo Jeynes, American Institute of Electrical 
Engineers Transactions, Vol* LXXV, Part 3, pp, l3^i}-14l5o
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Table lo5— Continued
Si S3 S5 * 1 *3 *5 SO
.1821 .1793 .1779 .1843 .1799 .1781 .1774
.1480 .1452 ,1438 .1503 ,1458 ,1439 .1434
.1238 .1210 .1196 .1260 .1215 .1197 .1191
,1056 .1029 .1015 .1079 .1034 .1016 ,1010
.0916 .0888 .0875 .0940 .0894 ,0876 ,0870
.0805 .0777 .0163 ,0828 .0783 ,0764 .0759
.0475 .0447 .0434 .0499 .0453 .0435 .0430
.0316 .0288 .0276 .0341 .0295 .0277 .0272
.0225 .0198 .0186 ,0250 .0205 .0187 .0182
.0167 .0160 .0130 ,0193 .0148 ,0131 .0126
.0101 .0077 .0067 .0127 .0084 .0068 .0065
.0045 .0027 .0020 .0070 .0033 .0021 .0019
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The annuity depreciation can be adjusted to reflect 
the effect of retirement dispersion as estimated in the Iowa 
State curves0 Jeynes and others have developed the following 
relation to achieve the required a d j u s t m e n t 17
B Retirement^.:;, ^ - r (1,27)
^ I v ' ^ yx yx
where ^d is the present-worth group-basis depreciation annuity
5 indicates that the annuity is the level percentage 
applicable to the group of units whose retire­
ments are dispersed about average life 
v^ is present worth factor for age x 
X is age in years
r is the minimum acceptable rate of return 
ÿjj is the mean annual survivors in year x 
Retirements^ is the retirements in year x,
For "fair" or allowable rate of return s
fd = — ____  - s , (1.28)
= Iv:: px
Table 1.5 shows a range of depreciation annuities for 
various types of dispersions. Different dispersions could as 
much as double the revenue required for depreciation in
IGp.H. Jeynes and C.J. Baldwin, "Financial Mathematics 
for Economic Studies," The Westinghouse Engineer, XI, No. 3, 
1964, pp. 41-47,
l^Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company, "Engineering 
Economics," 1962,
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certain cases, Jeynes called attention the extreme example 
of the case of SQ (no dispersion) and (right-skewed dis­
persion) for a plant having an average life of 40 years.
The resulting depreciation annuity rates are .065 and 1.27 
per cent, respectively.
Summary Statement: Adjustments
r and s to Cover Àli Real-World 
Fixed dharges '
Once the retirement dispersion is estimated, it is
possible then to calculate an annuity depreciation as a
component of r' and s' in both the cost and revenue functions
C = wL + r'WK (1.29)
R = wL + s'WK. (1.30)
By definition, r' = r + t^x + 3% + F
where r is the cost of capital
tj.jj is the tax factor expressed as a function of WK
dj, is the annuity depreciation adjusted for dispersion
F is a factor for property taxes and insurance.
Also, by definition,
s '  =  S  +  tgjj +  dg +  F ,
All fixed charges may now be expressed as a function 
of plant investment and of plant life. Fig, 1,5 shows one 
such function for specified conditions of return, taxes, 
salvage, and debt-drain (which is the result of a specified 
debt-equity ratio),
C  =  W L  + r'WK 















Depreoiation ( ■ )
Federal Income Tax (''Ĉ )
Property Tax
Debt Drain
Annual rate varies 
in accord -with use< 






Years of Useful Life
40 50
Fig. 1.5,— The sum of the cost of all fixed inputs, expressed 
as a function of the present value of investment.
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Minimizing the cost function classically results in 
optimal allocation of inputs for the unregulated firm. The 
mechanics of allocating inputs for the regulated firm, 
however, are yet to be developed. Conventional minimization 
of the revenue-requirements function,however, does not result 
in optimal allocation of inputs for the regulated firm. Ac­
cordingly, some other means must be found to allocate inputs 
for the regulated firm. A model for optimal allocation of 
inputs, inter alia, for the regulated firm is the substance 
of Chapter II,
CHAPTER II 
A STATIC MODEL FOR THE REGULATED FIRM
In Chapter I, discussion of the minimum-cost and 
revenue-requirements approach to project selection was clear 
with respect as to what constituted optimal allocation of 
inputs, labor and capital, in the minimum-cost case; but was 
much less so in the revenue-requirements approach that is 
applicable to the regulated firms In Chapter I, it was sug­
gested that the regulated firm might rationally allocate its 
inputs, variable and fixed, differently from the unregulated 
firms This view of the firm's behavior is a result of con­
ventional regulatory practice that makes return--and pure 
profit— a function of the firm's investment in plant and 
equipments This regulatory convention led to the observation 
that the regulated firm might logically be expected to make 
its production process as capital intensive as is rationally 
possibles It becomes at once apparent that the regulated 
firm may well select a mix of inputs that results in greater 
pure profit, (s-r)WK, even though this mix also results in 
greater costs» The question now arisess How far can the 
regulated firm push its propensity for substituting capital 
for labor in its production process? Principally, the
36
37
constraint is the demand function faced by the firm; but 
another constraint is also posed by the production function 
itself0 The revenue required for the optimizing regulated 
firm, then, is not determined simply by adding pure profit 
(s-r)WK to the costs that would apply under neoclassical 
minimum-cost conditions»
If the regulated firm substitutes more capital for 
labor than indicated by the minimum-cost solution to the 
problem of allocating inputs, then costs are greater and the 
output is sold at a higher price if return, s, is to be 
earned and pure profit, (s-r), is to accrue to the owners of 
the firm» If the output is sold at a higher price, however, 
less output is sure to be demanded» In this chapter, inputs 
for the production process are analyzed for the regulated 
firm and a model developed to determine the equilibrium 
interplay of inputs, output, and price of output»
A static model for the regulated firm evolves logi­
cally from the one-project situation of Chapter I» In Chap­
ter I, perfect knowledge of prices of inputs was assumed»
In this chapter and in subsequent chapters, perfect knowl­
edge continues to be assumed not only of prices of inputs but 
of the firm’s production and demand functions as well» The 
static model for the regulated firm is, then, developed for 
conditions of certainty. Such a model is the simplest if 
the assumption is made that one project generates the entire 
output of the firm. As before, two homogeneous inputs, labor 
and capital, are assumed. The model is a bit more realistic
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if the inputs are treated more encompassingly as variable 
and fixed inputs» Initially, capital is treated as in­
destructible» Output is treated as smooth and continuous, 
i»e«, all cyclical patterns of output are assumed away,^
While output is one of the variables determined by the equi­
librium model developed here, the demand function upon which 
output, in part, depends is exogenously determined» In 
accord with established public-utility practice, all cus­
tomers within service range who seek to purchase output at 
regulated price, P, must be supplied»
In the static model, the cost of capital, r, is 
assumed to be fixed» This assumption requires that the debt- 
equity ratio also be fixed» Under dynamic conditions this 
requirement may be relaxed» Similarly, the rate of return, 
s, is fixed at some level greater than the cost of capital»
Since the model to be developed concerns the firm 
rather than the project, a profit function may be defined»
Two profit functions for the regulated firm are relevant» 
These two profit functions may be called simply the "regu­
lated” and the "unregulated»" The regulated profit function, 
by convention in the United States, means that profit is a 
direct function of invested capital» Unregulated profit, 
however, is determined by classical considerations of supply 
and demand» The unregulated profit function serves to
^In utility operating parlance, smooth continuous 
output is characterized by the phrase "100 per cent load 
factor»"
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constrain profit resulting from the regulated profit function. 
In effect, then, regulated profit is the ceiling profit for 
the regulated firm; and since regulated profit is a function 
of investment, rational behavior of the firm calls for as 
much capital in the production process as is feasible. How 
much capital is feasible? The answer lies in the dimensions 
of the production and demand functions. The following static 
model is developed as a general solution to the problem of 
measuring the degree of capital intensity that can be achieved 
rationally in the regulated firm.
The Production Function
As in Chapter I, a production function of the Cobb- 
Douglas type is utilized;
Q = ml“K^ (2,1)
The Revenue Function
The revenue function is expressed simply as
R = PQ (2,2)




The unregulated profit function is stated
IT ■ PQ - wL - rWK (2,3)
where ir is profit
PQ is revenue (price times output)
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w is the wage rate, or price of variable inputs 
L is the quantity of labor, or variable inputs 
r is the cost of capital, or fixed inputs 
W is the price of a unit of capital 
K is the units of capital.
Unregulated profit typically increases to some peak 
value as more capital is used. The level of capital where
defines the optimal level of capital use by the unregulated 
firm. When more than optimal amounts of capital are used, 
unregulated profit declines curvilinearly until at some level 
of capital use all profit disappears.
The regulated profit function may now be stated as 
TT = (s - r)WK (2,4)
where s is the "fair" or allowable rate of return 
r is the cost of capital.
Obviously, equation (2,4) is a linear relation, i,e, profit,
T increases linearly as more and more capital is used.
Profit, IT, is equation (2,3) and (2,4) is pure profit. 
Since pure profit reflects opportunity costs, T' is a measure 
of the profit attainable from the regulated firm's investment 
in public-utility plant and not attainable elsewhere.
At some level of capital use, curvilinearly decreasing 
unregulated profit is equal to linearly increasing profit.
It is this level of capital use that the unregulated profit 
function constrains the regulated firms propensity for greater
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use of capitale This point may be determined by equating the 
regulated and unregulated profit functions
(s - r)WK = PQ - wL - rWK 
to form the telescoped zero "excess" profit function
0 = PQ — wL — SWK 0 (2 0 5)
Equation (2,5) means simply that zero "excess" profit results 
when a return exactly equal to s, is earned. Rate of return, 
s, may now be specified as
s = , (2,6)
The net represented by (PQ - wL) is the familiar TNRPj^, or 
total net revenue product of capital. Equation (2,6) may be 
restated as
sWK » PQ - wL
which means simply that return in dollars is equal to total 
revenue minus variable costs.
The Demand Function
The demand function may be represented by several 
functions, two of which are the familiar linear relation
P = a - bQ
where a and b are constants determining the intercept and 
slope of the demand curve, and by the log-linear function,
P = HQ'* 
where H and a are constants,
a being a measure of price-quantity elasticity,2
^Note that - 0  is not the familiar elasticity of
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P is price 
Q is outputs
demand, but rather is its reciprocal» This expression
P = HQ"° (1)
means that (-a) is a constant signifying elasticity of price 
with respect to quantity» The more conventional expression 
of elasticity of demand means the elasticity of quantity with 
respect to price is (-I/o),
Elasticity of quantity with respect to price is expressed as
^  ^ * e 0 (2 )dP Q
Thus the term - o  in (1) above is really i as in
^  » g -  L. (3)OQ P E
To show this, equation (1) is differentiated with respect to 
quantity Qj
0  = -GHQ-o-1 = - oHQ-(o+l). (4)
Both sides of ( 1 )  are divided into Q
Ï . C i . i!i
Now each side of (4) is multiplied by the respective sides 
of (5)
«  . 2  - • 2 ! ^  dQ • P
and
See George J, Stigler, The Theory of Price (New York: 
Macmillan Company, Third Edition), Appendix B»
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In this and subsequent chapters, the log-linear 
demand function is used for development of a model for the 
regulated firm. The log-linear demand function is con­
siderably more tractable mathematically than the linear 
function. The linear case is discussed in detail in the 
Appendix of this chapter. Conclusions for conditions of 
equilibrium are the same for both cases. The problems of
managing the linear case are reported in the Appendix.
The "Zero" Profit Functions for 
the'Unregulated and the Regu­
lated Firm
The special case where
0 = PQ - wL - rWK (2.8)
and
0 = PQ - wL - sWK (2.9)
may now be examined. These two situations are illustrated
3graphically and compared in Fig. 2.1.
^Note that if Q of the production function is sub­
stituted in 0 = PQ-wL-rWK the result is PmL K - wL - rWK. 
Now if price P is set, say at 10, m at 1, price, w, of labor 
at 4, price, W, of a unit of capital at 100, a and B at 
1/2, then,
0 = lOLl/2%1/2 _ 4L _ 4K
10 = 4L + 4K
Arbitrarily set K at 9, then,
30 = 4L + 36






Fig» 2.1,--The zero excess profit functions 
for the regulated and the unregu­
lated firm.
The locus of points described by
n = 0 = PQ - wL - rWK
defines the limits of the input mix where all profits disap­
pear, Similarly, the locus of points described by
rr = 0 = PQ - wL - sWK
defines the limits of the input mix where all profits in
excess of those allowed by regulation disappear.
L = 38.25 f V^38.25^ - 4 (81) 2,17, 36,03
Clearly, K can be chosen so large, or to the right of so 
that the quantity under the radical has a minus sign, i,e,, 
the solution for L is then indeterminate.
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Since pure profit (s-riwK is maximum at the point on the 
locus of
0 = PQ ~ wL - sWK 
where K is largest, the regulated firm may be expected to 
seek, and operate at, this point namely, where K = Kg„
Fig., 2^1 shows the limits of the mix of input of capital 
and labor for the zero and zero excess profit functions„
Clearly, regulated profit (s-r'!WK is greatest at 
Kg of Fig, 2ul: All profit vanishes at K j , T h e  unregulated
optimum is at î^^nreg”' which is the minimum-cost solution (pages 
115 and 125). In geometric illustrative terms, the locus of 
points described by the function PQ - wL - sWK = 0 is formed 
by the intersection of the plane (s-r)WK intersecting the 
unregulated profit "hill," it = PQ - wL - rWK_ This inter­
pretation is shown in Fig„ 2„2o Unregulated profit is shown 
rising above the (s-r)WK plane. The peak of this hill de­
scribes the coordinates of L and K for the minimum-cost case. 
Fig, 2,2a shows the production surface. Output Qq , resulting 
from inputs and Lg, is the optimal output for the regu­
lated firm. Output Qunreg, the optimal output for the un­
regulated firm. At output Q^, all profit vanishes.
Fig, 2,2 illustrates graphically the compelling incentive 
for the regulated firm to be as capital intensive as is 
prudently possible/*
^One advantage of a theory study is that such real- 
world situations as relationships with public utility com­
missioners may be ignored.
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Q-unreg.
T = (s -r )W K
T = P Q -w L -rW K
Fig. 2 .2  -  The  regulated and unregulated profit functions in relation to the 
production function of the regulated firm .
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The profit function may be shown graphically in 
another way» Figs, 2,3 and 2,4, allow two planes sWK and 
rWK, both hinged on the L axis to slice, this time, through 
the total-net-revenue-product, TNRP%, surface. The profiles 
shown in Figs, 2,3 and 2,4 apply to the path of optimal mix 
of labor and capital as capital increases. This path will 
be described more precisely later.
The arc through which the regulatory authority can 
swing the ray sWK is shown as delimited by K^nregu tne left 
and by K̂ . on the right, in Fig, 2,4, If the ray sWK inter­
sects the TNRPk arc to the left of K^nreg,' "fair" or
allowable price would be set above the unregulated price,- 
If the ray sWK intersects TNRP% to the right of K^, the rate 
of return is less than the cost of capital and the firm would 
disinvest. This point is the "threshold of confiscation" 
referred to by some students of public-utility rate making.
If sMK intersects TNRP% to the left of K̂ ., but quite close to 
it, new capital for growth may be difficult to attract at a 
"satisfactory" price.
The Short-run Optimal Allocation 
of Inputs
The solution to the problem of optimal allocation of 
inputs, labor and capital, in the regulated firm makes use 
of the rule that labor (or variable inputs) is used up to
^Fred M, Westfield, "Regulation and Conspiracy," 
American Economic Review. Vol. LV, No, 2, pp. 414-423,
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sWK




Fig. 2.3. — Profile of total-net-revenue-product surface along path of optimum 




Fig. 2.4 . —Diagram o f  "arc o f  e f fe c t iv e  p u b lic -u t i l i ty  regulation"
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the point where the addition to total revenue is just equal 
to the wage rateo Capital is used until the resulting addi­
tion to total revenue is just equal to the "fair" or allow­
able return on the price of one unit of capitalo Maximum 
profits are realized when
MRq = w (2.10)
and
MRq f^ = sW (2,11)
where M R q  is marginal revenue
f^, the marginal product of labor, is
(2 ,12)
fĵ , the marginal product of capital, is
= BmIi®K^"^ (2,13)
and hence, the left side of (2,10) and (2,11) are, respec­
tively the marginal revenue products of labor and capital. 
The function, MRq f^ = w, defines the short-run 
path of the optimal use of labor and capital. This path is 
shown graphically in Fig, 2,5, The log-linear demand func­
tion may be brought to bear to define further the optimal 
short-run path by converting the demand function
P » HQ
to a revenue function by multiplying both sides by Qj
PQ ■ (2,14)
Marginal revenue is obtained by differentiating the 
revenue function (2,14) with respect to Q to obtain
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-a
M R ^  =  (1- 0) H Q  c
Substituting from the production function for Q
_ 0 - o _ a 0 
M R q  =  (1- 0) H m  L  K (2,15)
Substituting for M R q  and in equation (2,10)




1™ ) ̂1̂ 6 ( 1 ̂ )
co*s
Capital, K
Fig, 2,5.— The path of short-run allocation of 
inputs for the regulated firm facing 
a log-linear demand function.
Equation (2,16) defines the path of optimal short-run 
allocation of inputs, labor and capital as more and more
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capital is used» The equilibrium point for the regulated 
firm is yet to be defined» In the unregulated case, the 
firm merely finds the point on the path
that produces the output of greatest profit» The regulated 
firm is not free to restrict its output to a level of 
greatest profit» All customers who are within service 
range and who are prepared to pay regulated price, P, for 
output must be supplied» Significantly, both the regulated 
and unregulated firms find their optimum allocation of inputs 
somewhere along the path defined by equation (2»16)»
Total differentiation of the zero excess profit
function
0 =» PQ - wL - sWK 
yields the slope of this function at the point of maximum 
capital employed by the regulated firm;
[MR^f L-w] dL+ [MRgf L-sW] dK = 0 ^
dK MRgf^-w
Since the firm allocates its inputs such that
then.
(MRgfL
n . dL lim-^ = * •
-wT+o
Solving for optimal allocations of labor and capital 
under regulation is now possible. The solution lies on the
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path described by the function MRgf^ = w. But the optimum 
for the unregulated firm is also found on this path. The 
optimal solution for the unregulated firm has already been 
described. The solution for the regulated case requires 
finding the limit, established by the demand and production 
functions, on the firm's desire to make the production proc­
ess as capital intensive as is rationally possible.
Solution of the Model> A 
Specific Case
A solution is developed first for the simplest, but 
specific, case of constant returns to scale (that is, where 
both exponents of the production function, « and g, equal 
1/2) and for a = 1/2 in the demand function.^ Later, a gen­
eral solution is developed. Consider the specific case 
where the production function is
Q = 100l 1/2k 1/2, (2,17)
the demand function is
P « lOQ-1/2, (2,18)
and the profit function is
0 » PQ-4L-(,05)(lOO)K. (2,19)
In (2,19), 4 is the wage rate; ,05 is the rate of return, and 
100 is the price of a unit of capital.
Solution for equilibrium quantities for K, L, Q and 
P for this specific case is simple and straight-forward. 
Solution of the simple, specific case facilitates presenta­
tion later of the general, and more complex, case.
53
PQ = lOQl/2
PQ = 10(100L^/^K^/^)^/^ (2.20)
PQ = lOOLl/^K^/*.
Substituting in the zero excess profit function (2.19)^
0 = 100L^/^K^/'*-4L-5K. (2.21)
Since regulated profit is a linear function of K, profit is 
maximum when
ar “ °-
Differentiating (2.21) with respect to L,
0 . i“»L-3/4Kl/‘'-4
1 =. (2.22)
Substituting for L in equation
and solving for
K = 138.4 = 144. (2,23)
Substituting in equation (2.22) permits solving for L|
L « 1 ^  4/3(144) 1/3 = 60,7.
Now that K and L are known, output, Q, may be solved for:
Q = mLl/2Rl/2 = 100x (144)1/2 (60.7)1/2 » 9 3 6 O. (2,24)
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In turn, substituting in the demand function permits solving 
for price, P
P = HQ"°
P = 10(9360)"^/^ = ,1032, (2,25)
General solutions for K, L, Q and P represent equi­
librium interplay of inputs, output, and price for the 
regulated firm having the specific production function and 
facing the specific demand function described.
Solution of the Model; The 
General Üase
The general solution is achieved in the same pro­
cedure as the specific case starting with
Q = ml ' < ̂ (2,26)
P = HQ-* (2,27)
0 = PQ-wL-sWK . (2,28)
Solution for Capital, K
As in the specific case, equilibrium solutions for 
K, L, Q, and P start with a solution for K, An intermediate 
solution for L in terms of K, however, is required for sub­
stitution in the zero excess profit function (equation 2,28) , 
Substituting in the revenue function,
1 -a PQ = HQ-̂
from the production function obtains
PQ = . (2.29)
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Differentiating the revenue function with respect to Q,
MR = (2.30)
and substituting again from the production function obtains
Since fĵ , the marginal productivity of labor, is
f^ = umL^ (2.31)
substituting for MRq and f^ from (2.30) and (2.31) into 
(2,28) ,
MRgf^ =






Inasmuch as equation (2,33) contains the term K, it represents
an intermediate, not a final, solution for labor, L.
Substituting for PQ from equation (2.29) into the 
zero excess profit function,
PQ - WL - sWK = 0
eliminates Q, so that
Hm (1"g) ^o(l-o) ^6(l-o) _ wL - sWK = 0. (2.34)
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Substituting for L from (2„33) into (2,34) eliminates 
L and thus permits solving the zero excess profit function 
on capital, Ks
Hml-o w





- sWK =» 0, (2,35)
Solution of equation (2,35) for K permits K to be expressed 
in terms of internal variables of the model, The final, 
general solution for capital, K, is given in equation (2,36), 















































Equation (2,36) is the final general solution for K in terms 
of the internal variables of the model. The solution for K 
may now be used to generate general solutions for labor, L, 
output, Q, and price, p.
Solution for Labor, L
The general solution for L requires substitution for
K from equation (2,36) into the intermediate solution for L
of equation (2,33), The intermediate L function may now be
solved in terms of the internal variables of the modelt
1
fd-g) m 1-° HK 6 (1-0)1 L  w J  (2,33)
1 - g i1-g)
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or^ restating equation (2.33)
L =
1 1-0 1 






Substituting for K from equation (2,36) into the intermediate 
solution for L (equation 2,33)
L = [a(1-0)] ^ T^ôTTrôr g r r r r ô T
w 1-a(i-o)
[1-a(l-o)] i-(«+B)ti-or [g(i-g)] l-(g+6)(i-o)
1 (1-0) 1 




1- (o+'B) ( 1-0) ^ i- (a+B) (i-o)J (2,38)
Equation 2,38 is a general solution for L, but the solution 
for L may be expressed in briefer, cleaner form in equation 
2,39, Equation (2,38a) is an intermediate, clarifying step.
L =
59
S (1-0) l - ( g + g ) (1 - g ) + g (1-g)^





H (ï-g(l-o) ] [l-(g+6) (l-o) [l-a(l-g) ] [1-(g+6) (l-o)
[l-(g+6)(l-o)]-a6(l-o)^w  T i ” a  T T ^ o T r r r -  ('«+6 ) ' r i ' - o T r
(2.38a)
6(1- 0) 1 - 6 (l-o)
L = t l - g d - g ) ]  [a(l-q)]
[l-o] 1
m 1 -(0 + 6 ) (l-o) jj i-(o+6) (l-o)
B(l-o) 1-B(l-o)
(gW) 1 -(0 + 6 )(i-o) ^  i-(g+B)(1 - 0 )
(?,3))
Equation (2,39) is the final general solution for Labor, L, 
It may be used with the general solution for capital, K, to 
generate general solutions for output, Q, and price, P.
Solution for Output, Q
Output, Q, may now be solved for by substituting for 
K and L, equations (2,36) and (2,39) respectively, in the 
production function
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Q = m L “K^ (2.40)
g6 ( 1-0) g [1-B (l-o)]
m  [l-g(l-a)] i-(a+B)(l-o) [a(l-a)] l-(a+B)(1-a)
Q = ------------------------ Y “------------------------  °
g (l-o) g
m 1-(0+6)(1-0) H l-(*+6)(l-o)
gB(l-o) g [1-g(l-o)
1 - (g+0)(l-o) ^ 1 - (g+B)(l-o)
B [1-g (l-o) ] gB(l"~g)
[1-g (l-o)] l-(a+6) (1-0) [a (l-o)] l-(“+3)(1-a) 
---------------------- T------------------------- °
B(l-o) B
m 1 - (g+B) (l-o) jj 1-(g+B) (l-o)
. B[l-(l-o)] g B ( l - o T  '
l-(g+B) (l-o) ^ 1- (g+B) (l-o)
B g
Q = [1-g (l-o)] ^■-(«+3Hl-o) [g(l-q)] l“ (g+B) (l-q)
g+B  1
H i-(g+B)(1-0) m 1 - (g+8)(l-o)
B g
(g^) l-(g+B)(1-0) ^ 1 - (o+él(l-o)
• (2,42)
Solution for Price, P
The solution for equilibrium Price, P, may be ob­
tained by substituting for K, L, and Q in the function
PQ - wL - sWK
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or more convenientlyby merely substituting for Q in the 
demand function
P = HQ-o.
H [1 -0 (l-o)] (1 -0 ) [o(i_o)] (l-o)P - — —  -----------3— ---------- — ----- :----------  —  '
l-(a+B) 0
mH i - (a+S) (1-0) „ 1 - (a+S) (l-o)
 — go____________ -go
(gW) l-(o+3)(l-o) ^  1 - (g+0)(l-o)
(2.43)
— go — go
P  = [1-g (l-o)] [g(l-o)] l-U+S)"(l-o)
1 - (g+g) -o
^ 1 - (g+g) (l-o) ^  1 - (g+gV (l-o)
-go -go
1- (g+g) (l-o) ^  1- (g+g) (l-o)
(2.44)
The Graphic Solution of the
Mojn" --------------------
Equilibrium inputs, output and price are shown 
graphically in Fig. 2.6. Fig. 2,6 is a graphical solution 
of the static model for the regulated firm.
The difference between the rational solution for 
inputs for the regulated firm on the one hand and the solu­
tion for inputs for the unregulated firm on the other becomes 
graphically clear in Fig, 2.6. The optimal solution for
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PO » wL +• rlfK





I T - (i-r)WK
—  (a-r)TIE • T T  
70 - wl - r V X ■ Tt
Capital
Tig. 2,6.—4The oomplete statio model for the regulated 
firm facing a log-linear diirand function
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inputs is shown as and Lq » Equilibrium output is shown 
as Qq , to be sold at price, Pq . The demand curve is shown 
as applicable to only one capital requirement, equilibrium 
capital, Kq . The unregulated firm would allocate its inputs 
as and — if it were required to produce Qq „ The un­
regulated firm does not produce Q q , however, but reduces 
output to that level where
3% = O'
or where the profit curve
TT = PQ - wL - rWK 
is at its highest level,
A Comparison with the Minimum- 
Cosi: Case : An Example
For cost of capital, r, and using the same numerical
values cited in the example of allocating inputs for the
regulated firm (page 53), the corresponding solution for the
cost-minimizing unregulated firm develops as follows;
C = wL + rWK (2,45)
= + rWK. (2,46)
If a and g = 1/2, then
C = 4 ("04)(100)K




Output remains the same as in the regulated case, or 
Q = 9,360, so,
9,360 = 100L^/2 (87^6)1/2 (2,50)
L = 87,6 (2,51)
Price, P, for the minimum-cost case where return, s, is 
earned, is not determined by the demand function, but by the 
profit function
0 = PQ - wL - sWK
0 = P(9,360) - 4 (87,6) - 5(87,6) (2.52)
P = ,0842 (2.53)
The corresponding rational solutions for the regulated 
case are K = 144, L = 60,7, P » ,1032--that is, the regulated 
firm uses more capital and less labor to generate the same 
output than the cost-minimizing unregulated firm. Moreover, 
to earn the same return on investment in plant and equipment,
the regulated firm charges a higher price than the unregulated
firm.
Summary Statement: The Complete 
Static Model
The general static model for the regulated firm is now
complete. When the production function,
Q » mL»KB,
the demand function,
P » HQ-o, 
the unregulated profit function,
IT = PQ - wL - rl4K,
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and the regulated profit function,
IT = (s~r)WK,
are specified, solution of the static model developed in this 
chapter describes the optimal allocation of inputs for the 
regulated firm, the output of the firm, and the price at 
which that output is sold.
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Appendix to Chapter II
The Static Model and the Linear 
Demand Function
If the demand function is expressed in the more
familiar linear form instead of the log-linear form, then,
P = a - bQ (1)
The demand function is converted to a revenue function by
multiplying both sides of (1) by Q
PQ = aQ - bQ^ (2)
Marginal revenue, MR^, is obtained by differentiating
(2) with respect to Q :
MRg = a - 2bQ (3)
= a - 2bmL“K® (4)
f_ = omL^'^K^ (5)Jj
MRgf^ = (a - 2bmL“K®) {r/m̂ “"^KS) = w (6)
= aamL“”^K® - 2abm^L^““^K^^ - w. (7)
For the linear demand function, marginal revenue be­
comes zero when Q = a/2b«
Calculations for allocation of inputs in case of a 
linear demand function parallel those for the log-linear 
demand function.
The fundamental relations for the static model are 
the same as before except for the demand function
P = a - bQ (8)
Q = mL“K^ (9)
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IT = PQ - wL - rWK 
TT = (S“r)WK 
PQ = aQ “ bQ^
= amL“K® - 
amL*(6 - bm^L^^K^S _ wL - sWK = 0. 
Differentiating with respect to L,
aamL^“’̂ I<® - 2abm^L^°‘”^K^^ - w = 0
or
K26 aK2bmL“ 2abmL 
Solving the quadratic,
w







1 L s l 2wL
mL“ ,2b /4b2 ab , (15)
Equation (15) poses no special problem when numerical 
values are substituted for the internal variables of the 
model; but in general form, this expression for K is most 
unwieldly when used to attempt, say, a general solution for 
labor, L, by substituting in equation (13), To solve for K, 
the required value for substitution in equation (13) must 
be in terms of L, not K» Equation (15) may be recast as
2k 6l “ . s a . la 7ÏÏ ' 4b'
2wL (16a)
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-  k  = v è - # r  -
Squaring both sides of (16a) ,
-  gmK®L® + = 0 . ( 1 7 )
Solution of equation (17) in terms of L requires 
working with a polynomial. The solution may be approxi­
mated by use of Hoerner's or Newton's method.^ The diffi­
culties of manag ing either equation (15) or (17) to obtain 
a general solution in terms of L are obvious.
Conceptually, equations (15) and (17) are the same 
as their counterparts in the case of the log-linear demand 
function. The difficulties of managing these equations 
are surmountable--but obviously, the log-linear demand 
function more easily facilitates development of a general 
model for the regulated firm.
Management of equations (15) and (17) pose no such 
problems in the specific case where constant returns to 
scale apply. Restating equation (13)
ambl/^Rl/Z - bm^LK - wL - sWK = 0, (18)
Differentiating with respect to L
-John Brixey and Richard Andree, "College Mathematics" 





2 (bm^K + w)
Substituting in equation (9)
a^m^K 
2 (brn̂ K + w)
a^m^K(bm^K + w) 
4 (bm^K + w)2 - sWK = 0





Substituting for K in equation 11
r sW(a^m^ - 4sWw)
^  O T --------
Output, Q f  may now be solved for by substituting for K and L 
in the production function,
Q = mL®K®
0  = m sW(a^m^ - 4sWw)
1/2 " 5 2a m  - 4sWw 1/2
a^bm^ 4bm2sW
Q
(a^m^ - 4sWw) 
2m2ab (24)
Price, P, may be solved for by substituting in the demand 
function
P =» a - bQ
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P = a a2jtj2 _ 4sWw2mrab
p _ 2m^a^b - m^a^b - 4sWw 
2m^ab
m^a^b - 4sWw 
2m^ab (25)
The graphical solution to the problem of determining 
equilibrium inputs, output and price of output for the 
linear demand function is shown in Pig. 2.7, Fig, 2,7 is a 
graphic representation of the static model for the regulated 
firm facing a linear demand function and is the linear 
counterpart for the log-linear version of Fig. 2,6, The 
short-run path of optimum allocation of inputs
MRgfL = w
for the linear demand function differs substantially from the 
optimal path of inputs for the log-linear demand function.
When'
then
P = a bo
(a - 2bmL“KB) {amL^-^K^} = w 
aamL“"^K® - 2abm^L^““^ K ^ w  = 0. (26)
2ttFrom equation (3), Q is determinable when MRq=0 
MRq = a - 2bQ 






* PQ - irL - rWK
Capital
Fig, 2:7.— The complete statio model for the regnlated film facing a linear demand function
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Total differentiation yields
dL _ BaoiraL“"^K^"^ - 4aem^L^“”^ K ^ .. .
^  (a-l)aamLO-^KG “ (2a~l)2abm^L^«"^K^^°
Marginal revenue is zero when
Q = a/2bo
Therefore, the firm may be expected to operate when
Q < a/2bo
An inspection of equation (27) shows that for small 
inputs the slope of the path of MR^f]^ = w will be positive» 
The slope of that path becomes zero when the numerator of 
the right side of equation (27) becomes zero» If the numer­
ator is set equal to zero, a solution for L at its maximum 
is obtained» This is equivalent to setting
or,
aornbO-lRB-l - 4ora2L2““lK2 6“l = o» (28)
Solving for L,
From the production function,
(30)
Output Q at the point of maximum L is obtained by 
substituting from (30) into (29), or
Q = f . (31)
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The slope of the path of optimum allocation of
inputs for output greater than a/4 is negative. The question
now arises as to whether the slope of this path is more or
less than the slope of the isoquant itself. The slope of an
isoquant is -,aK
The slope of the path of MRgf^ = w for output greater 
than a/4 may be shown to be less than the slope of the 
isoquant by first rearranging equation (27),
_  d L  _ BL _________________ [aL«-lK6-l-4mL2*-lK2e-l] __________________________________________
âïT i a L T - l K B - l - 4 m L 2 o - l K 2 B - l + 2 b m  L 2 a - l K 2 6 - l - a L a - l K 5 - l ]
a a
(32)
The slopes of the isoquant and the path of 
mRgf^ -= w are equal when






the output where marginal revenue is zero. Accordingly, the 









S O f  the sign of the algebraic sum of
2bmL2““V ® " ^  aL*-lK*"l (35)
must be negative»
And since it is known that the sign of the algebraic sum of
aamLG-lRB-l - 4o0mL2““lK23-l (36)
is negative when output is greater than a/4, the signs of 
both numerator and denominator of equations (32) and (27) are 
established as negative» And since the denominator of 
equation (3 2) is larger than the numerator when
the slope
g L  ̂ 6 L [aL*-lK6-l-4mL2*-lK2G-l]
Ô ÏT  ̂ “  ÏT [aL®” ^K '^"l-4m L2® -iK 2^“ l+2bmL^®“ lK^*^“ l - a L “ "iK '^”^V *
“ “ (37)
This interpretation is shown graphically in Fig» 2»8»
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The equilibrium output for the regulated firm is to 
be found at some level less than a/2b and probably greater 
than a/4o The precise level of equilibrium output is de­
termined by the values of H and a of the demand function, by 
m, a, and 3 of the production function, and by w, W, and s 
of the profit function.
?ig. 2.9.— Comparisons of short-run oaths of alloca­
tion of inputs for the recrulated firm 
facing linear and log-linear demand func­
tions.
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In the short run, the production process of the 
regulated firm becomes more capital intensive as output in­
creases regardless of the specification of the demand 
function. The path of optimum allocation of inputs for the 
log-linear demand function is continually rising, i,e,, both 
L and K increase as output increases. Significantly, for 
the linear demand function, input L actually decreases as 
short-run output is expanded beyond Q = a/4, This difference 
in allocation of inputs imposed by the two demand functions 
may not be as important as it would first appear. The 
paths may have no divergence at the equilibrium output for 
the firm. The output where the two paths intersect may be 
obtained by equating the marginal revenues for the two demand 
functions and solving the resulting polynomial for output Q, 
which is the equilibrium output:
(1 - a) HQ-o = a - 2bQ
(1 - a) H = aQ® - 2bQl+® ,
CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF THE STATIC MODEL 
FOR THE REGULATED FIRM
In this chapter, the static model for the regulated 
firm developed in Chapter II is analyzed and interpreted» 
The model retains its static character even though some 
aspects of the model under conditions of change resemble 
dynamic behavior» No inter-period analysis is made here» 
The capital stock is again assumed to be indestructible but 
the effects of changes of variables within the model are 
analyzed, and their results interpreted»
In Chapter II, equilibrium solutions for capital, 
labor, output, and price for the regulated firm were de­
veloped» These solutions were:
Capital,
1-g(l-o) g (l-o)
K = [l-g(l-o)] l“ (a+6) U-a) i“ (a+0) (l-o) ^
 1  1-0____
JJ 1-fg+S) (l-o) ^ 1- (g-!*8) (1-0)
« 1-g (l-o) g ( 1—0) "** 6






L = [l-a(l-o)] (1-0) [a(i_o)] l-(o+G)i-o) °
H 1- (a+3) (1- 01 n\ 1“ (“+S) (l-o)
° i? (l-oj 1-B (l-o)
(gW) l“ (ci+B) (l-o) ^ l-(a+g) (l-o]
(3.2)
Output,
Q =  [1-0 (l-o)] l - U + B V C l - a )  [a(i_o)] l-(o+B)(ï-o)°
0+6 1 
y 1 - ( o + 6 ) (l-o) ^  l - ( a + 6 ) (l-o)
6 g
(gw) 1-(o+é)(1-G) w i” (g+3)(T-o)
(3.3)
Price f
 - 6 g   —00__
P = [l-o(l-o)] 1- (g+f r U-a) [o(l-o)] l-(g+&y(l-o, ■
1 - (g+6 ) - 0 _____
H J-- (g+é) (l-o) ^ 1 - (0 + 6 ) (i-oTJL - 6 o_____ -oo___
(gQ,) l-(g+6 ) (1 - 0 ) ^ l-(o+6 ) (1-G)
(3,4)
If exponents o, 6 , and o of the production and demand 
functions are held constant, i.e.,
do d 6 do _
“7 “ "6 “ “T  ’ ° (3°5)
79
then.




% " [ 1 [i-(a+3) (1 - 0 )




_  t e
(T-(0+3) (1-G)
dP _ I l-(tt+8)
P [1-(0+3)(l-o)
. [ So_____
[1 -(0 + 8 )(l-o)




[ 1" 0 ] dw
[1-(a+3) (l-a)] w (3,6)
dH , [ 1-0 ] dm
—  [r-fo+T)"(l-o)'] In
d(sW) [ 1-3 (1-0) ] dw -7 ^
1 W  [T=T7+mr:5T] -w (3.7)
dH , [ 1 ] dm"TT [1-(a+3 ) (l-o)] m
d(sW) _ [ o ] dw a\
n w r  [i'-ro+é)''(T-oT] “  '
dH _ [ 0______ ] dm ."TT [1 - ( 0 + 3  ) ( 1 - 0  ) ] m
d(aW) . [ 0 0  1 dw
- n w r  + [r-T o+vrrr-oT] “w °(3°9)
Effect of Changes in Demand
The effect of a change in demand, i,e,, a change in 
variable H, the coefficient of the log-linear demand function, 
on the four equilibrium products of the static modelt capital, 
labor, output, and price may be expressed
3K ^ [ 1 ] 3H








 0-0 ] 311
1“ ( ot+0) ( l“a) ] H





A change in variable H, among all the variables of 
the model, is unique in that a change in H represents a 
shift of the demand function rather than movement along it 
as induced by changes in m, s, W, and w, A change in H of 
the log-linear demand function corresponds to a change in 
the Y-axis intercept of the linear demand function. Ex­
ponents a, 0, and o are still assumed to be constant. Be­
cause a change in H represents a shift of the demand 
function, it can be expected to have a greater impact on the 
equilibrium products of the model; capital, labor, output, 
and price; than the other variables of the model. Equations 
(3,10) and (3,11) show that changes in capital and labor re­
quirements as a result of changes in variable H are 
identical. Equations (3,5), (3,7), (3,8), and (3,9) show 
that the log-linear factor [the elements within brackets 
in equations (3,10) through (3,13)] for all variables have 
in common the term l-(a+B)(l-o) in the denominator of the 
factor. This term approaches zero as (a+0)(l-o) approaches 
one and accordingly, the log-linear factor becomes inde­
terminate.
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For all determinate cases,
r-Ta“+eTU"5T "
Therefore, a one per cent change in H may be expected to re­
sult in more than a one per cent change in capital and 
labor,^ The profound effect of a change in price-quantity 
elasticity, o, on capital and labor requirements becomes 
clear as the effect of even a small change on the denom­
inator, 1-(o+e)(1-a), is observed.
The effect of a change in variable H on output is 
conditioned, in part, by returns to scale. The expression
9Q _ [ ct+6 ] 3H 
-Q - [l-(cx+6> (1-a)'] —
shows this to be true. Only for constant returns to scale
would a change in H have the same effect on output as on
capital and labor requirements. Obviously, a decrease in a
(or an increase in the elasticity of demand) has the same
explosive effect on output as it has on capital and labor
requirements. In the case of increasing returns to scale, a
one per cent increase in demand causes a greater than one
per cent increase in output, A one per cent increase in
demand increases output more than proportionately even for
decreasing returns to scale if
a+6 > l-(a+6) (l-o) ,
Equation (3,13) relating changes in price to changes
^In Chapter II, p, 42, it was shown that price- 
quantity elasticity, o, is the reciprocal of the more 
familiar concept, elasticity of demand.
8?
in demand may be restated
9P  ^ [ !■= (o+e) ] P i-i  ̂A\
W  [l-(o+e') (T-o)'] ÏÏ ° (3.14)
Equation (3«14) conforms to widely held notions as to 
the shape of the long-run cost curve for increasing and de­
creasing returns to scale. The numerator tells whether the 
long-run coat falls or rises; and the equation (3,14) also 
precisely defines the sign and slope of the cost curve and; 
hence, whether the latter is rising or falling.
Equation (3,14) shows that for constant returns to 
scale a change in demand has no effect on price. This sit­
uation must be considered a special case. Clearly, for all
other returns to scale, increasing and decreasing, a change 
in demand does affect price.
Effect of Change in Technology
The coefficient m of the production function
Q " mL®K®
is usually considered a measure of the state of technology 
of the production process. The effect of a change in tech­
nology on capital, labor, output, and price may be expressed
3K _ [ 1-a
"Y " [r-r«+éï(T-o)’
3L _ [ 1-a
“T  ■ [l-(o+6)(1-a)
3Q . [ 1






"p - “ rt _ /™-LRTVl'JrtTi ~  o (3«18)
A change in technology causes identical changes in 
capital and laboro The term (1-a) first appeared in the 
revenue function
PQ =, HQl-o =
The term (l-o) of equations (3.15) and (3«16) indicates that 
one per cent change in technology causes a less than pro­
portionate change in capital and laboro If price-quantity 
elasticity is one, the numerator of (3ol5) and (3,16) be­
comes zero; hence a change in technology has no effect on 
capital and labor requirements, A positive change in 
technology has a positive effect on capital and labor 
(3,15 and 3,16) for the simple reason that improving tech­
nology decreases the cost of output. Decreased cost of 
output serves to increase--by way of the demand function—  
requirements of inputs capital and labor,
A change in technology causes the same, change in 
output (3,17) that a change in demand causes in changes of 
capital and labor; i,e,, the elasticity of output to tech­
nology is determined by the dimensions of the denominator,
1-(o+0)(1-a), as in equation (3,17), The elasticity of 
price to technology (3,18) has a alone in the numerator; 
but a, as for the equations relating to changes in vari­
ables H, above, w (3,19) through (3,22), and (sW) (3,23)
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through (3.26), also appears in the denominator « Whether 
or not a change of one per cent increase in technology 
causes more than a one per cent decrease in price depends 
in large measure on returns to scale, (a+8),
Effect of Change in the Wage Rate
The effect of a change in the wage rate on capital, 



























An increase in the wage rate, w, does not result 
in an increase in capital requirements. An increase in the 
wage rate makes output more expensive. The demand function, 
then, acts to decrease output, which, in turn, causes a 
decrease in capital. An increase in the wage rate causes 
changes in the same negative direction for labor and out­
put, but the magnitude of the change is clearly different. 
For most cases, it seems likely that
l-B(l-o) > a(l-o) 
which would mean that a decrease in the wage rate causes 
a greater positive change in requirements of labor than of
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capital0 As for output, it is not at all surprising to 
find that the elasticity of output to labor is represented 
in the numerator of the log-linear factor describing the 
change in output in response to a change in the price of 





c ' a c "
; T - s r r - p T " " m
^l-(o+8)(1-0)
' 'a n-èTr-oTT"“
^r-TcT+eTTl-ar • “ (o+é) (i-ol w,i-(o+B) (i-oj'
where C %  c ' "  are inclusive constants substituted
for all internal variables and constants except w«
Similarly, the product aa appears in the numerator 
of the factor describing the elasticity of price of output 
to the wage rates
Capital, labor, and output decrease as the wage 
rate increaseso Price increases as the wage rate increases. 
The relations developed here measure the magnitude of the 
changes in capital, labor, output and price in response 
to a change in the wage rate*
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Changes in Return and the Price 
of a unit of Capital
Return on, and the price of,a unit of capital are 
treated together in the term, (sW)o The effect of changes 
in (sW) on capital, labor, output, and price may be ex­
pressed
[ l-ad-o) ] 3 (sW)
nr ll-(o+g)(l-o)J (sW)
= - [ g(l-o) ] 3 (sW)Li-(o+gyn-oTj (sW)
12 = - [ 6 ] 3 (sW)Q 11-(o+g)(1-0)j (sW)
3P [ go ] 3 (sW)





An increase in return, s, does not result in the 
use of more capital. An increase in return, like an in­
crease in the price of a unit of capital or an increase in 
the wage rate, makes the product more expensive. This change 
causes a decrease in output, which, in turn, causes a de­
crease in requirements of capital and labor. Obviously, 
an increase in (sW) results in an increase in price. The 
terms, l-a(l-a) and 0(l-a), are less than one; 6 and go 
are also likely to be less than one. Accordingly, a one per 
cent change in s, W, or the product sW is expected to cause 
a less than proportionate change in K, L, Q, and P,
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Some Comparisons of, and Combi­
nations Changes! in internal 
Variables
A change in (sW) causes changes in K, L, Q and P 
that are in the same direction as those caused by changes 
in the wage rateo The question arises as to whether a one 
per cent increase in the wage affects capital requirements 
more than a one per cent increase, in the price, W, of 
unit of capital or in the rate of return, s. The answers 
cannot be definitely stated until a, 0, and a are known; 
but later, in the discussion of the expansion path of the 
firm, it is established that g)' niay be expected to be
less than oneo If so, then clearly
l-ad-qj  > g ( l-o )
l-Ta+0)(1-0) 1“ (g+0)(i~o)
Accordingly, an increase of one per cent in the price of a 
unit of capital (or in the rate of return) decreases 
capital requirements more than a one per cent increase in 
the wage rate* As for the relative effect of changes in 
(sW) and w on a change in labor, no general statement may 
be made as to whether 1-0(l-o) is greater than 0(l-o)«
A one per cent increase in demand affects changes 
in capital by a factor greater than changes in tech­
nology. Again the larger part of this greater response of 
capital to a change in H than in m lies in the fact that 
the former represents a shift of the demand function while 
the latter represents movement along it.
ni
the effect of a one per cent change in technology 
on capital requirements may ne offset by a i per cent
change in the wage rate or by a per cent change in
(SW) 0
Combinational changes may be studied, eog», the 
effect of a one per cent increase in the price of both 
capital and labor on the use of capital (or use of labor, 
or in output,or price of output) may be investigated, A 
change in capital, labor, output, or price may be ex­
plained not only by the values of the variables within the 
model (H, m, w, W, and s) but by changes in any one, or 
all, of the remaining three of the solutions for K, L, Q, 
and P of the model. For example, output may be explained
This expression may be modified to explain changes 
in capital another way,
Price changes may be explained by
- a Ëg (3,28)
or by,
- â| - oâïï - ^  . (3,28a)
Intermediate relations may also explain changes, 
in solutions for K, L, Q, and P. For example, since





d(MRQ) ^ dfK _ d(sW) 
""mïïq'" + -7^ “str"
The intermediate solution for labor is another 
example 0 Here changes in labor may be explained by combi­
national changes of variables within the model plus a 




jjl-o ( i-a) jjjl-o fl-ar [a (i-a) ] i“0 (l-o) ^
  1 -----..........
,1-a (l-o)w
then, assuming that a, 8, and a remain constant.
dL _ t 1 ] dH ^ [ 1-0 ] dm ^
T  [l-Vd-oJ] nr ^ [TnSTTToT] “m +
. [ 8:1-0) ] dK _ [ 1 ] dw
[1-0(l-o) ] nr [1-0(l-o)] w °
The examples above (assuming o, 8, and o are con­
stant) are only a few of the many possible combinations of 
changes in the internal variables and changes in the solu­
tions for K, L, Q, and P that may explain changes in a
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selected single solution of the model.
Changes in Capital in Response 
to dnanges in o, a, and 3 ~~~
Attention is now directed toward explanations of 
the changes in capital where all internal variables H, m, 
w, and sW are held constant, but where a of the demand func­
tion and a and 3 of the production function are allowed to 
change0 Differentiation of K with respect to a, 3, and o 
is a considerably more involved exercise than for the 
variables previously investigated. Under this assumption 
all changes in capital may be expressed
dK = do + H  da + H  d3. (3.29)3o 3a TF
Restating the capital function.
1—a (l-o) a(l-o)___
K . [i-a(i-o)i [.(i.,)] iTrâTmT=âr
1 1-0
1-(a+3) (l-o) ^ i-fa+0) (i-o)
1-a(i-o) a(l-o)
1- (a+3) (l-o) ^ i- (a+3) (1-0)
Differentiation with respect to o, a, and 8 re­
quires that the capital function be expressed in logarithmic 
form:
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logK = + [i-Tâ+èTrr-ân
+ [ T = T O T m W ]  [i-«(i-o)] + [r- T ^ rfr ^ ‘] t«(i-o)]
- !r “K w r r W n  logf^w) - [f:r«wrr:?n 1°**
(3.30)
The Change in Capital in Re­
sponse to a Change in the 
Price-Quantity Elasticity, a
Changes in capital, K, in response to a change in
2price-quantity elasticity, a, is expressed
l-g(l-j)
)K . [l-a(l-g)] l-(a+BMl-o) [a(l-g)] l-(a+6) (ï-o) 
Ta [l-(o+6)(1-a)]^
jj 1-(a+S) (1-0) n\ l“ ('o+̂ ) (1 -0 ) 
l-a(i-g) g (i-a)l - ( a + s J  (i-a) ^ i-(a+i) (T-a)
,|-(a+B)logH-logm-glog[1-a(1-a)]-alog[a(l-o)]+alogw-glog(sw) j
(3,31)
All terms in last bracketed collection of terms in
(3.31) are negative in sign except the wage rate. An in­
crease in a, then, has a drastic negative effect on capital,
2Details of the logarithmic differentiation are 
supplied in the appendix to this chapter.
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The corollary observation is that an increase in the elas­
ticity of demand has an equally drastic positive effect on 
capital requirements0
The Change in Capital in Re­
sponse to a Change in the 
Elasticity of Output to Labor
The change in capital, K, in response to a change
in a, the elasticity of output to labor, may be expressed
l-o(l-a) g (1-g)
3K _ [l-g(l-a)] (i-a) i-(a+S)(l-aT
^  [l-(g+B)(l-o)
1    1-0____
jj l-(d+3) (1-oj m i-(o+6) (T-o)
__l-g^l-o) ' a d - o T
(sW) "1- (g+g) (l-o) y, 1- (g+^j (i-o)
a |^(l-o)logH + (l-o)^logm + 6 (l-o) ̂ log [1-g (l-o)] +
[ (l-o)-3(l-o)logg(l-o) - [(l-o)-3(l-o)logw -
3(l-o)2log(sW^ ,
(3.32)
The signs of the first four terms of the latter 
bracketed collection of terms in (3.32) are all positive. 
The fifth term has a negative sign but because of the sub­
tractions within brackets is very small. The sign of logw 
could even be positive. The last term is unmistakably 
negative but the coefficient of log(sW) is clearly very
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small. Accordingly, may be expected to be positive; 
that is, an increase in elasticity of output with respect 
to labor increases capital requirements.
The Change in Capital in Re­
sponse to a Change in the 
Elasticity of Output to Capital
The change in capital, K, in response to a change
in B, the elasticity of output with respect to capital, may
be expressed
l-a(i-g) a (l-o)
3K ^ [-a(l-o)] [«(1-a)] T^T^+ÏÏTTT=vr
3 3 —  [l-(a+B) (l-o) ]^ *
H 1“ ( a+ôy fl-o) Yn 1" ( a+6) (l-o ) 
1-a(l-o) (l-o)
(gw) i-(a+B) (1-0) ^ r-ra+éTrr-ôT"
» jjl-o)logH + (1—o)^logm + [ (l-o)-a (l-o) log(l-a (l-o) ] -
- [ (l-o)-a (l-o) (sW)+a (l-o) ̂ log [a (l-o) ]-a (l-o) ̂ log^ •
(3,33)
a VThe sign of ^  is almost sure to be positive. The 
term a(l-o) is very small, so the effect of the wage rate 
is minimal. The price of a unit of capital would have to 
be extremely high to make the sign of negative. In 
Chapter V, changes of capital are investigated in relation 
to the sum of a and g, or returns to scale, in a dynamic 
setting. Positive changes in a and g, then,may be expected
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to have a positive effect on changes in capital. It is 
difficult to imagine a case where an increase in a or 0 
would have a negative effect on the change in capital. The
e x p r e s s i o n s and ^  have common terms for logH and logm 3 o 3 6
SO the relative effect of 3a versus 3 6 rests in a compari­
son of
6(1-a)^log[1 -0 (1-a)] + [(1-a)-6(1-a)logo(1-a) - 
- [(1-a)-6(1-a)2]logw-6(1-a)^log(sW)
with
[1-a)-o(1-a)log[1 -0 (1-a)] + o(1-a)^logo(1-a) -
- [o(1-a) ̂ 1 logw- [ (1-a) -o (1-a)'^] log(sW) ,
No general statement may be made here as to the relative 
effect of changes in o and 6 on K; but in Chapter V, where 
some specific numerical values for o, 6, and a are sup­
plied, changes in capital in response to changes in 
(o+6) are shown to be greatest when the composition of this 
sum is most heavily weighted by 6 rather than o.
The Process of Attaining 
iËiquiTibrivun
Instead of considering wL-fsWK as an expression for 
required revenue of the regulated firm, this sum may be 
considered a "quasi-cost" function. This sum is a quasi- 
cost in that it represents a collection of charges without 
being exclusively costs in the strictest sense. Indeed, 
this expression simulates the sum of "costs" to be covered
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by revenues and is referred to as "cost of service" in 
public-utility rate making^ The symbol C '  represents cost 
of service in the quasi-cost function
C" = wL + sMK. (3.34)
This function may be used to provide for conditions of
disequilibrium. Only at equilibrium is the cost of service
function equal to the revenue function
R = PQ = HQl-0, (3.35)
A quasi-revenue function may also be devised to 
represent conditions of disequilibrium, i.e., in cases where 
revenue is not equal to revenue requirements, the symbol R' 
represents such conditions, or,
R' = HQl-o.
Disequilibrium conditions may be investigated to 
gain insight into, for example, changes in capital with re­
spect to changes in other variables of the model. Parallel 
investigations may also be made of changes in labor, output, 
and price with respect to changes in the same variables of 
the model.
To pursue this line of investigation, the quasi- 
cost and quasi-revenue functions must be expressed in 
terms of capital K. From the static model of Chapter II, 
it is known that
L = f (K),
To obtain this function more precisely, use may be made of 
the dimensions, defined in Chapter II, of L and K.
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L =
g (l-o) 1-g (l-‘g)
[l-a(l-o)] l-(»+8)U-o) i-lo+BHl-a)




K = [1-a (1-g)] l-(“+Bni-ar l-(a+g)(ï-gy
H
1 w».-g) ^ 1-(o+g) fl-g|)
1-a(1-g) a (l-g)**
1- (a+g) (l-g) ^ 1 - U + é )  (l“oT
The labor-capital ratio, then, is
L _ [ a(l-g) ] sW
ÎT " [rrsTr=gT] “ . (3,36)
Substitution from equation (3o36) may be made into 
equation (3c34)
C' » w —  + sWK,[l-g(l-g)] w (3,37)
Rearranging,
C  - r-rr— T ' (3.38)1-a(l-g)
Equation (3,35) must also be expressed in terms of
K and L
R' - HQl-*. (3,39)
Substituting for Q from the Cobb-Douglas production,
91
R '  =  H  m l - *  L * ( l - * )  K ^ f l - * )  ( 3 e 4 0 )
r ' = H ml-o KG (l-o) T
H ml-*(sW)G(l"*)K(»+B)(l-o) (i_o) =(!-*)
- (l-o ) (l-o) , —
(3.41)
Equating the quasi-cost and quasi-revenue functions 
results in the familiar equilibrium expression for capital, 
K, developed in Chapter II.
To equate the changes in the quasi-cost function to 
changes in the quasi-revenue function, it is necessary to 
restate the functions in the differential logrithmic form:
dlog C  = - dlog [1-a(l-o)] + dlog (sW) + dlog K
(3.42)
dlog R' ■ dlog H + (l-o)dlog m + a(l-o)dlog (sW) - 
- a(l-o)dlog w + (o+g)(l-o)dlog K +
[a(l-o)]dlog [a(l-o)] - [o(l-o)]dlog[1-a(l-o)] .
(3.43)
Under equilibrium conditions, the changes in the cost 
function may be equated to changes in the revenue function.
dlog R' - dlog C' = dlog H + (1-a) dlog m + a(1-a) dlog(sW)
- a(1-a) dlog w + (a+3)(1-a) dlog K 
+ [a(1-a)] dlog [a(1-a)] - [a(1-a)] dlog [1-a(1-a)]
+ dlog [1 -0 (1-a)] - dlog (sW) - dlog K = 0,
(3.44)
Since at equilibrium,
R' - cr = 0 
equation (3,44) may be rearranged;
[1-(a+3)(1-a)]dlog K = dlog H+(l-a)log m+[a(l-o)-1]log (sW) 
[1 -0 (1-a)] dlog [1-a(1-a)]+[a(1-a)] dlog [a(1-a)]
- [a(1-a)] dlog w ,
(3.45)
Dividing (3,45) by l-(o+3)(l-o) and taking the 
antilogarithm of both sides of the equation results in the 
familiar expression for capital, K, developed in Chapter II, 
A change in any of the variables destroys the 
equality of R' and C , but a kind of dynamic process is 
set in motion to restore equilibrium. The upsetting, and 
restoration, of equilibrium may be illustrated by examining, 
for example, the change in capital induced by a change 
in the demand function. Clearly, equilibrium is upset by 
this change; but immediately the adjustment process begins. 
First, the quasi-revenue, R', is shifted by an amount equal
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to dR as shown in Figo 3olo Gradually the dynamic process,
illustrated by the sawtooth steps, works itself out in the
change of capital requirements that is shown in Figo 3olo
The factor of the log-linear function acts1- (a+3)(l-o)
in a manner that parallels the action of the familiar in­
vestment multiplier 1- Ac/ûŸ macroeconomic theory.
Similarly an increase in quasi-cost, C^, because of 
an increase in either return, s, or in the price, W, of a 
unit of capital, causes, by the same dynamic process, a 
decrease in capital requirements. This process is shown 
graphically in Fig. 3.2.
The log-linear factor 
examined a bit further* Since a of the demand function,
p = HQ“®, is equal to ^  where e^ is the elasticity of
d
demand, marginal revenue MR^ may be defined as
MRq - P (1 -
Thus, (1-a) becomes equivalent to marginal revenue divided 
by price,
( W )





Fig. 3.1— The establishment of nev equilibrium capital requirements as a result of a 






Fig. 3.2— The establishment of new equilibrium capital requirements as a result of an
increase in the "cost-of-service* to cover an increase in the rate of return, s
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Obviously, for increasing returns to scale, a need not 
equal one for l-(a+3)(1-a) to equal one^ For example when 
a+B*2, 1-(oi+B) (l-o) is equal to one when o=l/2o The ex­
plosive nature of this multiplier may be grasped by con­
sidering the case of increasing returns to scale and a
small price-quantity elasticity, o, (large elasticity of 
demand)« Capital requirements approach infinity as the 
denominator approaches zeroo No meaning is attached to 
l-(o+B) (1-a) 0; that is, when (o+6) (1-a) ^ 0.
Expansion Path of the Firm
The function
L [ g(l-a)] sW
[1 - 0  (1-a) ] w
is of greater importance than a mere device to permit 
substitution for Labor, L, in the cost-of-service function. 
The ^ function defines the long-run expansion path of the
regulated firm. The path so defined is an equilibrium 
path.
Since the regulated firm is rationally more capital 
intensive in its production process than is the unregulated 
firm, and since s>r, then the ratio ^-o 
expected to be less than one.
The ratio of the expansion paths of the regulated 
and unregulated firms is a constant. Therefore, the ex­
pansion path of the unregulated firm may be obtained without 
solving for cost-minimizing inputs. The marginal rate of
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technical substitution of capital for labor in the cost- 
minimizing firm is defined






ITT" ~  
I?
(3,46)
where L* and K* are optimal inputs for the unregulated firm. 
Equation (3,46) defines the expansion path of the 
unregulated firm. The ratio of the unregulated and regu­
lated expansion paths then is
L* a r W
8 w
















Fig- 3 . 3 . —Expanaion paths of  the regulated and the unregulated firms
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The expansion path defined by bas been
described as "efficiente"^ Expansion paths for the regu­
lated and unregulated firm are shown in Figo 3o3, The 
divergence between these two paths is a central theme in 
proposals to improve the "quality of regulation." To the 
extent that divergence from cost minimization is a measure 
of efficiency, the expression
® “ I [l-&Tr%T] (3.48)
determines, in per cent, the efficiency of the regulated 
firm. Equation (3.48) has significant welfare implica­
tions to those who believe any departure from cost minimi­
zation is socially undesirable. Equation (3.48) precisely 
defines the extent to which the regulated firm digresses 
from cost minimization.
Capital Requirements in Response 
to Changes in dutput and to the 
Rate or Change of Output
For the static model developed in the last chapter,
changes in capital requirements may be expressed in several
ways. The expression, ^  may take different forms
^See Alvin K. Klevorick, "The Graduated Fair Returnt 
A Regulatory Proposal," American Economic Review, Vol. LVI, 
No. 2, p. 478. Klevorick' defines efficiency as
w
which is a ratio of MRTS^ for L conditions that do not 
minimize costs, with rW/w.
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because changes in output may be explained by changes in 
one or more variables of the model itself a
If changes in output are explained by changes in 
the demand function, then from equations (3„6) and (3.8)
%  = [l-Ca+sfrr-aT] ^
and
%  " [l-(a+înT:ôT] ^  ' (3'SO)
Eliminating ^  from equations (3.49) and (3,50),
dK » r ^ j  I dQ . (3,51)
The capital-output ratio is obtained from equa­
tions (3.1) and (3,3)t
1- (g+g) -g
H i“ (a+6)(i-a) ^ 1 - (o+ô) tl"0)
' l-g (l-g)-' è qq
(SW) l“ <«+^T(l-a) ^ I-la+éMi-a) (3,53)
and may be substituted in equation (3,51) to obtain the 
change in capital in response to a change in output.
If an increase in output is explained by an increase 
in technology m, then, from equations (3.26) and (3.34)
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dK = (1-a) I dQo (3.53)
Similarly if an increase in output is explained by 
a decrease in the wage rate, w, then again,
dK » (l-o) I dQ (3.54)
and if an increase in output is explained by a decrease in 
(sW), then,
dK = I dQ, (3.55)
Equations (3.53), (3.54), and (3.55) are not satis* 
factory, because they all contain H of the demand func­
tion in the capital-output ratio. If H is eliminated, 
then, the absolute level of capital, K, as well as the 
change in K may be expressed in terms of technology, m, 
wage rate, w, return on the price of a unit of capital, 
(sW), a and B of the production function, and o of the de­
mand function. Changes in all these variables represent 
movement along the demand curve rather than a shift of the 
demand function.
Starting with the production function,





L [ g (1 -g) 1 aW
îT [1-g (l-g) ] w
Substituting for ^ in (3o56)
Q = m
Solving for capital, K,
g+? , y g+é
K 4 ©  .
Equation (^oSS) makes K a function of Q« If 
output, Q, is a function solely of H of the demand 
function, then both H and Q should not appear in the 
same equation» Equation (3,58) permits treating output as 
a constant to permit, in turn, investigation of the effect 
of a change in m, w, sW, g , 8 and o on capital 
requirements.
The rate of change of output may be investigated for 
its effect on investment. It
or, by multiplying both sides by W
g 1 l-(o+6)
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But investment, I, is W ^ ;  therefore equation 
{3o60) becomes an expression for investment in terms of 
the rate of change of output, and from equations (3o58) 
and (3,59),
Like equation (3o51), equation (3o61) shows the 
change in capital to be an increasing function of the 
change in output for decreasing returns to scale. But for 
the more interesting case, the change in capital is a de­
creasing function of output for increasing returns to 
scale. This finding for the regulated firm is in accord 
with Smith's conclusion for the unregulated cost- 
minimizing firm,* Like Smith's finding for the cost- 
minimizing firm, the investment implications of equations 
(3,60) and (3,61) are not generally believed.
The relations investigated in this section are 
those to which, in other works, the terms accelerator, 
accelerator coefficient, and the acceleration principle 
are frequently applied^ both in macro- and microeconomic 
studies. Because these terms are not uniform in specific 
relations, the writer has avoided their use in this section,
Vernon L, Smith, Investment and Production 
(Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University ÿress, l^ëdj, pp« 313*
318 and Vernon L, Smith, "Theory of Investment and Pro­
duction," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol» LXXIII,
No, 1, pp, s3-W,
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The Case Where Capital Employed 
Falls Short of Its Regulated 
Optimum WheA the Aequlated 7irm 
Maintains a Specified Output
The static model developed in Chapter II may be used 
to explain what happens to profits, regulated and unregulated, 
when the firm uses capital in an amount less than the optimal 
level determined by the equilibrium solution of the model.
The situation where the amount of capital falls short of the 
optimal amount permits profit, it, to rise even though a 
constant output is maintained. The increased profit, how­
ever, results froiji the unregulated profit function. Regu­
lated profit, on the other hand, declines linearly as the 
amount of capital employed decreases. Unregulated profit 
rises as the amount of capital employed is reduced from the 
regulated firm's optimal amount to that level which would 
be used by the cost-minimizing firm. Classically the cost- 
minimizing firm increases profits as it reduces output to 
some optimal level. The case examined here assumes constant 
output. In this case, unregulated profit also rises— until 
a maximum profit is attained. Thereafter, as the amount of 
capital employed is further decreased, profit declines and 
ultimately disappears altogether. See Fig, 3,4,
The unregulated profit function, restated, is 
ÏÏ = PQ-wL-rWK
where it is profit
r is the cost of capital
ng. 3.4.— Illustration of ezoess profit resulting from substitution of rarlsble Inputs for fixed Inputs
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Changes in profit, ir, may then be described;
dir = MRgdQ-wdL-rWdK, (3.62)










dïï _ fw _ rwl
K|F^ (3.63)
The expression
k - n - °
represents conditions of maximum profit for the unregulated 
firm. Substitution for f. and f yields the minimum-cost 
solution of Chapter I:
w_________ rW
amL®“lK® " 6mL®K^"^ *
i:.::
Substituting for L from the production function and 
solving for K,
If price is set for a certain constant output, Q ,
(to be produced with the optimal allocation of inputs under 
regulation), the amount of profit that results when the 
amount of capital used decreases is designated as profit, 
tt'. a  portion, t t " ,  of profit, ir ' , is "excess" in that fair 
or allowable return is exceeded. This "excess" is subject to 
refund unless the regulatory authority elects to attribute 
the excess to chance. If the excess is attributed to chance, 
it presumably would be offset by a corresponding deficiency 
in profit during some other period. The amount of the 
excess profit, t t " ,  is
t t "  = PQ-wL-sWk. (3.66)
If the regulated firm allocates its inputs optimally 
and if rate of return, s, is perfectly set, then excess 
profit, is zero.
Excess profit disappears when capital, K, is de­
creased to a certain level, e.g. at approximately 46 of 
Fig. 3.4(a). Capital, K, at the point where profit disap­






A simultaneous solution is possible here because 
both output, Q, and its price, P, are fixed.
For the example in Chapter II (page 53) where regu­
lated optimal inputs, L and K, were 144 and 607 units, re­
spectively (and a, B, and o each were 0.5), the output is
Q = 100 l V 2  r I/2 = 9̂ 360 units 
and the price is
P = 10 Q"5 = .103.
Where wage rate, w, = 4
Price of a unit of capital = 100 
Rate of return, s, = .05 
substituting in the zero excess profit function,
0 = PQ-wL-sWk
0 = 963-4L-5K. (3.67)
From the production function.
T _ (93.6)2jj = TT (3.68)
Substituting in equation (3.67) and solving the re­
sulting quadratic^
_ 193 ±|/l93 - 4 (.8) (93.6)2 (3.69)K
K = 144, 46
Solutions to the equations for conditions other than 
constant returns to scale require working with a polynomial. 
Approximation by Hoerner's or Newton's Method are required. 
See J.C. Brixey and R.C. Andree, Fundamentals of College 
Mathematics (New York; Holt, 1954), pp. ^43-^4^.
I l l
The first of these two roots is the optimal solution 
for capital, K, already solved for; the second is the reduced 
level of capital where all excess profit disappears.
Similarly, substitution in the function 
0 = PQ-wL-rWK
yields the levels of capital where all "ordinary" profit dis­
appears, For cost of capital, r, = ,04; wage rate, w, = 4; 
and price of a unit of capital, W, = 100, the simultaneous 
solution of the profit function and the production function 
yields the two roots to the resulting quadratic, K = 197, 44, 
Clearly, these two levels of capital represent the outer 
limits of the profit "hill" for an output of 9,360 units sold 
at a price, P, of ,103, All these solutions for capital, K, 
are shown graphically in Fig, 3,4,
Capital used by the unregulated firm while maintain­
ing output of 9,360 units when
is obtained by differentiating the unregulated profit function
TT' = PQ-wL-rWK
K = 93,6
This solution means that profit, ir', increases as capital is
decreased from the regulated firm's optimal level of 144 to
93,6 units. Thereafter profit, tt', decreases until it dis­
appears altogether at a capital use of 44 units.
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A part, of profity n , is "excess" profit.
Excess profit tr ' ' is maximum when
dill = 0
This solution is obtained by differentiating the excess 
profit function with respect to Ks
TT  ̂ — PQ“WL~sv’7K
K = 84,1,
The two profit functions, tt = PQ-wL-rMK, one for 
optimal output along the path I^RgfL = w and the other for 
constant output, are shown as tangent at the point of optimum 
employment of capital for the regulated firm. The point de­
termined by
on the path MRgf^ = w indicates the cost-minimizing amount of 
capital to be used. This amount of capital is used to gen­
erate the output that equates marginal revenue and marginal 
costs
But setting
Ê -  "  °
for the i t'’ profit function merely establishes the cost- 
minimizing amount of capital to be used when a particular 
output must be maintained. The amount of capital used when 
excess profit i t " ’ is greatest, i o e , ,  when
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involves the same output « All three solutions are shown in 
Figo 3c4,
The "Interior" Cost of Capital 
of the Regulated Firm
A principal theme of this study is that rational be­
havior of the regulated firm calls for the use of more
capital in producing output than is used by the unregulated 
firm; furthermore, given demand and production functions, it 
is possible to measure how much more capital intensive the 
production process is in the regulated firm than in the un­
regulated firm. If this margin of relative capital in­
tensity is indeed measurable, then it is possible to solve 
for the interior cost of capital of the regulated firm.^
If the optimum solution for the regulated firm calls
for capital Kg, an artificial "interior" cost function may 
be described as
Cg = WLg+pWKg (3.70)
where Lg and Kg represent optimal solution for inputs in 
the regulated firm 
Cg is total "interior" cost 
p is the "interior" cost of capital ,
GHere the term internal cost of capital might have 
been used. The term internal cost of capital implies some 
assessment of future earnings to provide the equity component 
of cost of capital. The word internal also is applied to 
funds originating from retained earnings and depreciation. 
Such funds may be regarded as having a "price" different from 
equity funds generated outside the firm. The word interior 
is used here to call attention to the regulated firm's useof 
capital, the "rate base," as though in effect, the rental 
rate of capital were lower than its market or "exterior 
rate."
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Substituting from the production function for Lg,
A  _ + pWK_. (3.71)s I m I K 6/a ®
Differentiating the artificial cost function with respect 
to Kg,
1
= _ M ( 2 V k ‘ ^ +PW =: 0. (3.72)dK_ a Im/s \ '
The interior cost of capital p then, is
 ̂ = lw(m)"K • (3-73)
Again, in the numerical example of Chapter II, solu­
tions for K and L were found to be 144 and 60.7 units, re­
spectively, for the situation where the production was 
defined as
Q = 100 L^/2r V 2 = 9360 units 
the demand function was defined as
P = 10 Q-1/2
and where the rate of return, s, was .05,
The corresponding solutions for K and L for the 
unregulated cost-minimizing firm were both found to be
93,6 units where the cost of capital was .04. The wage 
rate, w, and the cost, W, of a unit of capital, were 
assumed at $4 and $100, respectively, for both the regulated 
and the unregulated case.
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Substituting in equation (3o73)
p = \V/l) ( l Ô O W l M r  146"^ = "0169 (3.74)
In the example chosen, the margin between the 
"interior" cost of capital, p, and the exterior cost of cap­
ital (in this case, ,04) appears large; but the magnitude 
of the margin depends upon the values attributed to the vari­
ables of the model and to the spread between the cost of 
exterior cost of capital, r, and rate of return, s. The 
findings here confirm the view that regulation serves, in 
effect, to cheapen the cost of capital for the firm. The 
findings here, however, do not confirm the findings of 
Averch and Johnson who held that the interior cost of capital 
to the regulated firm is cheapened by the amount of the dif­
ference between the rate of return, s, and the cost of 
capital, r.^
If the regulated firm knew its interior cost of cap­
ital, the solution for optimal allocation of inputs would 
proceed exactly as for the cost-minimizing firm. Unfortu­
nately, the interior cost of capital cannot be known until 
the optimal allocation of inputs under regulation are known.
In other words, the interior cost of capital to the
^This pricing of the interior cost of capital is 
equivalent to [r-(s-r)] or [2r-s], Only for a special con­
trived case would p be equal to [2r-s], See Harvey Averch and 
Leland M, Johnson, "Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint," American Economic Review, Vol, LII, No, 4, 
pp, 1052-69,
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regulated firm can only be known ’’ex post."
The Marginal Rate of Technical 
Substitution, the "Lambda"
Function, and their Significance 
to the Regulated Firm
The marginal rate of technical substitution of
capital for labor for the cost-minimizing firm is
MRTS = c (3.75)K for L 7“ wLi
Equation (3.75), however, does not describe the 
marginal rate of technical substitution for the regulated 
firm. Averch and Johnson, however, have developed a MRTS 
function for the regulated firm.® The static model de­
veloped in Chapter II may be used to more sharply define 
the MRTS function developed by Averch and Johnson.
Averch and Johnson evolve the MRTS function as 
follows [Equations (3.76) through (3.82)];
Z = PQ-wL-rWK-X[PQ-wL-sWK] (3.76)
where Z is the objective function to be minimized— and,be­
cause of X and the expression in brackets, is an 
"artificial function”; X is a coefficient, or 
technically the LaGrange multiplier required by 
the expression of Z as a constrained minimum.
Now, set
^Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johnson, "Behavior of 
the Firm under Regulatory Restraint," American Economic 
Review, Vol. LII, No, 4, pp. 1052-1069.
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Il = MRQfL-w-XMRçfL+Xw = 0. (3.77)
Minimizing Z with respect to L results in
For this case X is one; but for the more interesting
case— under regulation— where Z is minimized with respect
to K,
H  = NR^f^-rW-XMR^f^+XsW = 0. (3.79)
*K = T f e % -
Solving for
MRQfjç-rW
 ̂= MR-f„-s'W * (3.81)
Obviously, X is not one when Z is minimized with respect to 
K— except for the case where regulation is absolute, i.e., 
all pure profit is eliminated.
Since
dr.
MRTSk for L “ “ 3Î? “ t t  .L






Equation (3.82) is conceptually adequate as a device 
to describe MRTSjç for L' but the static model of Chapter II 
may be used to lend more meaning, and precision, to the term 
X than is afforded by equation (3.81). Accordingly, atten­
tion is now directed to use of the static model to define X. 
The procedure adopted here to define X, is to use the model 
to obtain an expression for MRTS^ for L then equate it to 
right-hand side of equation (3.82) to permit solving the re­
sulting equation for X.
The development of an expression for MRTSk for L 
starts with the optimal labor-capital ratio (equation 3.36), 
which represents the ratio of equilibrium solutions of the 
model for labor, L, and capital, K;
L [ a(l-o) ] sW 





substitution for f^ and f^ from equations (3.84) and 
(3.85) into




"RTSR for L = - 5 3 - = - '3-GSI
L
Substituting for ^ in (3.86) from the expression for 
the optimal labor-capital ratio [equation (3,83)], in turn, 
yields
MRTSk for L = [l-aTÎ-a)'] ' <3° 87)
The MRTS k  for L function above resulting from the 
basic static model of this study may now be equated to the 
Averch and Johnson solution for MRTSk for L
Equation (3.88) permits solving for X in terms of 
the variables of the static model;
“ [l-a(l-o)] - B(l-o)
^  l-Ta+B)(l-a)  * (3.89)
If the cost of capital, r, is assumed fixed,then 
changes in X induced by changes in the rate of return, s, 
may be expressed.
From equation (2.36), rate of return, s, may be expressed
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H m [l-a(l-o)] [a(l-o)]s = ...Il   ...... o(l-o) l-{a+3)(l-o)
(3.91)
^ l-a(i-o) ^ jç i^o (l-o)
Substituting for s in equation (3.89)
\ r [1-0 (l-o)]-g(l-o)
 ̂ = — r-'fo+e)'(l-o)---- •
1 1-0 
H i-o(l-o) m  i-o(l-o) [1-0(l-o)] [o(l-o)] 1"® d-o)
o(i-o) l-(o+g)(l-o)
y, 1 - 0  (l-o) ^ 1 - 0  (l-o)
(3.92)
Equation (3.92; expresses \ in terms of capital,
K, so that changes in X in response to changes in K may be 
expressed:
3X g _ [1-(g+6)(l-o)] r [1-0(l-o)] - B(l-o) 
[1 - 0  (i-o) ] * l-(o+B) (l-o)
o(i~o)
. [1-0(l-o)][o(l-o)] .
■«—— ri— I- ^_l- 0 __^ B (l-o)
u  1 - 0  (l-o) 1 - 0  (l-o) f. 1 - 0  (l-o)




1-0 (l-o) „ 1 -0 (l-o)3X { r [1-0 (l-o)]-8(l-o) } [o(1- 0 )] H
^   ---------------------------o(i-ô)
r-oTn-oTw
1-0 8 (l^o)
. M K l-a(l-ô) . (3,94)
-r w
Since 8(l-o) > r[l-o(l-o)], the sign of dX/dK is 
unambiguously positive and is so shown graphically in 
Fig. 3.5(b), Requirements of capital K, however, are de­
creased by increases in the rate of return, s. It is then 
not surprising to find the sign of dX/ds to be negative. 
Pigs. 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) show the relation of al­
location of inputs to X. Pig. 3.5(b) is the graphic solu­
tion of equation (3.92). Changes in \ are caused by 
changes in rate of return, s. Equation (3.89) states X in 
terms of rate of returns, s. Equation (3.90) shows the 
changes in X in response to changes in rate of return, s. 
Pig. 3.5(d) shows how the rate of return, a, determines X 
as the ray sWK swings through the regulatory "arc" of 
Pig. 3.5(d). Output is also related to X. When X is zero, 
output is restricted to that of the cost-minimizing firm. 
When X=l, output is expanded to the level where all profit 
disappears. Finally, regulated profit, (s-r)WK, of 
Pig, 3.5(e) may be graphically related to the X function of 
Pig. 3.5(b) and the return function of Pig. 3.5(c).
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Fig. 3,5 — The interrelation of the \ function and output, 
return, TNRPjj, profit and regulation
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For X=0, or when the marginal productivity of 
capital is equal to its cost, the rate of return may be de­
termined from equation (3.89). If X=0, then
r [1-0(l-o)]-6(l-o) = 0 (3.95)
Equation (3.81) shows
lim X=o / o q-Tt
MRgf^+rW.




Again, from equations (3.81) and (3.89)
llm^X=l (3.99)
If X were known, return could be specified in terms 
of r, o, and 3. But X is probably more properly considered 
as the result of setting return, s, rather than the de­
terminant of s. Pigs. 3.5(c) and 3.5(d) are more likely 
to represent the deliberation of the regulatory authority 
than Pig. 3.3(b) «
Whether the X function is a cause of, or the effect
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of, the capital decision of the regulated firm may be a 
moot issue. The X function is so generic in character that 
it can encompass the whole range of behavior of the firm 
from no regulation to absolute regulation. The X function 
is useful, and perhaps is really required in determining 
the marginal rate of technical substitution, MRTS, of 
inputs for the regulated firm, i.e,, for the case where 
MRTS of inputs is not described by the inverse ratio of the 
costs of inputs. Moreover, the X function as used here 
serves another purpose: It permits the cost of capital,
r, to re-enter the static model of the regulated firm. It 
will be remembered that cost of capital, r, was eliminated 
as a variable early in the development of the static 
model.
The subject of changes in capital in response to 
change in the cost of capital, r, is not investigated here 
for the reason that r is arbitrarily held constantr but 
the X function developed here provides an opportunity to 
investigate the impact of changes in the cost of capital, 
r, and of changes in pure profit rate (s-r) on capital use, 
on output and price of output. The all-encompassing char­
acter of the X function makes it a most useful tool in 
probing the subject of the pure theory of regulation 
especially in those cases where cost of capital, r, and 
return, s, are correlated.
This subsection concludes the analysis and
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interpretation of the static model. The following two 
chapters are devoted to adapting the static model to 
dynamic conditions. Chapter IV treats on the problem of 
replacement. Chapter V treats on the subject of optimal 
size of plant for a range of conditions of growth, returns 
to scale, elasticity, capital durability,and patterns of 
output.
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Logarithmic Differentiation of the Capital 
Function with Respect to a ,  a , and g
Differentiation of the capital function
1-0 (l-o) o(l-o)
K - i-r^éTci-v)-
JJ i-(o+é) (l-o) ^ i-(o+é) (i-o)
1-0(I - o ) 0(1-0) 
(gW) l-(o+6) (i-o) yj 1- (0+0) (l-o)
(1)
with respect to o, o and g requires that the capital func­
tion be expressed in logarithmic form and that partial 
differentiation of log K with respect to o, a ,  and 6 be 
completeds The capital function in logarithmic form is
1 = 9  K  -  i T = , n  ”  *
+  [ i - K v l r r r W !  
■ ‘r- rj f f r n '- y rl '•°9 ”  * i i - W B ' m - v ) ' !
(2 )
 ] log H +
[l-(o+6) (l-o)]2
. - [ (l-(o+6) (l-o) ] - (l-o) (o+0) , _ . .+ 11.1 nil.— .■■■«.■II. ■■■ .1. ■■■ I I log m +
[l-(o+8)(l-o)]2
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+ [l-(a+e) (l-G)]o+q(l-o)] [o+G] log[l-o(l-a)] +
[l-(a+e) ( l - o ) ] 2
+ [ l-q(l-o) ] a . 
[l“ (a+0) (i-o) ] 1-8 (T“0)
+ [ - 8 ] - 8 ( l - G ) ^ a + B ^  l o g  [o (1 - 0 )] +
[l-(ot+e) ( l - o)]^
4. [ o (l“ o) ] [ “ a ] X[l-(a+eTn.-ari ITTT ]̂
+ [1 - (g+B) (l-o)]8+a(l-o)] [g+8)] ^og w + 
[l-(a+B)(1-0)]2
+ [1" (g+B) (l-o)] 8+[-1+8 (l-o)] [g+g]
[l-(g+B)(l-o)]2
(3)








3K [l-a(l-a)] (l-o) [a (l-o)] U - a )
[l-(a+e) (l-a)]2
 1 1-0
H 1- (o+B) (l-o) JJ, i- (o+B) (l-o) 
l-a(l-o) a(l-o)
(sW) 1 - ( a + S )(l-o) ^  1 - (a+0)(l-o)
0 |j-(a+B) logH-logm-6log[l-a(l-o) ]-alog[o(l-o) ] + 
+ alogw-glog (swjĵ  (6)
Similarly, changes in K resulting from a change in a 
may be investigated.
BlogK _  — --------  logH +   V logm
 [l-(a+S) (1-0)] 2 ^ [l-(o+B) (1-0) ]Z
+ [i~(tt+3)(l-o)][-(l-o)] + [l-g ( l - o ) ] ( l - o ) ] l o g [ l - g ( l - o ) ] 
[l-(a+6)(l-o)]2
+  r + ^ I : * ) ] , l o g [ g ( l - o ) ]
l - ( g + B ) (1-0) [ l - ( g + 6 ) ( l - o ) ] 2
(l-o) _ [ 1 - (o+6)(l-o)] [l-o]+g(l-o)^ ^____
* T-Ta-i (T~r




[1-(o+6) (l“o) ] = (l~a) logH+(l-o) ̂ logm+3 (1“ct) ̂3a
log[1 -0 (1-a)]+1(l-o)-3(l-o)^]logo(l-o)
- [(l-o)— 3(l-o)^]logw- [ 3 ( l - o ) l o g (sW)
(8)
l-o(l-o) o(l-o)
3K ^ [l-.ll-,)] T=ta+:I ti-c n  !-(»+»)I1-°I 
*“ [l-(a+B)(1-0)]3
JJ 1- (o+3) (l-o) jjj 1- (0 + 3 ) (1 - 0 )
1 -0 (1 - 0 ) o (l-o)
l-(o+B)(i-o) ^ 1-(0 + 3 ) (l-o)
. [(l-o)logHf(l-o)2iogm+3(l-o)^log[l-o(l-o)]
+ [(l-o)- 3 (l“o)^]logo(l-o)
- [(l-o)-3(l-o)logw-3[l-o)log(sW)],
(9)
Finally changes in Capital K resulting from a change 
in 3 are investigated.
=  il2 2- I09H + ---------- 7 log"'[l-(a+3) (1-0) ]< [l-(o+3) (l-o)
[l-a(l-o)1[l-o]log[1 -0 (l-o)] (1-ff)




[l-(o+6) (1-ct) ]2 21225 = (1-a) logH + (l-a)2logm +0 p
[1-a(1-a)][1 -0 ]log[1-a(1-a)] + [a(l-a) ]log[a(l-a)] 
- [a(1-a)]2logw - [1-a(1-a)] [1-a]log(sW) . (11)
1 - 0 (1-a) g (l-o)
8K ^ [1-a(l-o)] l-(g+B)(l-o) [a(i-g)] l-(a+3)(l-o)
[l-(a+6)(l-o)]2
1 1-0
JJ l+(a+g) (i-o) jjj 1- (a+g) (l-o)
a(l-o) l-a(l-o)
^ 1-(a+B) (l-o) (gM) 1-(a+s) (l-o)
^(l-o)logH + (l-a)^logm + [1-a(I-a)][l-o]log [1-a(l-o)] +
+ a(l-o)^loga(l-o) - [a(l-o)^]logw - 
- [l-a(l-o)] [l-a]log(sW)] (12)
CHAPTER IV
REPLACEMENT THEORY AND THE REGULATED FIRM
In previous chapters a model was developed to show 
that rational behavior of the regulated firm calls for a 
more capital-intensive production process than for the 
unregulated firm. The model developed for the regulated 
firm is best presented, and most easily interpreted, in a 
setting of indestructible capital goods. But capital goods 
are destructible and must be replaced. In this chapter, 
the behavior of the regulated firm is investigated in re­
lation to plant retirement and replacement. Behavior of 
the regulated firm is investigated first for constant and 
then for improving technology.
Modern replacement theory is principally concerned 
with the optimal timing of replacement of plant and equip­
ment. To date, such theory has been directed almost ex­
clusively toward timing replacement to minimize costs in 
the neoclassical tradition. At once, the question arises 
as to whether or not the regulated firm might rationally 
adopt replacement timing different from that of the un­
regulated cost-minimizing firm. The problem of
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replacement timing is a problem in dynamics, however; the 
model as developed thus far in this study has been a static 
model. Even the problem of determining the expansion path 
of the regulated firm was essentially an exercise in com­
parative statics, not dynamics. But relaxation of the 
assumption of the indestructibility of capital goods— and 
the introduction in turn of the problem of timing of re­
placement of capital goods in the regulated firm— requires 
that some consideration of dynamics be incorporated into 
the model. Accordingly then, time as a variable must be 
related systematically to other variables of the model.
Procedurally, some of the most useful approaches 
to replacement theory are reviewed below; the model of 
this study will then be adapted to incorporate the re­
placement problem— in a dynamic setting.
Review of Current Replacement 
theory
In probing the problem of replacement timing for 
the regulated firm some of the minimum-cost treatments that 
are most relevant are first reviewed. Probably the most 
important name in replacement theory is George Terborgh.^
^George Terborgh, Business Investment Policy 
(Washington, D.c.j Machinery and Allied Products insti- 
tute, 1958). George Terborgh, Dynamic Replacement Policy 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), George Terborgh, Realistic
^placement Policy (Washington, D.C. : Machinery and Allied
Products institute, 1954). George Terborgh, MAPI Replace­
ment Manual (Washington, D.C.: Machinery and Allied
Products institute, 1950).
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Other significant contributors to replacement theory were 
made by Vernon Smith,% pierre Massed^ and Prederich and 
Vera Lutz.'* Significantly, Smith and Masse draw upon the 
work of Terborgh in their development of replacement 
theory.
The Work of George Terborgh
Terborgh used two words, defender and challenger, 
to illustrate, and to dramatize, his approach to the 
problem of determining optimum replacement policy.
Terborgh envisaged a contest between the asset in use, the 
"defender," and the prospective replacement, the "chal­
lenger." Terborgh's analysis required finding an "adverse 
minimum" posed by a continually improving production proc­
ess. The adverse minimum, or the discounted annual cost 
of replacement equipment which is assumed to be installed 
optimally, is compared with the discounted annual cost of 
continuing to operate existing equipment. Terborgh's 
special and enduring contribution was the extension of this
2Vernon L. Smith, Investment and Production 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19^1),
Chapters V and VI. Vernon L. Smith, "Problems in Produc- 
tion-Investment Planning Over Time," International Eco- 
nomic Review, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 198-216. Vernon l . smith, 
"Economic Equipment Policies," Management Science, Vol. IV, 
No. 3, pp. 20-37.
^Pierre Massed Optimal Investment Decisions, Trans,, 
Scripts Technics, Inc. (Englewood dliffs, d.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1962).
*Frederich and Vers Lutz, The Theory of Investment 
of the Firm (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
T55TT:------
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marginal replacement requirement to the case of improving 
technology. Terborgh made his concept easy to use (even 
to the point of incorporating it in shop manuals) by de­
riving simple formulas for computing the life of replace­
ment equipment, based upon simple time averages of 
equipment cost.
Terborgh projected past trends indefinitely into a 
future of constantly recurring replacement chains.
Terborgh's adverse minimum provided a measure of the "oper­
ating inferiority" of existing machines. Terborgh added 
the operating inferiority at time, T, to all other costs 
including capital recovery costs from time Tq to T]̂  ̂ to 
establish the real cost of keeping old equipment in 
service.
Terborgh took some license with truth in assuming 
linearity to obtain his measure of operating inferiority 
of existing equipment. But this error is of minor sig­
nificance. Indeed, Terborgh recognized the error and used 
Cotter's arithmetic average, which increases linearly from 
zero to z(T-l) to obtain an average z to which he adds
an average of the capital charges, interest and deprecia­
tion, The term z is the amount by which operating cost is 
assumed to increase per year to time T. Terborgh'a sum
In this section the symbol, T, refers to spe­
cific time period which would serve to establish a 
specific date. The symbol, t, is used in a more generic 
sense, e.g., a period for which a maximum or a minimum is 
to be determined.
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to be minimized is the approximate annual cost inflow to be 
minimized, Terborgh allowed his capital costs to decline 
linearly as the service life increases;
_ ^ WK ^ rWKCapital costs = -^ + -j—
where WK is investment
T is the service life 
r is the rate of interest.
The sum to be minimized is
m' =
when T is optimal, m''becomes Terborgh's "adverse minimum," 
or when
dm'' z _ WK
Solving for T,
where T is the optimal service life
z is the annual increase in operating costs .
This is the simple expression Terborgh used for determining 
the optimal length of service in an endless chain of re­
placements.
To illustrate Terborgh's thesis, assume that (1) 
the operating inferiority of existing equipment increases 
at the rate of $100 a year, (2) the prospective replacing 
investment is $2,000, and (3) the interest rate is 10 per
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cent. Service life, T, then, is
3 ° ^  = 4.47 years.
Table 4.1 shows the solution in tabular form. The 
column entitled "total" is the tabular solution for 
Terborgh's "adverse minimum." The service life and minimum 
cost is shown to be between four and five years. Grant and 
Ireson have developed a refinement for the column entitled 
"excess of annual disbursements," Their refinement is a 
tabulated equivalent to the expression^
which yields a uniform equivalent to a linear gradient 
where R is the uniform equivalent,
z is the annual increase in operating costs, 
n is the service life, and 
r is the interest rate.
Derivations of this function are given below under 
the discussion of Smith's work. Further refinement may be 
obtained by continuous, rather than discrete, discounting.
Terborgh*s adverse minimum, m", in the case of the 
previous arithmetic example is
E, L, Grant and W. G, Ireson, Principles of 
Engineering Economy (New York: The Ronald Press, 1960),
^Û-Si and Appendix E, Table E-23,
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Table 4,1.— Determination of the economic life of equip­
ment that costs $1,000, that has an operating cost 
gradient of $100 a year, and is burdened with an interest
rate of 10 per cent
Excess Disbursement 
for Year Indicated 
Year over First Year's 














1 $ 0 $1050 $ 0 $1050
2 100 576 48 624
3 200 402 94 496
4 300 316 138 454
5 400 265 181 446
6 500 230 222 452
7 600 205 262 467
8 700 187 300 487
a1000
100 X Factor to convert from linear gradient to a 
uniform equivalent. See Eugene L. Grant and W. Grant 
Ireson, Principles of Engineering Economy (New York; The 
Ronald Press, H é d ) , Table A-jj, p. Seb,
m' /T-l\ . WK .
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rWK
(4.47-1) ^ 1000 ^ (.10) (1000) = 100---2----- + TTTT 3
= $442 .
This solution approximates the tabular solution
of Table 4.1,
Here, term z includes opportunity costs that are 
caused by improving technology. Terborgh's simple adverse- 
minimum relation represents an important contribution to 
replacement in that it was the first to reckon with im­
proving technology.
The Approach of Vernon L. Smith^
Smith's contribution to replacement theory is 
largely an embellishment of the simpler treatment of 
Terborgh. Smith does not use a linear obsolescence rate 
as does Terborgh, but he does defend Terborgh's linear ap­
proximations as being satisfactory in most cases.
Smith makes his operating cost a function of both 
utilization, u, and equipment age, t. After a period 
operating costs, then, will have increased to ([ (u q E©) .
The optimal time for replacing existing equipment is the 
time that minimizes annual unit equipment cost. The exist­
ing equipment, however, cannot be studied apart from the
^Vernon L, Smith, "Economic Equipment Policies: An 
Evaluation," Management Science, Vol. IV, No, 3, 20-29.
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equipment that will prospectively replace it.
Smith makes bolder use of Terborgh's point that de­
laying the purchase of new equipment will allow, ulti­
mately, the purchase of more and more advanced models. He 
describes the operating expense of the first replacement 
as 0(uĵ , Lq, t) , Smith interpreted this expression to 
mean that operating expense is an increasing function of 
output, a decreasing function of the length of time the 
installation of more advanced equipment is delayed, and an 
increasing function of the age of the incumbent equipment. 
Similarly, Smith describes the operating cost of the 
second chain of replacements as 0 (u2 , t), the
third as pfug, ÏÏq + + ^ 2 , t) and so on.
The function to be minimized is the uniform equiv­
alent of all costa, fixed and variable. To set up the 
function to be minimized. Smith lets be the rate at 
which operating costs increase with age; E^, the present or 
initial operating expense; E^, the first-year operating 
expense of replacement equipment; and Î, the rate of tech­
nological change, or the rate at which the first-year op­
erating cost of new equipment decreases each year. The 
utilization rate, u, is held constant for reasons of 
simplicity.
The function to be minimized is then
h - )8o(t)e'“ dt - 57o(Eo)e’*'''’]
where (|)q relates operating expenses to and t
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h is the uniform annual equivalent of all operating 
and capital costs, 
h' is the uniform equivalent of all future equip­
ment expenses starting with the first replace­
ment, and
SVq is salvage at the end of period Lq .
Substituting from the linear approximations
0 Q ( t )  =  E q  +  t i i Q t
0(ÏÏ̂  + kS^t) = E - ç(Lq + kL) + i|)t
where E is operating expense
il> is the rate at which operating cost increase 
with age
; is the rate of technological change 
Smith obtains
h - ( E + *gt)e-rtdt -
with k replacements,
f ^ 1
h' ■ r ^ e " ^ ^ ^  I / E - ( (L. + kL) + i);tk-0 U Je-rtdt + TVK -
,1, r (WK - - (Ç + 'l')Ee
" B - CL, + # + ---------  1 _ e-rc------------ •
Smith minimizes the h function by setting ®
H  I r  “
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Eo + t|/oLo + rSVo - p  = h'
(; + <1») (1 - rL^ _ + r^(WK - SV) = 0.
Smith's sum
represents the direct and the opportunity cost of con­
tinuing existing equipment in operation another year. Now 
may be solved for
. h" - Ea - f3?o + i
*
which is the optimal service life of future replacement 
equipment, but the solution contains the term h".
Solutions of the equation
(; + $)(1 - rîC® - e"^^) + r^ (WK - S7) = 0 
require an approximation of the Taylor expansion
. 1 - rro * . . .21 31 41
which Smith achieves by discarding all terms after the 
third. Now solving for
V ■
The term h" may now be solved for by substituting for Eq in
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= h" - Eq - rSVo + I .
Solutions for Lq° above are the same as that ob­
tained by Terborgh except that Smith makes provision for 
salvage, SV,
QThe Contribution of Pierre Masse'
In recent years a group of French research workers 
engaged in theoretical analysis have made significant con­
tributions to the theory of investment decisions. Among 
these contributions to investment theory, the work of 
Pierre Masse' is probably the most noteworthy. Masse' 
gives credit to Terborgh for the first and, to date, the 
most significant work in replacement theory.
Masse', like Terborgh and Smith, views the solution 
of the service-life problem as one that minimizes costs. 
Masse' first discusses "Retirement in the Pure Form." Here, 
he develops a simple function to determine the optimum 
service life when replacement is not contemplated.
Masse' optimizes the relation
G(T)
,T -
J  (PQ - wL) (t)e"^^ + (2v) (T)e"*t _ WK
where G(T) is discounted profit
gPierre Masse', Optimal Investment Decisions Rules 
for Action and Criteria for Choice. Trans. Scripta Tech- 
nica ," ïnc. (Englewood Cliffs, (Hew Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 
1962).
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(PQ-wL)t is the gross income earned during the 
period between t and t+dt,
WK is the initial investment, 
r is the interest rate,
3À7 is salvage, and 
T is the retirement date.
The optimum may be obtained by differentiating 
and setting the result equal to zero.
0 = II = [(PQ-wL) (T) - r(T)SVT + 2|^e-rt^
This relation simply means the equipment should be 
retired when the gross profit on continuing the service 
life is equal to the interest on the retirement value plus 
the loss in retirement value.
Masse' considers the problem of partial replacement. 
Here he proposes something short of total replacement to 
extend the service life of the initial equipment. For the 
extended service life, T", the revised discounted profit
= f  (PQ-wL)(t)e”^^dt - ce“^^ + C
• ' o  J t
G' j wL) "'^^ " (Pq-wL) (e, t) e"^^dt
where G' is again total discounted profit,
(ïQ-wL)tdt is the profit yield by the initial 
equipment,
c is the interim investment made at time t 
q is the output of the interim investment
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0 is the period of partial replacement.
Masse' obtains partial derivations to find the 
optimum time o’ for the interim investment and optimum time 
T' for the extended service life of the original equipment!
0 . IS' . cr(5)e-« - (Pq-WL) + f3 9 ^ 9 90
. (e,t)e"^^dt
0 = H r  = (PQ-wL)T'e"̂ T' + (Pq-wL)(8,T')e~fT
After solving for T' and 9, the discounted profit 
G' can be determined and compared with discounted profit for 
which no interim investment is made.
Masses's work in chain replacement retraces the 
work of Terborgh; like Smith, he arrives at the same con­
clusions but by a more elegant process.
His expression for the optimal chain replacement 
period, t , is
2 (WK - 37)
where t is the service life of the chain replacement 
WK is initial investment, 
sV is salvage, and
z is a measure of the adverse position per year (of 
variable costs of the incumbent equipment com­
pared to total cost of the prospective replacement.
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This expression is identical in form to that de­
veloped by Terborgh and Smith.
Masse' also abstracts from his function defining 
optimum retirement in the pure form to define optimum re­
placement in a constant chain. To do this he restates his 
basic discounted function to form
G(T) = f (PQ-wL) (T)e"^^dt + (57(T)+G] e"̂ '̂  - WK .
-'o
From this expression he defines his optimum point 
for retirement-replacement by the expression
(PQ-wL) T = r(T) [§V(T)+GI - •
In the above, Masse' delineates the conditions 
that apply for retirement of incumbent equipment when a 
constantly recurring replacement chain is involved. Since
r(T) [3V(T)+G] > r(T)S7(T)
the service life is shortened, A parallel for this con­
dition exists for the regulated firm as is developed in the 
next section below.
Masse' demonstrates that, at the optimum replace­
ment time T , the variable costs of the old equipment is 
equal to total costs, variable and fixed, of the new. The 
assumption is made that discounted profit of the recurring 




D^fT) = rM(? )
where Dg(T) is the variable cost of the equipment in use 
and rM(x) is the total discounted cost of the replacement 
chain
~  .1
rM(x) = i_g_rT j  D(t)dt + WK o
where WK is investment.




Masse' uses this relation to show that the optimum 
service life, t , defines the time when variable costs of 
incumbent equipment is equal to the uniform equivalent 
of the total cost of a new machine. This relation, ex­
pressed in less general terms, is almost an axiom in 
engineering economy. This concept is not quite as simple 
as it would at first appear,because the capital costs of 
the replacement equipment cannot be known until its service 
life is known.
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Replacement of Equipment in the 
Regulated Firm
In Chapters II and III, a model was developed to 
show that rational behavior on the part of the regulated 
firm requires a more capital-intensive production process 
than for the unregulated firm. In this section, an in­
vestigation is made as to whether or not this same pro­
pensity for greater use of capital affects the solution to 
the problem of determining the optimum service life and re­
placement policy of the regulated firm.
Retirement in the Pure Form
Conventional behavior requires that equipment be 
retired from service when the return on the retirement
value equals the interest on the retirement value plus the
loss in salvage value per unit of time. Obviously, for 
this equality to have meaning the loss in salvage value 
must be expressed in the same time units as return and 
interest. If, in the case of the regulated firm, return 
is held to a "fair" or allowable level, then,
sS7 - rSV + ^  (4.1)
where s is the allowable rate of return
r is the interest rate, or cost of capital
4>WK is the loss of retirement, or salvage, value 
per unit of time 





Pig, 4,1,— Masses's "retirement in the pure form"
9Here, following the argument of Masse', the decline 
in earnings is a linear function, as is the decline in 
salvage value;
$TVK , $WK-?7 _ WK ($-m) 
' I P '  n n (4,2)
where $ is the ratio of salvage 5Â7 to initial cost, ■̂IK 
at time zero.
^Pierre Masse', Optimal Investment Decisions 
(Englewood Cliffs, N,J,; Prentice-Hall, 1962), 54-56,
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Now,
SV = inWK 
5 V  = 4>WK-6t 
WK ( 4-in)
n
where t is year when salvage and book values are equal 
n is the economic service life 
m is the per cent of initial investment repre­
sented by salvage «
From equations (4.1) and (4,2)
(s-r)Sv = n




For a specific example, let
WK » 750 
4»WK = 375 
s = ,065 
r ■ ,05 
n" ■ 25 years 
n ■ service life
  *WK 375




100m = » .133
$ $—m
n' n
30 _ .50-.133 
IS’ n----
Service life, n = 18.33 years.
This solution is equivalent to Masse",s "retire­
ment in the pure form" and is not the optimum solution to 
the problem of recurring replacement.
Determination of Service Life 
When Replacement is Contem­
plated
If replacement is contemplated, or required, rational 
behavior on the part of the regulated firm requires that 
pure profit foregone because of delayed replacement be 
measured against the loss caused by retiring the equipment 
before the end of period n. Here, n is still the optimal 
service life, as in the preceding discussion of "retirement 
in the pure form."
For constant technology and where the rate of depre­
ciation, 7# oil book v a l u e , o r  "rate base," is expressed
The term book value conforms to conventional 
accounting usage, i.e., the undepreciated value, or value 
as per accounting records,is determined in accord with some 
prearranged schedule to depreciate, or "write off," the 
asset.
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- , WK-§^ , WK-mWK , WK(l-m) , 4  g\
 ̂ n n n
The rate of depreciation, 6, of salvage value is expressed
, _ 4>WK-SV _ 4>WK-mWK _ WK(«>-m) , 46 = ---—  = ---      (4.5)
If t is the service life of plant and equipment 
which permits book value and salvage realization value to 
be equal,
(s-r)[WK-(WK--t)] = [WK-Yt] - [WK-7t] (4.7)
(s-r)Yt = WK(l-$) + t(fi-Y)
t - - WK(i-$). (4.8)
Substituting for Y and 6
t (s-r)iEllZ™L + = WK(l-$)n n n
(1-*)n (4.9)(s-r) (1-BT) + 1-*
To correct for income-tax reduction because of the 
capital loss on retirement of the asset when the income 
tax rate is t%, the indicated loss is decreased, 
or
(.-r)Tt - .




^ = 2 (s-r) (1-m) + 1-$ ' (4.10)
For the conditions used in the ex^nr>le where re­
placement was not contemplated, (pic-c 152) , the optimal 
service life for an asset which depreciates at a rate, y, 
is shortened to 17.9 years for the case of no income tax 
and to 17.6 years for the case where the income tax rate, 
t^, is .50— when replacement is planned.
Neither of the two preceding solutions for service 
life, t, is truly optimal, because the firm could have 
shortened its depreciation schedule so that no capital 
loss would have occurred at the end of the service life. 
This approach is shown graphically in Pig. 4.2. The solu­
tion for service life, n, for the no-replacement case is 
shown in relation to the preceding solution for service 
life, t, for the replacement case. If the firm were to 
change its depreciation schedule (represented by the line 
AB to the line AC), the consequences would be; (1) no 
capital loss occurs on retirement of the equipment at the 
end of period, t; (2) the regulated firm earns on a larger 
rate base, WK-7t, during the service life of the equipment; 
and (3) the equipment is retired at a higher salvage 
value.
The shorter the service life of the productive 




Salvage realization value 
on retirement
time
(s-r)WK, pure profit foregone 
because of delayed replacement]
time
Loss on retirement before time n
time
Fig. 4,2— Optimal depreciation schedules for the regulated firm under 
assumptions of replacement and non-replacement of plant
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rate base.
Average = H ÿ Z  = T Lil ' E l  » (4.11)Rate Base 2 2
Unless some constraint is brought to bear, the 
regulated firm would logically retire its plant and 
equipment in the year of its installation if the depreci­
ation schedule permitted the firm to recover full cost 
minus salvage; WK-SV, or WK(l-lfi), Apart from the con­
sideration that plant retirement is subject to regulatory 
approval, the demand function faced by the regulated firm 
serves to define the limit to which the firm may shorten 
the service life of its plant and equipment. Clearly, 
unless the salvage value is compensatingly high, a 
shortened service life increases the cost of output because 
of higher depreciation charges. Most realistic time- 
salvage-realization functions do not permit the higher 
salvage values attending shortened plant life to be great 
enough to obviate higher depreciation charges.
The solution to the problem of determining a truly 
optimal service life of plant and equipment for the regu­
lated firm requires that a time-salvage function be de­
scribed, that a function for the increase in cost of
variable inputs as the plant ages be defined, and that the
demand function faced by the firm be known.
The salvage function may be restated:
Salvage, 5? - - *WK-.mWK , WK(»-1)n" n n
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where is salvage
n" is the period required for salvage to acquire 
zero value
$NK is the salvage value immediately after con­
struction of the plant 
m is the ratio of salvage value to initial cost 
n is the period, the end of which, book value 
becomes zero
t is the period, the end of which, salvage values 
and book value are equal.
The function for the increase in cost of variable 
inputs is
Variable
Inputs, wL^ = wLo+zt, (4.12
The increase in cost of variable inputs as the 
plant ages could have been expressed exponentially rather 
than linearly, but a linear function was chosen here, 
partly because the depreciation function is linear.
The demand function is the same as used in 
Chapters II and III
P - HQ"®.
Unlike the cost and revenue functions of Chap­
ters II and III, the cost and revenue function for de­
teriorating capital stock must provide for the return of, 
as well as the return on, capital. Accordingly, these 
functions must now provide for the annuity of depreciation 
in order to recover capital. The expression (for zero
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salvage) to achieve this end was developed in Chapter I 
to be
sest
The expression that provides for an increase in the 
cost of variable inputs as the plant ages, plus the capital 
recovery factor for an asset with realizable salvage 
value, is;
C = [wL +zt] + WK |r + (4.13)o I  ert_i
Similarly, the corresponding expression for revenue re­
quirements is
R =» [wL^+zt] + m »t-i J •s + • (4.14)
The term, u, in equations (4,13) and (4.14) is the ratio at 
time, t, of salvage value, 5v, to initial investment, WK; 
and thus, y represents a special case of m.
The total revenue requirements function is shown 
diagrammatically in Pig, 4,3. The height of line AB is a 
measure of the return on salvage at the time of retirement. 
Obviously, the shorter the service life, the greater is AB, 
While the rate of pure profit (s-r)WK remains unchanged, 
the absolute value represented by (s-r)WK becomes expo­
nentially greater as the service life is shortened.
In Chapter I, an expression for an equated average 











''...’--The effect ef the tlme-salvage relation upon the uniform equivalent
vrrruc :'equireù to earn return, a
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was developed to be
Equated Average _ g + ^  - (4.15)
Rate of Return e®^-l ^
where s is the rate of return
u is the ratio of salvage value to initial in­
vestment at retirement date ,
Hypothetical data for a range of t in the service 
life, or planning period,and salvage values are shown in 
Table 4.1.
Pig. 4.4 shows the increase in the equated average
rate of return as the service life is shortened and as the
salvage value is increased. The example illustrated in
Pig. 4.4 and Table 4.2 reflects a rate of return, s, of
.065 and a specific salvage function
wTf WK .6WK WK(4>-m) WK(.6-m)^  “ rP- “ “T S “  ’  n-  “- - -  n- -
The path x-x describes how the equated rate of re­
turn increases as the service life is shortened, A com­
mensurate increase in the equated average pure profit rate 
(s-r)WK occurs as the service life is shortened.
The cost and revenue functions must be expressed 
in terms of their present value or in terms of their uni­
form equivalent. The latter form is more convenient,
^^Prom the identity developed in Chapter I,
Equated Rate of Return 
+
Straight Line Depreciation
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Table 4.2,— Numerical example of equated rates of return, 
assuming an allowable return of 6,5 per cent and linear 
depreciation for a range of asset lives and salvage values
Year
Salvage, Per cent of Investment
0 10 20 30 40 50
1 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50 6,50
2 4,93 5,09 5,24 5,40 5,56 5.72
3 4,43 4,63 4,85 5,05 5,26 5.46
4 4,19 4,42 4,65 4,88 5,11 5,35
5 4,06 4.30 4,55 4,79 5,04 5.28
10 3,91 4.17 4.43 4,69 4,95 5,21
15 3,97 4,23 4,47 4,73 4,98 5,23
20 4,08 4.32 4,56 4,81 5,05 5.29
25 4,20 4,43 4,66 4,89 5,12 5.35
30 4.33 4,54 4,77 4.98 5,30 5,41
40 4,51 . 4.76 4,96 5,15 5,34 5,54
50 4,79 4,96 5,13 5,30 5,47 5.65
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partly because so many of the tables and much of the 






12expressed in terms of the uniform equivalent are
r + r(l-w) eft.i
(4.16)
and
R  =  „ L „  +  | £  - | i  ( ^ 1  + W K  s +
(4.17)
l^The expression i - —  f— E— ] for the uniformIT 3T \annual equivalent to a gradient was derived by Grant and 
Ireson. See E.L. Grant and W.G. Ireson, "Principles of 
Engineering Economy" (New York: The Ronald Press, 1960) ,
Chapters IV and Appendix D.
Essentials of the derivation are:
,t f  e r ( t - l ) ^ i  e r ( t - 2 ) _ i  . 2 _ i  ^  e ^ - l ]
 r  + r + • • •  r  — J
s p + @r(t-2) + , , , + e^ + 1 - (t-l)|
- f  + ef(t-2) + . . . er.2 + ^  ^
The expression in brackets is the compound amount 
of a sinking fund of one per year for t ycirs. Hence,
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. SV WKt WK($-m)twhere = WK “ Î T W K ---- W n   (4.18)
$ is the per cent salvage upon completion of con­
struction of plant 
m is the ratio of salvage SV to initial invest­
ment, WK
li is the ratio of salvage 5v to initial invest­
ment WK when salvage value equals book value 
t is the year when salvage value equals book value 
n' is the period for which salvage value became zero 
n is the period for which salvage value became mWK, 
r is the cost of capital
s is the rate of return
2  is the annual increase in the cost of variable 
inputs
WK is the initial investment 
Lq is variable inputs 
w is the wage rate
the sum of compound amounts = — ~  •r r r
The uniform equivalent for t years is determined by 
multiplying by the sinking-fund factor for t years, ' «r ' ■ to obtain , ê ^.-l
the uniform equivalent = |
z tz / r \ 
- r - r \ert.i)
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The optimum service life, t, for the unregulated 
firm occurs when^^
|£ = 0 and afc > 0.
a ?
Differentiation of the revenue function, like dif­
ferentiation of the cost function, yields a unique solution 
for t, or when
^  = 0 and > 0.
The solution for optimum service life, t, for the 
regulated and the unregulated firm is shown in Figs. 4.5(a) 
and 4.5(b).
1 ̂ Differentiating the cost function yields a 
polynomial and accordingly, requires approximating tech­
niques to achieve a solution, e.g., Newton's method. See 
John Brixey and Richard Andree, Fundamentals of College 
Mathematics (New York: Holt, 1954), pp. 24i-i4§.
-y )c =. WL, * «K[r + ^
dC -, 5. - z (eft_i) -tre^t _ WKr^ (1-y) e^^ = q
It r (ert_i)2 (e^t-l)^
p(e^ -1) _ z(eft-l)ftzre^t _ WKr^(l-y)e^^ = o
(e^^-1)^ (e^^-1)^ (e^t-1)2
p(e^t-i)2 -z(e^^-l) + ztre^t - WKr^(1-y)e^^ = 0
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The profit function for the unregulated firm is 
stated in terms of the uniform equivalent
IT = HQ
(4.19)
The profit function under regulation is also ex­
pressed in terms of the uniform equivalent
TT =  ^ ( s - r) + (s-r)(1-y) WK . (4.20)
Equation 4.20 states pure profit in terms of the 
uniform equivalent to the pure profit rate (s-r) applied 
to capital stock that is depreciating at the rate i •
The two profit functions may be equated, as was 
done for the static model, to yield the zero excess profit 
function
0  = h q I -  -[wl + I  .  H ( ^ )  . WK [s .
or
+ WK
So equation (4,21) becomes the revenue function al­
ready described in equation (4.17). Thus, the profit 
function in a dynamic setting parallels the behavior of the 
static case of Chapter II,
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Graphie Solution to the Problem 
of Determining Optimal Service 
Life of Plant
The problem of determining optimal service life in 
the regulated firm is illustrated graphically in Pig. 4,5—  
the solution obtained by the simultaneous solution of the 
two profit functions [equations (4.19) and (4.20)], The 
interesting solution is at point A of Pig. 4.5(a).
Another solution exists at point B, but because it does not 
maximize profit— or anything else— is of no more interest 
than the second and minimal solution for capital K ob­
tained by simultaneous solutions of the production and zero 
excess profit functions of Chapter III, page 114.
Either a decrease in demand, which means a decrease 
in unregulated profit, or an increase in the pure profit 
rate, s-r, moves the solutions for optimal service life of 
plant and equipment of the regulated and of the unregu­
lated firms closer together. If the regulated profit func­
tion lies entirely above that of the regulated, then the 
unregulated profit function solely determines optimal 
service life.
The depreciation schedules for the three solutions 
are shown in Pig. 4.5(c). Depreciation schedules C and D 
are optimal, when replacement is planned for the regulated 
and unregulated firms, respectively. Depreciation schedule 
E is optimal when no replacement is to occur. Constant 
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Tig. 4.5— Determination of optimal service life of plant for the regulated and unregulated firm
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depreciation schedules require a time-salvage function for 
optimizing service life of the firm's plant and equipment.
The Replacement Chain
In the case of technological improvement, Smith^^ 
adds a measure of the reduction in costs that would be 
realizable if new equipment were purchased to the cost of 
operating incumbent equipment. Smith, then, adds oppor­
tunity cost to current cost to obtain the total cost of 
continuing to operate existing equipment. Addition of 
opportunity costs to increasing variable costs moves the 
points of the minimum uniform equivalents of cost and 
revenue to the left for both the unregulated and the regu­
lated firms. An increase in costs would ordinarily move 
the solutions for optimum service life of the regulated 
and of the unregulated firm closer together; but an in­
crease in technology decreases the cost of output, which, 
in turn, causes output to be increased. In Chapter III, 
the changes in price, P, output, Q, and capital, K, that 
resulted from changes in technology, m, were reported to be
3P ______ g P3m ” ” 1 - (a+g) (l-o) m
1 Q
3m 1 - (o+ b) (l-o) m
14Vernon L. Smith, Investment and Production 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, l^él), 146-
152.
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9K _ 1 - 0  K
3m 1 - (a+3) (l-o) m
One of the axioms of engineering economy is that an 
asset is replaced when the variable costs of inputs in­
crease to a level equal to the total cost of improved 
equipment. This axiom is sometimes equated to the dictum, 
"Sunk costs don't count.
The rationally managed regulated firm adapts its 
depreciation scheduled in accord with its optimal service 
life and its time-salvage function. For constant tech­
nology, the firm measures its return foregone because of 
delayed replacement by triangle PBA of Fig. 4.6. But for 
improving technology, the measure of return foregone is 
now triangle FDA. Line FA is a measure of the level of 
decreased total costs prospectively realizeable through 
constantly improving technology. Line FA permits the total 
cost of new equipment to be equated to the variable cost of 
the old, shown by line EA, Line EB is the opportunity cost 
of the old equipment as Smith saw the problem. Line PC is 
the service life of the equipment if permitted to wear out 
completely. Line PG represents economic life if no
15In the regulated public utility, sunk costs do 
count on some occasions. If technology improvement is 
great enough, the regulatory authority, in a number of 
cases, has permitted the firm to write off the old asset—  
and then to amortize and earn on the unamortized after - 
tax loss, according to some artificially contrived schedule 
which is usually shorter than would have been applicable 
had the old asset remained in service.
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replacement is contemplated, i.e., "retirement in the pure 
form."
Fig. 4.6 shows technology improving linearly (line 
PA), but the illustration could have shown technology im­
proving exponentially. The replacement chain is now 
established and may be expected to maintain the illustrated 
behavior until the variables of the model assume new di­
mensions. Obviously, the investment that is made at the 
beginning of each chain is greater and the optimum service 
life shorter than for constant technology. Despite the 
shorter service life and attendant increase in depreciation 
charges, the cost of output is lower— not merely because of 
improvement in technology but also because of concommitant 
increasing returns to scale. Moreover, as a result of 
growth, cost of capital r is likely to decrease.
The rationally managed firm, then, may be expected 
to keep its plants and equipment in service a shorter 
period, ceteris puribus^than the unregulated firm. The 
traditionally long-lived character of public utility prop­
erties does not upset this proposition. Explicit in the 
replacement model of this chapter is a time-salvage func­
tion and a demand function. Perhaps the time-salvage 
function— apart from the inherent durability and more 
slowly improving technology— of public-utility properties 
is the compelling reason for their relatively longer 
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to the constraint of the time-salvage function and the 
demand function— is demonstrably present and, in theory, 
is measurable.
CHAPTER V
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS OP A DYNAMIC MODEL 
OF THE REGULATED FIRM
In this chapter, investigation of the use of cap­
ital by the regulated firm in a dynamic setting is con­
tinued. The rate of growth of the firm, rate of capital 
deterioration, returns to scale, and price-quantity 
elasticity are the parameters investigated. In Chapter IV, 
a model for capital replacement in the regulated firm was 
developed. Chapter IV was concerned with (1), increasing 
cost of variable inputs as the plant ages, and (2), im­
proving technology. The object of Chapter IV, like most 
replacement theory, was the determination of optimal 
service life of plant and equipment. In this chapter, as 
previously stated, concern is for the amount of capital 
used as determined by growth, the planning period, returns 
to scale and price-quantity elasticity. Adaptations de­
veloped here of the static model to determine capital use 
in a dynamic setting, however, may be meshed with replace­
ment theory for the regulated firm.
Technology and the cost of variable inputs are held
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constant throughout this chapter. This treatment of tech­
nology and variable costs is deliberate; such treatment 
facilitates the investigation of the parameters that are of 
primary concern. Accordingly, the planning period is held 
to be determined solely by the rate of destructibility of 
capital stock. The planning period, however, may be, and 
should be, coincident with optimal service life in a setting 
of improving technology and increasing variable costs.
Growth and returns to scale may cause the firm to 
invest rationally in "overcapacity." Such investment is 
independent of the regulated firm's propensity toward 
capital intensity as developed in the static model of 
Chapter II. Finally, assuming equal output over a planning 
period,further investment in capacity is prompted by a 
fluctuating pattern of output, as opposed to the smooth, 
continuous output heretofore assumed. The interplay of 
growth, capital deterioration, returns to scale, and price- 
quantity elasticity is essentially dynamic in character, 
but the investigation of these parameters abstracts from 
the static model of Chapter II.
The planning period as implied above is determined 
by the destructibility— or its obverse, the durability— of 
capital stock. The present value of the gross revenue for 
the planning period discounted at the rate of return, minus 
the present value of variable costs for the planning 
period (also discounted at the rate of return), must equal
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the present value of the investment minus the present value 
of salvage. In other words, the total net revenue product 
of capital, TNRP%, discounted at the rate of return must 
equal the present value of investment minus the present 
value of salvage. In the simplest case, the present value 
of investment is the initial investment; and no salvage 
value is realized at the end of the planning period. 
Alternately, all revenues and costs may be stated in terms 
of the uniform equivalent rather than in terms of present 
value.
Indestructible capital was assumed for the static 
model. This requirement was relaxed in the investigation 
of optimal service life of Chapter IV. Equating the 
present value of TNRP^ to the present value of the invest­
ment suggests integration of replacement theory with theory 
that relates to the amount of capital to be used. Thus, 
the optimal service life merely becomes the t in the
capital recovery factor of Chapter IV, (s + — §— ) , or ase®^-l
more frequently expressed. se®'*'est_i '
Chenery adopted the planning period as a parameter 
in the problem of determining the optimal scale of plant 
in the unregulated firm.^ Chenery also considered the 
scale coefficient (o+&, in the Cobb-Douglas production 
function) and the discount rate as parameters. Chenery
^Hollis B. Chenery, "Overcapacity and the Accelera­
tion Principle," Econometrica, Vol. XX, No. 1, 1-24.
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did not treat the rate of growth as a parameter? and, in a
minimum-cost setting, he did not reckon with the elasticity
of demand. Indeed, price was held constant in Chenery's
study as was production technology. Chenery developed the
thesis that the unregulated firm would rationally construct
excess capacity in the case of increasing returns to scale
2even when no growth was anticipated. Smith developed a 
case for overcapacity in the presence of sinusoidal output 
from a production process of constant returns to scale, as­
suming no secular growth to be present.^
Excess capacity is clearly logical for constant 
returns to scale when certain growth is present, as is 
established below. The extent of overcapacity depends, 
among other considerations, upon the rate of growth, the 
planning period, and opportunities for what Chenery calls
4"flexible capacity." An example of the latter term is the 
addition of generating capacity after a high-voltage 
transmission line has been completed and put into use.
In the regulated firm, rational behavior in a 
dynamic setting continues to require that the firm be as 
capital intensive as permitted by its production function 
and demand function. Increasing returns to scale reduces
^Ibid., p. 17.
^Vernon L. Smith, Investment and Production (Cam­
bridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1961), 286-292.
^Chenery, p. 19.
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the cost of the product to permit greater output which, in 
turn, requires more capital. Obviously, this is also true 
for the unregulated firm but, as in the static case, the 
regulated and unregulated firms respond differently to 
such a situation. Analysis of overcapacity in the regu­
lated firm reveals two components: that attributable to
growth and that attributable to increasing returns to 
scale. Each of these, in turn, may be investigated for the 
overcapacity inherently attributable to regulation by com­
paring the capital requirements with those of the unregu­
lated firm (which presumably behaves in accord with prac­
tices that achieve minimum cost).
The Static Model Modified for 
Growth and Capital Deterioration
To measure the overcapacity that would rationally 
be constructed by the regulated firm, the static model of 
Chapter II must be modified. A certain total net revenue 
product function
TNRPj^ = PQ - wL (5.1)
for the planning period, discounted at the rate of return, 
must equal the present value of a certain investment, 
which is the initial investment if no interim capacity 
and no growth in TNRP% is anticipated; that is.
WK. (5.2)PQ • wL
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In the more interesting case where a certain rate 
5of growth, J, occurs,'




Integration of (5.3) yields
(PQ - wL) (J-s)t _ 2 J - s = WK. (5.4)
In the development of the static model of Chapter 
II, equation (2.7)
H.m (l-o)L «(l-G)K^6(l-o) _ _ sWK^ = 0 (5.5)t o  t: o t o
was differentiated with respect to the static equivalent 
of L^, The resulting form was solved for K^ and this 
value was substituted back in equation (5.5) to obtain 
the static equivalent of for conditions of equilibrium. 
Subscripts are added to equation (2.7) of Chapter II to 
obtain equation (5.5) above. The subscript, t, for H and 
L shows that these values may change over time. The sub­
script, o, shows that K and m remain constant until K is 
replaced or improved. With respect to the term m^, it 
should be noted that improving technology does cause
^This function may also be expressed in terms of 
the uniform annual equivalent.
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opportunity costs and has implications relative to replace­
ment decisions as developed in the last chapter.








If the demand function grows at rate, J, and 
revenue and variable costs are discounted at rate, s, then 
the discounted revenue minus discounted variable costs 
must equal the present value of the investment, which in 
this case is the initial investment. To achieve this 
equality, integration of the total net revenue product 
function from time zero to T is required. Equation (5.6) 
is now rearranged and simplified;
H
 1______  (l~g) B(l-o)
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permits investigation of capital requirements of the regu­
lated firm in response to changes in the growth rate, the 
planning period,and the rate of return.
Changes in Capital in Response 
to Çnanqes in the !Manning 
Period, the Growth Rate, and 
tKe Rate ot Return
In Chapter III the static model was investigated to 
show how requirements of capital and labor, resulting 
output, and price responded to changes in the variables 
of the model. Now changes in K, L, P,and Q may be defined 
in response to the new variables, planning period, t, and 
growth rate, J. Another variable, rate of return, s, is 
not new but its role is different for depreciating in­
vestment WK than for a constant WK. In analyzing and in­
terpreting the static model the terms s and W were treated 
as a unit (sW). This treatment,so logical for indestructible 
capital stock must, in a dynamic setting, be abandoned in 
favor of separate treatments of s and W. The separate 
treatment is required because while return, s, may remain 
constant, investment WK is decreasing in accord with some 
depreciation schedule which is presumably determined by the 
rate of destructibility of capital stock.
In this section the emphasis is on capital require­
ments. Accordingly, changes in capital only are investi­
gated in response to changes in J, t, and s.
Capital, K, of equations (5.10) may be
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differentiated partially with respect to planning period, 
t, growth rate, J, and rate of return, s.
Changes in Capital in Response 
to Changes in the Planning 
Period
The planning period, t, here is assumed to be de­
termined by the durability of the capital stock of the 
regulated firm. Changes in capital,K,in response to changes 
in the planning period, t, may be determined by differen­
tiating equation (5.10) with respect to, t.
The term
1-tt(l-o) (l-o)
H 1-(a+3)(l-o) 1-(a+6)(l-o)o ™o_______
1 —a ( i-(j)






i - ( a + 6 ) (i-o)
of equation (5.10) may be treated as a constant, C, so that
K = C 1-0 (l-o) ® -̂1
1-0(1-0) -s
^_l^oj(l—o2_̂ _̂  
1 - ( o+p) (l-o)
(5.11)
Differentiating capital, K, with respect to the 
planning period, t.
185
3Ka t 1—a (1—0)1 - (o+3) (i-o)
1—a (1—0 )-s t-1








l-(a+B) (l-o) f J   t
ejl-a (l-o) /
(5.12)
No maximum exists, i.e.,
0 * - ^ .
Clearly, constant C is not zero and e (l-a (l-o) ) is not
zero. The bracketed quantity in (5.12) may be equal to
zero; but only if t or ]_'-'J^r-o) equal to zero. The
situation where t=0 is uninteresting. The term , ■‘î,., . . -g1-0 (i-o;
may possibly equal zero; but in that case, the solution for
3K^  is indeterminate.
The term is positive for both regulated and un­
regulated firms. Cost is decreased for the unregulated
firm as capital becomes durable. The same is true for the 
regulated firm but here the effect of capital of greater 
durability influences the capital decision by way of the
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demand function.
Capital is shown graphically as a function of the 
planning period in Figs. 5.1 and 5.2 for a wide range of 
conditions. Equation (5.12) and Figs. 5.1 and 5.2 show that 
as capital proves more durable it is used more. The im­
portant point to be made here is that,while the unregu­
lated firm uses greater durability of capital to minimize 
costs, the regulated firm sees greater durability of capital 
as a means of making the firm still more capital intensive—  
by way of its demand function.
Changes in Capital in Response 
to Changes in the Growth Rate
Equation (5.11) permits the changes in capital re­









L  ~]l, 4, ^ (l-a (1 - 0 ) t-a (1-0) 7  1  . \^l-a(i-o) “j \i-a (l-o) j r  ^ ) l r - 5 n - ô ) J
i^-a ( l-o)
(5.13)
Table 5.2 shows the effect of a change in the 
growth rate on capital requirements. Pigs. 5.2 through 
5.5 also show graphically this effect for a wide range of
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  d3Jconditions. The sign of 1Ü is unambiguously positive even
when
® " i-'zrn-oT •
The effect of a change in the growth rate is ob­
viously affected by price-quantity elasticity, a, by a, and 
by t. The most important of these is o. A very slight 
negative change in o that occurs simultaneously with a 
positive change in the growth rate can cause a very large 
change in capital, K.
Capital requirements as a function of the growth 
rate, J, is shown graphically for a range of specific con­
ditions of a and t, in Pig. 5.4,
Changes in Capital and Changes 
in the Rata of Return
In the static model, rate of return, s, was always 
associated, and investigated with, the price of capital,
W. For deteriorating capital the rate of return must be 
treated apart from W for the simple reason that the return 






1 -0 ( l-o) -s
3(l-o)
1 - (o+3) (l-o)
{l-o (l-o)
, (5.14)
The sign of |2i in a dynamic setting is unambigu­
ously negative just as it is for static conditions. The 
precise impact of a change in the rate of return, s, like 
a change in growth rate, J, is affected by other variables, 
the most important of which is again price-quantity 
elasticity.
Solutions for Labor, L; Output,
Q, and Price, P, t̂ i Provide for 
Growth and Capital Deterioration
The equilibrium solution for variable input, L, 
which provides for growth and capital deterioration is ob­
tained by the same procedure adopted for the static model 
of Chapter II. The solution for fixed input K in equation 





to obtain a solution for L that provides for growth and 
capital deterioration;
L =




1— (a+3) ( 1-0)
1-0
H1 - (a+3)(l-o)^ 1 - (a+3)(l-o)
W
1-3(l-o) ~ 
1- (a+3) (l-o) -s
1- 3(1-0)
1- (a+3) (l-o)
1 - a (l-o)
(5.15)
Output, Q^, is again obtained by substituting for 
L and K in the production function
— ihL^Kq ,
Thus,
1-a (l-o) ( 1 - 0 ) ' 3(1-0) !-(*+%) ( l - o )
w1- (a+3) (i-o) ^1- (a+3) (l-o)
q+3_____________ 1





Price, P, is also again obtained by substituting in 
the demand function
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t -no — $ a
^1“ (a+B) (l-a) ^1- (o + b ) (1-a)
1- (g+g)  -0______





Capital Requirements in Relation 
to the planning Period, the Growth 
Rate. Returns to Scale, and Prlce- 
Quantlty Ëlasticity; An Example
In a dynamic setting, the planning period becomes 
a significant parameter in the problem of determining the 
optimal size of plant. Pig. 5.1 shows that even in the no­
growth case, the planning period is a parameter. The plan­
ning period remains a parameter regardless of returns to 
scale. In Chenery's investigation, the planning period was 
a parameter only in the case of increasing returns to 
scale.® The planning period is a parameter for the regu­
lated firm, regardless of returns to scale, for the simple 
reason that the more durable is the capital stock,the less 
is the resultant depreciation charge. Greater durability
®Hollis B. Chenery, "Overcapacity and the Accelera­
tion Principle," Econoroetrlca, Vol. XV, No. 1, 1-24.
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of plant and equipment decreases the cost of the product. 
Here again, the demand function indicates more output which, 
in turn, requires more capital. Pig. 5.1 shows that capital 
requirements, however, are by no means independent of re­
turns to scale. The growth rate too is shown to be a sig­
nificant parameter. The interdependence of these and other 
variables is developed more fully in Pigs. 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 
and 5.5,





1- (g+3) (1-a) 1-0
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1- (o + b ) (l-o)
Table 5,1 (a) is a tabular solution for the no-growth 
case for planning periods of 10, 20, and 30 years, and for 
a range of returns to scale. Table 5.1(b) is a tabular 
solution for the same problem except that here the growth 
rate is 7 per cent per year. In Pig. 5,1, the optimal size 
of plant is a function of the planning period. In Fig, 5.1, 
the wage rate, w, is 4
the price of a unit of capital, W, is 100
rate of return, s, is ,065
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price-quantity elasticity, o, is .5
initial price-quantity coefficient. H, is 10 
production function coefficient, m, is 100 
the rate of growth, J, is both .00 and .07 
a, 3 range from 1/4 and 1/4, to 3/4 and 3/4,
Fig. 5.1 shows graphically the effect of various
7returns to scale on the optimum size of plant for condi­
tions of no growth and 7 per cent continuous growth. 
Price-quantity elasticity, a, is held constant at 0.5.
In Pig, 5.1, longer planning periods reduce depreciation 
costs to permit a lower price for output. Each line of 
Pig. 5.1 measures the constraint imposed by the demand 
function upon the propensity toward capital intensity in 
the production process.
For the no growth case and for constant returns to 
scale, the optimal size plant for a planning period of 30 
years is 2.4 times that for 10 years. For decreasing returns 
to scale, e.g., (a+3)»l/2, the ratio of optimal scale of 
plant for 30 years to that for 10 years is 2.1; however, 
for increasing returns (a+B =1.5), the corresponding ratio 
is 4.3. These calculations have some rough parallel to 
Chenery's findings that overcapacity will attend increasing
^Here,as earlier in this study, the measure of 
returns to scale is the sum of the elasticity of output 
to labor and elasticity of output to capital, or o plus B. 
Constant returns to scale is defined as the conditions of 
the production process that equates (a+B) to one. For de­
creasing returns to scale l>(a+B); for increasing returns 
to scale, (a+B)>l.
193
Table 5.1(a).— Optimal size of plant for three planning 
periods for various returns to scale (growth, J = 0;
price-elasticity, a = .5)
Optimal Scale of Plant
10 years 20 years 30 years
a a 1/4, 6 1/4 10.4 17.2 22.1
a a 1/2, 6 S 1/2 33.3 60.4 77.8
ct a 1/2, e ss 3/4 99.6 231.0 324.0
a a 3/4, 6 a 1/2 114.0 240.0 303.0
a a 3/4, 6 = 3/4 1,262,0 3,610.0 5,420.0
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Table 5.1(b).— Optimal size of plant for various returns 
to scale (growth rate = .07; price-elasticity = .5)
g = 1/ 4 , B = 1/4
K =
J - . 0 7 , s=.065.
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fig* 5*1*— XUustration of optimal planning period reanltlng in optimal size of plant.
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returns to scale in the unregulated firm. The difference 
in the two cases is important. In Chenery's case, over­
capacity for increasing returns to scale was an instrument 
for cost reduction. Here, in the regulated case, increasing 
returns to scale cheapened the cost of output to permit 
use of more plant upon which a return, s, can be earned.
The constraint again is the demand function.
For growth rate J=.07, optimal sizes of plant for 
a range of returns to scale are shown in Pig. 5.1. In 
each case, plant was presumed constructed for the entire 
planning period. The margin between the no growth lines 
and the 7 per cent growth lines for each condition of re­
turns to scale affords certain meaningful comparisons. The 
margin between optimal size of plant for 7 per cent and no 
growth for 30 years for increasing returns (o+0»3/4) is some 
250 times that for constant returns.
In Chapter III, the changes in capital in response 
to changes in a and g were investigated. Equations (3.32) 
and (3.33) show clearly that is substantially different 
from But Chenery makes capital requirements a function
of the "scale" coefficient (o+g) for his cost-minimizing 
case without regard to the composition of the sum. Clearly, 
the regulated firm does not equate K, and K 2
" <j>(«i, g]_)
where ■ 1/4, and g^ ■ 3/4
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^2 ~ ^ (^2» 2̂)
where «g ~ 1/2, and 6 = 1/2,
But neither does the unregulated firm equate 
Kg 0 Chenery merely treated the sum (a+B) as though the 
composition of the sum were fixed„ Later, changes in 
capital in response to changes in the composition of this 
sum are compared graphically in Pigc 5,5 for the regulated 
and unregulated firmso
Chenery used the term "flexible capacity" to cover 
situations where plant is added incrementally as demand for 
output grows» In his example, a gas pipeline was built 
with capacity years ahead of requirements, and compressor 
capacity was installed incrementally as demand for output 
grew. The electric utility has parallels, for example, in 
additions to generating capacity once high-voltage main 
transmission and distribution lines are constructed. Such 
flexible capacity is generally added in relatively large 
discrete units. If a minimum size of capital addition can 
be defined, and if the size of the irreducible starting 
plant can also be defined, the optimum scale of plant can 
be recalculated. Flexible capacity would increase the 
optimum scale of plant for a planning period for the
Tabla S.2,— Optimal size of plant for a range of planning periods, growth rates, and price-quantity elasticities
1/2, =  1/2
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t = 10: 1,142 t = 10: t = 10:
t = 20: 3,560 t = 20: t = 20:
t » 30: 9,920 t = 30: t = 30:
3 = .UT
t = 10: 2,322 t = 10: t = 10:
t = 20: 18,650 t = 20: t = 20:
t = 30: 49,300 t = 30: t = 30:
J =* .u; J = .07 J = .07
= 10% t = 10; 3,900 t = 10: 3.75 t = 10: 1.06
= 20% t = 20: 31,040 t = 20: 9.60 t « 20: 2.16
— 30; t » 30: 128,000 t = 30: 22.27 t = 30: 2.96
TTU
t * 10 
t a 20 
t a 30
The numerical values for parameters J, t, a, a, and B are as shown in the 
table; the values for the internal variables are the same as used in previous 
examples in the text, namely, H»10, m=100, w«*4, W=100, s=.065. These are substituted 
in the equation for the following general solution for K, in order to produce the 
examples of K values in the table:
1-0(1-a)
( J \. i.-(a+B) (l-o) 1 1- 0ĝ r-all-o) *V_1 jjl-o(l-o)-B (1-0 ) 1̂-0(i-o)-B(l-o) 1-0(1-a)i7 0(1—0) 1—0(1—0) -a(i-o)1-0(1-a) * yi-o(i-o)-6tl-o) (i-o) -B (i-o)
l*»q (1-0 )__
1-a li-a)-5 (1—0)
For 0 » 1/4, a » 3/4, and B * 3/4 no solution exists.
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compelling reason that the cost of excess capacity is re­
duced,,® > ^
In Fig. 5.1, price-quantity elasticity, a, is held 
constant. Fig. 5.2 again shows the optimum scale of plant 
as a function of the planning period, but this time price- 
elasticity, a, is a variable. Here the rate of growth of 
demand is held constant at J=.07.
The optimum scale of plant for price-quantity 
elasticity, o=l, is the same for all combinations of o and 
8. These identities result when it is assumed that a=l in 






yl-(a+B) ( 1 - a ) ( a + S )
(l-o) 1- (l-o)











where o=l, for all values for g and S,
Hollis B. Chenery, "Process and Production Functions 
from Engineering Data" in Wassily W. Leontief (ed.) Studies 
in the Structure of the American Economy (Oxford; Oxford 
dnivefsity Press, l951).
9Hollis B, Chenery, "Engineering Production Func­
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For the example cited on page 192^ in Table 5d  and 
illustrated in Figc Sol^the optimum scale of plant is 2^96 
when the price-quantity elasticity is 1 (and when the 
planning period is 30 years, for constant returns to scale 
and for growth rate of «07). The optimal scale of plant 
increases exponentially as price-quantity elasticity de­
creases (or as the elasticity of demand increases). For 
t=30, and constant returns to scale (a, g=l/2), J=,07, 
the optimum scale of plant for o=3/4 is 17.2; for a=l/2, 
52.6; and for a=l/4, 25,650,000 (See Table 5.2). Further 
decreases in the price-quantity elasticity tends to make 
capital requirements infinitely great, or,
lim K = » ...
1— (o+g) (1— <j)"̂ 0 e (5.19)
This characteristic of the model has some re­
semblance to Gordon's growth stock paradox, which permits 
the price, P, of a share of stock to approach infinity as 
the growth rate approaches the discount factor in the 
valuation model^®
DP =
lim P = » 
g-»k
where P is the price of the stock 
D is the dividend paid
Myron H. Gordon, The Investment. Financing and 
Valuation of the Corporation (Homewood, fll.: Irwin, 1^62),
dhap. 4,
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k is the discount rate
g is the growth rate .
As pointed out in Chapter III, this characteristic 
of the model is present in a static setting; but since, in 
a dynamic problem, the elasticity term is even more inter­
related with the,growth rate and the planning period than 
other variables of the model, changes in capital require­
ments are made even more responsive to changes in elasticity 
in the dynamic setting than in the static.
Table 5.2 shows that capital requirements increase 
much more slowly as the elasticity of demand increases 
(or as price-quantity elasticity decreases) for the no­
growth assumption than for a 7 per cent rate of growth.
Fig. 5,3 shows that capital requirements increase much 
faster for increasing returns as elasticity of demand in­
creases than for constant returns to scale. To a much 
lesser extent, the planning period also affects the rate of 
response of capital requirements to changes in elasticity 
of demand. Fig. 5.4 shows the optimum scale of plant as a 
function of the rate of growth for constant returns to 
scale. The planning period and price-quantity elasticity 
are also parameters in Fig. 5.4. In effect, Fig. 5.4 merely 
measures how capital requirements respond to a decreasing 
price of the product because of lesser depreciation 
charges than attend longer planning periods.
years
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Comparisons of Capital Require-e- 
xs o£ the Regulated ana dn-ment
regulated P*irm ünder Dynamic
Conditions
In Chapter II, the difference between capital re­
quirements for the regulated and unregulated firm were de­
veloped for the firm in a static setting, i^e», no growth 
and no capital deterioration, A corresponding difference 
between capital requirements in the two cases also applies 
in a dynamic setting. The difference between the two re­
quirements may be demonstrated as in the static case by 
imposing identical conditions of output, cost of capital, 
rate of return, wage rate, and price of capital. Addi­
tionally, identical conditions of growth in demand and of 
planning period may be imposed.
Table 5,2 illustrates a solution for capital units, 
for the regulated firm. Here K is 526 units for a specific 
numerical example.
Where: planning period, t = 30 years
production coefficient, m = 100 
demand coefficient, H » 10
rate of growth of demand, J = ,07 
rate of return, s = ,065
wage rate, w = 4
price of a unit of capital, W ■ 100 
production exponents, a and 6 = ,5 
price elasticity, o = ,5
cost of capital, r = ,05
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To obtain output, Q^, for the above conditions, 
the required solution for variable input, L^, was de­
veloped initially in Chapter II and adapted to dynamic 







Ht - Hq Oit
substituting for the internal variables of (5.20a) yields
4/3
Lt -
lOQl/2 ^ (lo g2.ljl/4 ^ 526^/4
= 126
(5.20b)
= m^Lt Kg - 100 X 126 ' x 526 = 28,000.
Similarly, variable inputs, L^, and output, Qq , for time zero 
is determined to be 62.5 and 19,700 units, respectively. The 
growth rates for the 30-year period then, for variable in­
puts and output are .0673 and .008, respectively. If J' is 
the rate of growth of output
Qt = Qoe^'t (5.21)
To obtain the neoclassical minimum cost capital re­







Since =o \m K e/a
Jt 
® “ • (5.23)
The classical cost function 
C = wL + rWK
may be restated in terms of present value for the no growth 
case
o
and where growth is present
wL
C = j ^  + W K .





art + WK , (5.24)
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Integrating to obtain the present value of all 
costs of output (growing at rate J) produced by a plant that 







To obtain the neoclassical minimum-cost capital re­
quirements, where growth and capital deterioration are 
present, the marginal productivity conditions are equated 





do o 6-1= gmL K = W, (5,27)







For the case where investment is all made at the 
start of the planning period, substitution in (5,28) yields
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11the capital requirements for output growing at rate,
For the values cited on page 205, and where the 
growth rate of output is .008, the capital requirements of 
a cost-minimizing firm may be determined:
K = 28,000
( -  .os) 30 ^
5 X 4 e'* -1
Ts X lOO^I^ElT ,05) _
,04 (18.82)]l/2 X 280
= 243 (5.29)
The optimal capital requirements for this firm under regu­
lation is 526. See Table 5.2.
As in the static case, no general statement may be 
made as to how much more capital intensive is the regu­
lated than the unregulated firm until the production, demand, 
and profit functions are specified.
Fig. 5.5 shows graphically the minimum-cost solu­
tions to the example cited at the beginning of this 
section. Fig. 5.5 shows the optimal size of plant for 
the cost-minimizing firm in relation to the optimal size 
of plant for the regulated firm for a range of t, J, a, 8,
^^Note that the rate of growth of variable inputs,
L, is greater than the growth of output, which means that 
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Fig, 5.5.— ^Comparisons of sizes of plant for the regulated and the unregulated 
firm for various conditions of growth, elasticity, and returns to 
scale.
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and a. All minimum-cost solutions shown in Fig. 5.5 lie 
appreciably to the left of the optimum solutions for the 
regulated firm.
Capital Requirements for the 
Regulated Firm that Produces 
Output sinusoidally
To this point, all output has been assumed to be 
smooth and continuous. Patterns of fluctuation, if not 
pure periodicity, occur in output of most real-world pro­
duction processes. If output is not storable, time series 
fluctuations in output are unavoidable. These fluctuations 
may involve normal seasonality as well as monthly, weekly, 
daily, and even hourly peaks and lows. Except for gas 
utilities, output of public utilities is for the most part 
not storable. Even in the gas-utility industry, the in­
vestment required for storage facilities is so enormous 
that no attempt is made to eliminate seasonality of the 
pattern of output from the pipeline; rather the firm seeks 
some optimal amplitude in the fluctuations in output. To a 
much lesser extent, the electrie-utility industry stores 
output by pumping water to uphill reservoirs during periods 
of slack demand^for release to produce electricity during 
peak periods. The familiar "heat pump" is another, but 
relatively unimportant, example of indirectly stored 
electric-utility output.
If any contention of relative completeness is to be 
made for a theoretical model of the regulated firm, the
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model must in some way encompass fluctuating output. So 
that these fluctuations in output may be accommodated by 
the model, reliance will be placed by the present writer 
on the sinusoidal pattern of fluctuation; that is, the 
pattern described by a sine wave (i.e., constant frequency 
with equal, constant positive and negative amplitude) is 
used to represent unavoidable fluctuations in output 
characteristic of an operating regulated firm. Although 
only a simple sinusoidal pattern is employed here, it is 
possible to simulate complicated recurring patterns by the 
use of a complex function which, in effect, is achieved by 
adding sine waves of different frequencies and amplitudes.
Obviously, problems arise out of the necessity that 
peak capacity be constructed to provide peak output—  
regardless of the considerable amount of time that peak 
capacity is not used, A low load factor makes no dis­
tinction between, say, 10 per cent use for a day and 10 per
cent use for a 3-month season.
It would also be possible to subject the sinusoidal 
pattern to additional random fluctuations (characterized by 
known or subjectively established probability distributions) 
Interesting as this problem is in planning operations, it
is a refinement not covered in this study.
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19 1q 14Chenery, Goodwin, and Smith have discussed the 
problem of capital requirements for sinusoidal, rather 
than smooth continuous^output. All three discussed the 
problem from the neoclassical minimum-cost view. Only 
Goodwin discussed the problem in a setting of growth. 
Classically, this problem is and has been integrated into 
conventional minimum-cost inventory theory in those cases 
where inputs and outputs are storable. For storable out­
puts of the regulated firm, the problem becomes a bit 
muddled by the ability of the utility to earn^not only on 
the capital required for storage facilities, but also on 
the value of the stored output itself. Conventional inven- , 
tory theory is also deficient for the regulated firm in 
another way. Gas storage projects, and to a much lesser 
extent projects for the indirect storage of electric- 
utility output, have production functions of their own and 
therefore do not readily lend themselves to treatment in 
accord with the large body of current inventory theory.
Smith covers the case of no growth and constant re­
turns to scale, providing a minimum-cost solution for
^^Hollis B. Chenery, "Overcapacity and the Accelera­
tion Principle," Econometrica, Vol. XX, No. 1, 1-28.
13 Richard M, Goodwin, "Secular and Cyclical Aspects 
of the Multiplier and Accelerator" in Income, Employment, 
and Public Policy, Essays in Honor of Alvin M. Hansen (îiew 
York; W. W. Norton & Co., 1948), 120.
^^Vernon L. Smith, Investment and Production (Cam­
bridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, l^él), 205-290.
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fixed and variable inputs for a given o u t p u t . H e  con­
cluded that more inputs are required for sinusoidal output 
than for an equivalent constant output. The amount of 
output has not been rigidly specified throughout this 
investigation up to this point; rather, a demand and a 
production function have been specified and equilibrium 
inputs, outputs, and price determined by the constraints. 
The equilibrium output so determined has heretofore been 
a continuous, non-fluctuating output. To the extent, then, 
that sinusoidal output is inherently inefficiently pro­
duced, it must cost more and accordingly must decrease 
from levels represented by constant output. Again, the 
constraint is the demand function.
If the demand function behaves in some sinusoidal 
pattern and price is held constant over the sine wave, 
then, perforce, the only degree of freedom is output. So 
if the amplitude of the demand function is y and if
Hf = Hq (1 + Y sinet) (5,30)
where is the coefficient of demand at time t
H is the coefficient of demand at time o o
Y is the amplitude of demand
9 is the relative position in the sine wave at 







^  (l+ysinet) I/o (5.31)
Thus at and ,
d+y') = (l+y)^/° 
where y '  is the amplitude of output.
(5.32)
Since price, P, is constant over the period &1, sinu*
6
soldai output, may now be defined
Qt = Qq (1+y'sinet) 
















rnKg (1+y'sinet) l/“dt (5.36)
I ■
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Here L* represents the sum of all variable inputs








where represents the mean of variable inputs
for the planning period. The familiar zero excess profit 
function
PQ - wL - sWK = 0 
may be restated to accommodate the demand function 
(equation 2.2 9)
Substituting for from (5.37),
2irn a (1-a)
I ( 1 + Y ' s i n 0 t ) ^ ^ “ d t
Jo
- wL - sWK = 0.
(5.38)
Differentiating with respect to L*,
a (1— a)Hm^ ^ (l - o ) -1 ^ 0(1-0)
2irn
/ (1+Y'sin0t) ̂ A d t
Jo
a (1-ff)
= w . (5.39)
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Solving for L* 
g ( 1 - g )L* = r 2-rn 
0I (1+Y"sin0t) g (1-0) w
1 B (1-0)
1—g (1-0) 1-g(1-0) 
K
(5.40)
After substituting for L* from equation (5.37) ,  
equation (5,37) may be used to define the short-run path 
of inputs for the mean output of the regulated firm that 
produces output sinusoidally.
Substituting for L* from equation (5,40) into 
equation (5.39) permits solving for capital, K:
Hml-Of'3 ( 1—o)
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Since | (l+sin0) ^®dt > 1
and since a (l-o) and ^^e positive,
then the denominator of the bracketed quantity in equation 
(5,39) must be less than one. This means that less capital 
is used for sinusoidal output than for smooth continuous 
output of the firm with specified demand and production 
functions.
Similarly in equation (5.41) L* is less for 
sinusoidal output than for smooth continuous output because 
again
2irn
^  (1+Y'sin0t)^/“dt > 1.
Thus, less labor as well as less capital is used for
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sinusoidal output.
The relative inefficiency of sinusoidal output 
makes the inputs more expensive in terras of output. Ac­
cordingly, less of each is u s e d . S i n c e  both L and K are 
decreased relative to requirements for smooth output, out­
put is less and price is higher. As in the solution for 
the static model, output is obtained by substitution for
L+. and K infc o
“ .3Q-t - o
If the mean rate of output is desired, mean input, 
Lq , must be substituted to obtain Q^. However, L* may be 
substituted to obtain cumulative output, Q*:







Smith has a solution for inputs for sinusoidal 
output in the neoclassical minimum-cost tradition. Smith 
maintained a constant level of output in his problem. Ac­
cordingly, his solution required more inputs for a given 
output. Again, he did not impose a demand function &s a 
constraint. See Vernon L. Smith, Investment and Production 




B ( 1 - a ) 1 - 6 (1-a)
L* = [ l - o ( l - a ) ] ^
•(o+B) (1-ff) [a (l-o) ] i- (»+6) (1-ff)
B (1-ff)
1— ff 1
jjjl-(o +B) (1-ff ) jjl-(o+B) (1-ff)
1-B(1-ff) ■ 2irn O(1-ff)
1- (o+B) (1-ff)w f (l+Y'sinet)^/“ dt 
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27rn - , ,
L* = Lq r 9 (l+Y'sin9t)-‘-'“dt. 
Jo
(5.45)
0 = 1 / 2 , and planning period T = ~ ü  




L* = Lo Jil (2+y '̂ )
L*
“o (2+9'^
The expression |Ü(2+y '̂ ) evolves from integration of
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(l+Y'sinet) dt = (l+2Y'sin6t+Y^sin^0t)dt
2 Trn
■n l+2Y'sin0t+^ (l-cos20t) dt






When I/o is equal to some value other than 2 ,  say, 3/2, 
(which means the elasticity of output to labor is 2/3), the 
problem becomes an exercise in Maclaurin's series where 
f(t) is stated in terms of a power series in (t);
f(t) = (1+Y'sin0t) 
f'(t) = 3/2(1+Y'sin0t)^^^v'Scoset 
f"(t) = 3/4(l+Y'sin9t)”^/^(Y'6cos0t)^+3/2(l+Y'sin9t)^^^
(-Y'0^sin0t)
f "  (t) » -3/8(l+Y'sin0t)’^/^(Y'0cos0t) . . . .
where f(t) = f (o) ttf " (o)+1r.g| ' . . . . t^f"(o)
f(o) - 1, f'(o) . ^ : l }  f-(o) - f'"( o)
3.3-3/8v' A f” (0) = - ...1. I m. I. ,
2"
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to obtain mean equilibrium output, Q^, to permit substitu­
tion in the demand function
P = HQq "'" (5.47)
to obtain equilibrium price, P, for sinusoidal output.
The solution to the problem of sinusoidal output 
is illustrated in Fig. 5.6. Here mean equilibrium output 
Qq is shown as
Consider the firm that produces smooth continuous 
output, Q^. Now assume that the firm must produce 
sinusoidal output, the mean value of which is still Q^.
The firm now finds that its average level of variable in­
puts is now not Lq . This is due to the non-linear
transformation of input L into output (diminishing re­
turns) . The firm now finds that required average inputs 
Lave longer afford regulated pure profit (s-r)WK. The 
inefficiency of sinusoidal output causes the product to 
cost more. If the firm must supply sinusoidal output, it
yZirn
”5r 3Y,;et
i. ' L i i dt
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Fig. 5.6— The decrease in inputs for the regulated finn as a result of sinusoidal output
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adjusts to this situation by reducing mean output to a new 
and lower level, , and charging a higher price. Both 
inputs are decreased from the levels required for smooth, 
continuous output; but variable inputs are reduced rela­
tively more than fixed inputs. The required cyclic output 
makes the variable inputs relatively more expensive than 
for constant output. This may be seen more clearly if it 
is assumed that the firm must produce a mean sinusoidal 
output equal to constant output. To earn its pure profit 
(s-r)WK, the firm would have to substitute fixed inputs 
for variable until the allocation of inputs conformed to 
the new input path;
The simultaneous solution of (5.48) and
= mL®K^
which represents smooth continuous output, yields the 
solution for optimal allocation of inputs for the regulated 
firm that must produce a mean sinusoidal output equal to 
smooth continuous output This solution is shown
graphically at A in Fig. 5,6,
A general relation for mean variable inputs and 



















1-a (l-o) j^l-a (l-o)
Note that as amplitude, y , approaches zero^inputs 
L and K approach values that are optimal for constant 
output as determined in Chapter II.
As for the static model of Chapter II, and for the 
static model adjusted for dynamic conditions in the first 
part of this chapter, output, Q^, may be determined once 




Qt = Qq (1+Y'sin0t) 
Ht = (1+Y sin0t)
d+Y') = (1- y )
the time path of output may be determined. A solution may
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also be obtained for maximum and minimum output levels as 
well as for maximum and minimum variable inputs. Graphic 
solutions are shown in Fig. 5,6.
Price, P, may be obtained for either equilibrium 
mean sinusoidal output or for a mean sinusoidal output equal 





The model for sinusoidal output is thus complete. 
Using the same variables, except for added variables ampli­
tude, Y, and wave length, , the sinusoidal model abstracts 
from the static model of Chapter II.
The sinusoidal adaptation of the static model of 
the regulated firm shows that sinusoidal output serves to 
increase the capital-labor and capital-output ratios of the 
regulated firm. Given values for the internal variables, 
the model developed here precisely determines these ratios.
CHAPTER VI
POTENTIALITIES FOR FUTURE ELABORATION 
OF THE MODEL
This theoretical investigation has demonstrated 
that the regulated firm, as represented by a simple ideal­
ized model rationally makes its production process as 
capital intensive as the firm's constraints (the production 
function and the demand function) permit. Given specific 
production and demand functions, equilibrium solutions of 
the model measure precisely the amounts of capital and 
labor to be used as inputs by the regulated firm. The 
model also determines, equally precisely, the firm's output 
and the price to be charged for it,
The model has been adapted to determine the optimal 
service life of the regulated firm's plant and equipment. 
Again, the optimal solution reflects the regulated firm's 
propensity for use of capital.
The behavior of the regulated firm in relation to 
its capital decisions has been investigated.over a con­
siderable range of conditions including growth, price- 
quantity elasticity, technology, durability of capital
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Stock, and production characteristics. The capital decisions 
of the regulated firm have also been investigated in a 
setting of sinusoidal output. In all these conditions, the 
regulated firm was found to be more capital intensive in its 
production process than the unregulated firm.
Despite the wide range of conditions for which ra­
tional behavior of the regulated firm has been investigated, 
the model developed in this study to illustrate and explain 
this behavior is admittedly a simple one. The question 
arises, is the model too simple? Whether or not the regu­
lated firm actually acquits itself in accord with the simple 
model developed in this investigation would appear not to 
rest upon the simplicity or complexity of the model as de­
veloped, but rather upon a number of other factors; diffi­
culties in dealing with uncertainties, upon human behavior­
ism (which relates, more to the attitudes of the individual 
in, or near, management) in todays business environment, 
upon the complexity attending the large number of separate 
decisions involving heterogeneous capital additions to be 
made by the firm, and still others. This observation is not 
made to refute the argument that the model should be made 
more "realistically c o m p l e x . I f  the simple model of this 
investigation is tenable in its essentials, then indeed the 
model should be made more and more realistically complex.
1M.L. Greenhut, "On the Question of Realism and the 
Regulation of Public Utilities," Land Economics, Vol. XLIII, 
No. 3, pp. 260-267,
229
What can, and should, be done to make the model of 
this investigation more realistic? During the course of 
this investigation, several "areas" that are related to 
capital decisions of the regulated firm anpeared to the 
writer to merit new or further inquiry. Treatment of these 
areas would serve to make the model more realistic. Some 
of these areas suggested below may more properly be called 
sub-areas in that they may well relate to peripheral treat­
ment of issues that have already been investigated, to some 
degree, rather than new and separate problems.
Probably the first move to greater realism should 
be a general treatment, first, of heterogeneous inputs and, 
then, heterogeneous outputs. Initially these inputs, and 
outputs, could well apply to only one production function.
It would appear that the work of Samuelson and Henderson 
and Quandt^ relating to heterogeneous inputs may be adapted 
for application to the static model for the regulated firm.
Next to be considered is the problem of the multi­
production functions, first with homogeneous and then with 
heterogeneous inputs. The problem of heterogeneous capital 
inputs for the regulated firm opens up a broad spectrum of 
problems relating to the selection of particular capital
^Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1^47),
pp. 57-89.
^James M. Henderson and Richard E, Quandt, Micro- 
economic Theory; A Mathematical Approach (New York; McGraw- 
Hill Book Co., Inc., 1§^8), pp. 4y-S3,
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inputs 0 Selection of particular capital inputs and the 
timing thereof suggests the kind of capital budgeting prob­
lems that concerned Lorie and Savage,^ Weingartner,^ et al. 
Weingartner's solutions to problems relating to ranking of 
projects, mutual exclusiveness of projects, contingency of 
projects, interperiod analysis, and parametric programming 
were linear solutions. The nonlinear character of the pro­
duction and demand functions that serve as constraints 
suggests that new techniques or adaptions of existing 
techniques are needed in order to place less reliance on 
linear methods. Here project selection should be a fertile 
area for applications of much of the theory relating to 
nonlinear programming that has been developed in the past 
decade.
Probably the next move to greater realism would be 
to encompass the problem of uncertainty. This entire in­
vestigation has been an exercise in certainty. The cost 
of capital has been fixed in this study, but the suggestion 
has been made in Chapter III that the cost of capital be 
made a variable determined within the model itself. Indeed, 
the "Lambda" function of Chapter III appears ideally suited 
as a mathematical device to explore the effects of changes
^J.H. Lorie and L.J. Savage, "Three Problems in 
Rationing Capital," Journal of Business, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, 
pp. 229-239.
^H. Martin Weingartner, Mathematical Programming 
and the Analysis of Capital Budgeting Problems (Englewood 
■----------------  -n a 'al'I, ïnc.,"ÏW5T .----dlifi^s, N.J.; Prentice-
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in the cost of capital, r, or of changes in pure profit 
rate (s-r). Changes in both cost of capital and pure 
profit rate seem likely to be, in part, the products of un­
certainty. For example, as the pure profit rate rises in 
period I, the cost of capital in period II may be expected 
to decline, and vice versa. The rate of pure profit may 
be expected to determine the growth rate of the firm's 
assets. The growth rate of the firm, in turn, may be ex­
pected to determine largely the equity component of the 
cost of capital. This suggests that for a particular pure 
profit rate, there is an optimal debt-equity ratio. Ob­
viously the pure profit rate is not determined by chance, 
but the variance in pure profit and particularly the 
variance in the growth of pure profit has an important, 
perhaps decisive, effect on the cost of capital to the 
regulated firm. If, as seems plausible, the growth rate is 
some function of the pure-profit rate, then prospects for 
making cost of capital for period II a function of pure 
profit, debt-equity ratio, and growth rate in period I 
appear fruitful.
The problem of fluctuations in output deserves much 
further study. Research may well show that decreasing 
amplitude (in the sinusoidal pattern) of output of the 
electric-utility industry has had a large role in decreas­
ing the real price of output during the last two decades.
It appears certain to this writer that technology and
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returns to scale have received credit for cost reduction 
that really belongs, in part, to decreasing amplitude of 
the fluctuations in electric-utility output. If empirical 
studies confirm this hypothesis, then certainly the subject 
of peak-load pricing for output of the regulated firm de­
serves further study. The prospects of theoretically 
linking capital requirements and average price of output 
to peak-load pricing would appear to be rewarding. The cost 
of increasing amplitude of output of the natural-gas in­
dustry has been offset, in part, by the ability of this 
industry to store output. This circumstance, largely 
unique among regulated firms, suggests a model to determine 
optimal investment in— and output of— storage facilities 
of the regulated natural-gas firm. Such a model could be 
integrated with a model for optimal total investment, out­
put, and price for the regulated natural-gas firm.
The problem of replacement deserves to be integrated 
with the problem of fluctuating output. Aging plant may 
be relegated for standby or "peak" service rather than 
actually retired. If so, then there is probably some optimal 
age at which plant and equipment of the regulated firm is 
retired from continuous service and relegated to standby 
service. This suggests that, given a depreciation schedule, 
a time-salvage realization schedule, an output schedule, and 
a demand function, there is some optimal average age of 
plant for the regulated firm.
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To the writer, it appears that the subject of 
theory of regulation should properly start with a model, 
whether unrealistically simple or realistically complex, 
of the regulated firm. The writer believes the "Lambda" 
function of Chapter III may well be a start in at least 
one treatment of the pure theory of regulation. The 
Lambda function of Chapter III abstracts from certainty. 
Probably, this function or some other function that purports 
to be a central theme in the pure theory of regulation must 
encompass the greater part of the problems engendered in 
the real world by uncertainty.
Finally, the area of welfare economics resulting 
from rational capital decisions under regulation may be 
investigated. The entire rate-of-return system of compen­
sating the regulated firm would come under scrutiny. Suc- 
cessional treatment of the subject of welfare economics in 
relation to conventional regulation probably should 
start from a tenable model for the regulated firm. Indeed, 
a case— if one exists— against conventional methods of 
regulation of the public utility might well start with a 
"complete" model for the regulated firm.
The model of the regulated firm developed in this 
study— and the various adaptations described herein— is 
another step in the direction of understanding of both the 
regulated firm and the theoretical problems in regulation 
itself. While the study contains several original elements.
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it is of course firmly established upon the prior works 
of micro-theoristso It is hopefully suggested that it 
will provide a foundation for further work in the theory 
of the regulated firm,at least some of which may be along 
the lines suggested above^
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF SYMBOLS USED
The symbols used in this study are listed alpha­
betically below. For Greek symbols the order of listing 
conforms to the English equivalent to the symbol used.
a Y-intercept of linear demand curve
a Elasticity of output with respect to labor
b Slope of linear demand curve
S Elasticity of output with respect o capital
c Interim investment of Masse's investment func­
tion, Chapter IV
C Cost, of the cost function
C  Quasi cost of the quasi cost function of 
Chapter III
^d Present worth group-basis annuity depreciation
D(T) Variable cost of Masses chain replacement model. 
Chapter IV
S Rate of depreciation of salvage value
E Operating expense, in Smith's replacement model 
of Chapter IV
E Equity component of capitalization for function 
relating income taxes to investment.
Chapter I
Ç Rate of technological change
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Marginal productivity of labor 
Marginal productivity of capital
G(T) Discounted profit in Masse's replacement func­
tion, Chapter IV
7 Rate of depreciation of book value
Y Amplitude of sinusoidal output
h Uniform equivalent of all operating and capital 
costs in Smith'S replacement function,
Chapter IV
h' Uniform equivalent of all future expenses
starting with the first replacement in Smith's 
chain replacement model. Chapter IV
H The coefficient of the log-linear demand function
i Rate of interest on debt. Chapter I
I Investment
J Rate of growth
k Number of replacements, in Smith's replacement 
model, Chapter IV
K Units of capital
L Units of labor
L Service life in Smith's replacement function. 
Chapter IV
X The LaGrange multiplier— as a multiplier has
added meaning in the section on Lambda func­
tion of Chapter III
MRTS Marginal rate of technical substitution
M(t) Discounted cost of Masse's replacement chain
Chapter IV
m Coefficient of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function
m" Terborgh's adverse minimum. Chapter IV 
m Ratio of salvage value to initial investment
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y Ratio of salvage value to initial investment 
when book and salvage values are equal
n Integral number of wave lengths, Chapter V
n Year book value becomes zero, Chapter IV
n' Year salvage value becomes zero. Chapter IV




q Interim output in Masse's interim investment 
function
r Cost of capital, per cent
r '  Cost of capital, per cent, to cover real-world 
charges of income taxes, depreciation, in­
surance and property tax
R Revenue
R ‘ Quasi-revenue of Chapter III
s Rate of return
s' Rate of return to cover real-world charges of
income taxes, depreciation insurance and 
property taxes
a Price-quantity elasticity
T Time, generally signifying a particular date
t Time, generally used more for a period
t^ Income tax rate
T Optimal replacement time, of Masse's replace­
ment chain
W  Time of interim investment in Masse's interim 
investment relation. Chapter IV
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9 Angle subtended by the arc of the circumference
equal in length to the radius. Chapter V
u Utilization rate, Smith's replacement model, 
Chapter IV
Present worth factor for age x for retirement 
dispersion related to depreciation annuity. 
Chapter I
$ Ratio of salvage value to initial investment at 
time zero
w Wage rate
W Price of a unit of capital
X Age of plant in years, retirement dispersion.
Chapter I
y^ Mean survivors in year x, retirement dispersion, 
Chapter I
z Late operating costs increase each year, replace­
ment model for the regulated firm, Chapter IV
